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ABSTRACT  
   
Anthropogenic land use has irrevocably transformed the natural systems on 
which humankind relies. Understanding where, why, and how social and economic 
processes drive globally-important land-use changes, from deforestation to urbanization, 
has advanced substantially. Illicit and clandestine activities--behavior that is 
intentionally secret because it breaks formal laws or violates informal norms--are poorly 
understood, however, despite the recognition of their significant role in land change. 
This dissertation fills this lacuna by studying illicit and clandestine activity and 
quantifying its influence on land-use patterns through examining informal urbanization 
in Mexico City and deforestation Central America. The first chapter introduces the topic, 
presenting a framework to examine illicit transactions in land systems. The second 
chapter uses data from interviews with actors involved with land development in Mexico 
City, demonstrating how economic and political payoffs explain the persistence of four 
types of informal urban expansion. The third chapter examines how electoral politics 
influence informal urban expansion and land titling in Mexico City using panel 
regression. Results show land title distribution increases just before elections, and more 
titles are extended to loyal voters of the dominant party in power. Urban expansion 
increases with electoral competition in local elections for borough chiefs and legislators. 
The fourth chapter tests and confirms the hypothesis that narcotrafficking has a causal 
effect on forest loss in Central America from 2001-2016 using two proxies of 
narcoactivity: drug seizures and events from media reports. The fifth chapter explores 
the spatial signature and pattern of informal urban development. It uses a typology of 
urban informality identified in chapter two to hypothesize and demonstrate distinct 
urban expansion patterns from satellite imagery. The sixth and final chapter summarizes 
the role of illicit and clandestine activity in shaping deforestation and urban expansion 
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through illegal economies, electoral politics, and other informal transactions. Measures 
of illicit and clandestine activity should--and could--be incorporated into land change 
models to account for a wider range of relevant causes. This dissertation shines a new 
light on the previously hidden processes behind ever-easier to detect land-use patterns 
as earth observing satellites increase spatial and temporal resolution.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The paucity of formal study of illicit activities in land system science 
Land, the terrestrial component of the biosphere, is a part of nearly every 
biophysical process that sustains life. It is now widely recognized that anthropogenic 
land uses have transformed the structure and function of carbon, water, nitrogen, and 
phosphorus cycles at an unprecedented rate (Falkowski et al., 2000; Vitousek et al., 
1997), assisting in the conditions that give rise to the Anthropocene (Crutzen, 2002). 
These changes influence the dynamics of species distributions, water availability, 
temperature, net primary production, ocean chemistry, fish stocks, and a host of other 
components of the biosphere essential to human well-being (Steffen et al., 2015). 
Understanding where, why, and how land-use changes occur is essential to address 
global sustainability.  
Land systems science (LSS) is an interdisciplinary research field dedicated to 
understanding these land-use changes (Turner II et al., 2007; Verburg et al., 2015). 
Linking earth observations via remote sensing to social-environmental system 
assessments has led to significant advances in causally linking land changes to their 
generating processes (Chowdhury and Turner II, 2019; Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; 
Verburg et al., 2015). Special attention has been given to the processes of land-use 
change, examining the human dynamics in question (Lambin et al., 2001; Liverman et 
al., 1998; Rindfuss et al., 2004). Despite this progress, a significant blind spot remains in 
the assessments of land change causes (or drivers) and consequences, those following 
from illicit activities involving land transactions. 
Illicit activities are those not allowed or permitted by formal or informal rules of 
governance (i.e., institutions) and occurring across a spectrum of formal to informal 
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institutional settings. Illicit transactions (exchanges) may be given other normative 
labels including illegal, corrupt, criminal, illegitimate or fraudulent. Illicit transactions 
are often clandestine activities, invariably hidden from prevailing institutions, because 
the actors involved wish to avoid detection and the potential for sanction or shame. The 
label “illicit” is also normative, because it identifies a transaction in the eye of the 
beholder (or researcher) as violating a social norm or formal law. Some behaviors that 
are non-public in character but are common, such as small bribe from a citizen to a 
government official to expedite paperwork, may not be considered illicit in a society 
normalizing such behavior. Some illegal activity may also be licit if authorities commonly 
permit it. For example, the Dutch term gedeogen refers to toleration of offenses, such as 
the government permitting the use of small amounts of cannabis. The category of illicit is 
fluid and subjective, making it difficult to provide a typology with clear boundaries of 
what is licit versus illicit. Furthermore, categorizing illicit versus licit transactions may 
obfuscate from the functional role clandestine behavior plays in land systems. The intent 
of this dissertation is to examine the mechanism of clandestine exchange, most of which 
is illicit, and unpack its influence on land systems. 
  Numerous observations indicate that illicit transactions influence land changes 
worldwide, and in some cases, may be more prevalent than licit transactions.  For 
example, 40% of deforestation globally is estimated to be illegal (e.g., Forest Watch 
Indonesia et al., 2002; Ravenel et al., 2005), a figure reaching 80% in Indonesia and 
Brazil (Lawson et al., 2014). Local politicians with agency over land use permits may 
abuse this power to grant land access to their supporters to maintain political power. In 
election years, deforestation increases dramatically (by over 40%) in Indonesia (Burgess 
et al., 2012), and by 8-10% in the Brazilian Amazon when an incumbent runs for mayor 
(Pailler, 2018). Other examples include urbanization and infrastructure development via 
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kickbacks (Baskaran et al., 2015; Weinstein, 2008), revenue generation through 
agriculture by terrorist groups (Jaafar and Woertz, 2016), narco-deforestation in Central 
America (Mcsweeney et al., 2014) , illegal charcoal production and deforestation 
(Cavanagh et al., 2015), and informal urban settlement (Aguilar, 2008).1    
In these and other examples, illicit activities are typically unrecorded (i.e., 
missing in official state or municipal records), even if their land use is openly observable 
and known, (e.g., much informal urbanization in the Global South) and may result in 
land changes that would not likely take place otherwise (e.g., narco-deforestation 
[below]).  For these reasons, illicit activities have, for the most part, been absent in 
theories and models of land systems and their change (Meyfroidt et al., 2018), despite 
the recognition of the prominent role that they maintain on land uses and systems.  
Examining these activities is difficult in part because knowledge about their 
operation are rarely available (i.e., officially undocumented) nor linked to pixel data, 
hindering the corroboration of illicit transactions and land-use change, especially 
through the analytics marking LSS research. Given this impediment, do approaches exist 
that would enable us to make inferences about the location, extent, pattern, and 
consequences of illicit activities? We suggest that they do. In the following section, we 
insert illicit activities within a conceptual framework of land-use transactions, and 
provide two “pixel-based” approaches that can be used synergistically to identify land 
uses associated with illicit activities.  We also identify new or unused data and analytical 
methods that facilitate the operation of the approaches. 
                                                        
1 In addition, much land change globally involves clandestine transactions, regardless of their illicit or licit 
nature. For example, an estimated 42 to 100 million ha of land in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia have been purchased or leased to private companies since 2000, a rate of acquisition 20 times above 
historical averages  (Wolford et al., 2013), leading to concerns about “land grabs” (Ruilli et al., 2012), 
some of which involve questions about clandestine activities. Other examples includes the use of tax 
havens, many that offer secrecy of transactions, to invest in land resources such as the 68% or more of 
financial capital for the major soy and beef companies deforesting the Amazon (Galaz et al., 2018).  
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Inserting illicit activities into land system research 
Despite the importance of these processes worldwide (Peluso and Lund, 2011), it 
is difficult to demonstrate the causal role of illicit and clandestine activities in land 
changes. Both a paucity of data and research risks may preclude researchers from 
formally modeling this phenomenon. Failure to account for these kinds of drivers, 
however, may miss the identification of significant dynamics in land change. 
 LSS has yet to engage fully with the range and nuances of institutional contexts 
that shape illicit transactions that may result in unique landscape signatures. Their 
identification and operation will likely improve the understanding of land change and 
the accuracy of land system models. This improvement requires insights gained in 
political science and political economy about clientelism, corruption, and illicit 
economies. 
 This dissertation seeks to begin to fill this lacuna.  It examines two types of 
clandestine transactions in Latin America, one urban and one rural, which have 
corollaries in Latin America and throughout other parts of the world (DeFries et al., 
2010; Redo et al., 2012). The effects of clientelism, or exchanging votes for 
improvements in informal settlements to make them formal, has been and remains 
common in Mexico City. Informal settlements have resulted in the loss of substantial 
conservation land while providing shelter for an enlarging portion of the Basin’s 
population (Aguilar and Santos, 2011; de Alba and Hernández Gamboa, 2014; Hagene, 
2015). In contrast to Mexico City’s clandestine land operations, narco-related ranch and 
palm oil plantation expansion in Central America are illicit transactions, undertaken, in 
part, to launder drug monies. Illicit narco-trafficking in Central America has thus been 
identified as potentially precipitating deforestation (Mcsweeney et al., 2014).  
  5 
This dissertation aims to both understand the institutional conditions that 
promote clandestine activity and quantify the influence of these activities on land 
conversion at a landscape scale. It asks: 
1. Can illicit and clandestine drivers of land-use intensity be identified either 
by unique spatial patterns of change or through correlations with proxies 
of illicit activity?  
2. What is the role of these activities in urbanization in Mexico City and 
deforestation in Central America?  
These questions are addressed in the following four chapters—stand-alone 
research papers—and summarized in the sixth. The research is based on synthesis of 
socio-environmental data, including interviews with key actors, remote sensing of urban 
and forest change over a 15-year period, and ancillary data regarding voting and zone 
change in Mexico and cocaine transport in Central America. This first chapter introduces 
the paucity of work on illicit and clandestine transactions in land systems and how to 
address them. It argues that new data and methods could quantitatively assess the role of 
these activities, which is empirically demonstrated in subsequent chapters. The second 
chapter analyzes qualitative interview data with actors who purchase, sell, or regulate 
urban land in Mexico City. The third chapter examines how electoral politics influence 
informal urban expansion and land titling of informal settlements in Mexico City, using 
panel regression. The fourth chapter tests the hypothesis that narcotrafficking has a 
causal effect on loss in Central America from 2001-2016, using two proxies of 
narcoactivity. The fifth chapter explores the spatial signature and pattern of informal 
urban development in Mexico City with satellite imagery. The sixth and final chapter 
summarizes how illicit and clandestine activity through illegal economies, electoral 
politics, and other informal transactions plays a significant role in shaping deforestation 
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and urban expansion. It identifies how measures of illicit activity could be incorporated 
into land change models to identify a wider range of relevant causes to bridge 
methodological and conceptual divides in Political Ecology and Land System Science 
(Turner and Robbins, 2008). This dissertation shines a new light on the previously 
hidden processes behind ever easier to detect land-use patterns as earth observing 
satellites increase spatial and temporal resolution, improving our understanding of illicit 
and clandestine activity in the earth system. 
A conceptual framework to study land patterns and illicit transactions2  
The challenges and knowledge gaps described above point to the need to better 
understand illicit and clandestine activities in the context of land systems. Illicit 
activities are undertaken in formal and informal institutional settings. They can be illegal 
as defined by rules of governance of the state or a lower order administrative unit, or 
subvert informal norms and ethics (e.g., sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct) (North, 1990). Illicit activities are those that are not formally legal, or 
normatively disapproved and not permitted by group norms or ethics. Illicit transactions 
in either institutional setting may be accepted business as usual (and perhaps, licit) 
among the actors or organization (henceforth, actors) at play. In addition, the 
appearance of licit transactions (e.g., formal land holdings) may follow from illicit 
processes, such as bribery among state officials or threats of violence on marginalized 
landholders, or serve to maintain an illicit activity, such as land uses for money 
laundering.  Significant to these activities are their clandestine quality, which pose large 
problems for land change analyses. 
                                                        
2 This chapter, largely taken from my proposal, was recrafted into a perspective with three co-
authors, Nicholas Magliocca, B. L. Turner II, and  Peter Verburg. It is currently under revision for 
publication submission. 
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All institutions, formal and informal, are given the legitimacy which allows their 
persistence via trust, norms, power, and other repeated interactions and exchanges 
among actors. Importantly, the structure of actors and interactions in illicit land 
transactions differs from that of formal land transactions in two ways (Fig. 1). First, in 
illicit transactions the differential power (i.e., social, political, economic, or 
informational capital) between the actors with needs and the actors with authority and 
influence tends to be large (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2004; Vandergeest and Peluso, 2015). 
This distinction facilitates the tendency for illicit activities to co-opt and blend in with 
existing economic and social structures to avoid detection (Basu, 2014; Cavanagh et al., 
2015; Duffy, 2006). Second, licit transactions and contracts are typically enforced by a 
third party, either a formal institution such as a court of law, or an informal institution 
such as a community board. These transactions share the non-codified and non-written 
characteristics of informal institutions, but unlike them are invariably clandestine and 
adjudicated without a third party, often based on trust between the two actors involved 
to keep the exchange secret. Illicit transactions may also be enforced by threats or 
intimidation, including extortion and violent action (Lambsdorff et al., 2005a).  
Following Ostrom’s (2011) Institutional Analysis and Development framework, 
the actors with land-based or monetary needs and those with the authority and influence 
(or power) to fulfill them make exchanges in the “action arena”, the space where actors 
weigh the costs and benefits of potential transactions and outcomes (Fig. 1). These 
outcomes may include land entitlements and improvements, resource output, monetary 
funds, or externalities (e.g., environmental disservices, such as loss of biotic diversity) 
for actors with needs and political, economic, or social gains and losses for actors with 
authority and influence. The degree of authority or control of each actor, the perceived 
benefits each expects from the outcome, and formal and informal institutions (e.g., rules 
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of governance) shape conditions of exchange and the adjudicating authority in the action 
arena. The social and environmental land system co-evolves, producing the landscape 
uses and patterns observed.   
 
Figure 1 Adding illicit transaction into an action arena for land use. (Following Ostrom 
2011; Turner et al. 2007; small arrows link actors to institutional mechanism of illicit 
transactions, occurring across a spectrum of formal to informal institutional 
constraints). *denotes a specific type of trust between the two actors to deliver on the 
exchange and keep it clandestine. Trust in general underlies legitimacy of all institutions, 
formal and informal. 
 
To these we add illicit activities. Examples of illicit land transactions include: 
bribes to officials to not prosecute illegal land sales, common to deforestation and cattle 
ranching expansion in the Petén, Guatemala (Grandia 2013); local government officials 
bribed to clear slums for shopping mall development Mumbai (Weinstein, 2008); 
selective enforcement of urban land zoning regulations and land eviction to gain political 
support of votes in informal settlements, known as “forbearance” in Bogota and Lima 
(Holland, 2016), and anonymous elite “big men” who help foreigners navigate and 
expedite the process to obtain gold mining concession permits in forested areas of Ghana 
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(Hausermann et al., 2018).  In addition, access to land, either licit or illicit in kind, may 
be a screen for a more central illicit activity, such as access for cattle ranching to launder 
drug monies in Central American (below; Devine et al., 2018; McSweeney et al., 2017). 
Accounting for the illicit transactions is challenging because they are 
intentionally hidden. Official data attempting to track “the hidden” are commonly not 
available for public use and when available prove to be incomplete. Primary data 
collection is often only possible once the researcher builds long-term, trusted 
relationships in the field that allow the topic to be broached, and even then broaching the 
topic may be dangerous. As a result, observations of illicit activities are incomplete, 
fragmented, and/or unreliable, often based on anecdotes or side comments made in 
formal surveys, and tend to be specific to one location or community. In addition, 
mismatches occur in the spatio-temporal scales between the level at which illicit-
clandestine activities are perpetrated (e.g., social interactions, local contexts) and the 
landscape scale analysis.  
The context under which illicit or clandestine activities occur has been studied by 
various disciplines including new institutional economics (della Porta and Vannucci, 
2005), urban sociology (de Alba and Hernández Gamboa, 2014; Roy, 2005), and political 
science (Hicken, 2011; Scott, 1969). These insights have been applied to quantitative 
modeling and hypothesis testing to explain clandestine behavior at the individual level 
(Armantier and Boly, 2011; Barr and Serra, 2009), or agent-based modeling at a city 
scale (Patel et al., 2012). The insights from these studies are rarely integrated into 
studies of land systems, however. 
Discipline-specific methods employed to analyze illicit activities include 
ethnographic field research, statistical analysis, and simulation modeling, which produce 
diverse types of data (e.g., ethnographies, material or capital flows, social/organized 
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criminal organization network structures) are difficult to reconcile in space and time. 
Observations may also be unreliable because, in some cases, a highly sensationalized 
activity causes biases in reporting (i.e., known as the “spotlight” effect for crime data), 
such that lower or moderate levels of the same activity are missed elsewhere. Even more 
problematic is political manipulation of data regarding illicit activities by governments 
and authorities, which may be incentivized to hide activities in which they are formally 
charged to control or eager to tout the success of their efforts to do so. Overall, the 
clandestine character of illicit transactions, by definition, makes them difficult to detect 
and study, and creates a paucity of data and knowledge that challenges formal 
investigation of these phenomena.   
 
 “Socializing the pixel/pixelizing the social” to understanding clandestine 
activity 
Despite the importance of clandestine and illicit processes worldwide (Peluso and 
Lund, 2011), it is difficult to demonstrate the causal role of these activities in land 
changes through the quantitative and modeling approaches common to LSS and 
articulated in such work as People and Pixels (Liverman et al., 1998) and Land Change 
Science: Observing, Monitoring and Understanding the Trajectories of Change on the 
Earth’s Surface (Gutman et al. 2004). This connection and cause has proven difficult 
because of the dual challenges of “pixelizing the social” and “socializing the pixel” as a 
means to dig deeper into the processes operating on land change (Geoghegan, 1998).  
“Socializing the pixel” refers to the use of remote sensing data to analyze pixelated 
patterns of land-use changes that are “mined” to indicate which societal processes are 
responsible for the patterns. “Pixelizing the social”, in contrast, refers to linking social 
data (e.g., social surveys and census data) to “pixelized” units of land to glean their 
associations, providing inferences about the social, political, and economic forces at play.  
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LSS has made much progress in pixelizing the social: greater spatial and 
temporal resolutions of pixel-based biogeophysical data commensurate with social data 
(e.g., household surveys, census blocks); new satellite sensor capabilities; increased data 
availability through open access data; development of tool kits for analysis; and 
significant amounts of funding to encourage data use. This progress has resulted in the 
ability to monitor decades of land-use changes at high resolution for forest, water, and 
agricultural systems (Cooley et al., 2017; Hansen et al., 2013; Jain et al., 2016; Pekel et 
al., 2016). Higher resolution spatial-temporal time series facilitate impact evaluation of 
land use policies (Blackman et al., 2017; Heilmayr and Lambin, 2016) and support causal 
inference to better understand which socioeconomic process drive landscape outcomes. 
Socializing the pixel—informing socio-politico-economic processes and theory 
from land change patterns—has evolved less. Perhaps the most well-known linkage of 
pattern to process is that of the “fishbone pattern of deforestation” in Amazonia, in 
which road and farm parcels placements generate a specific pattern visible in the aerial 
image (De Oliveira Filho and Metzger, 2006). Proximate causes, such as the roads and 
parcel allotments in Amazonia, have been identified via specific patterns they generate to 
better understand global deforestation (Curtis et al., 2018). Examining land-use patterns 
to provide insights about social problems or theory, however, confront the age-old axiom 
that the same process can give rise to the different spatial patterns and vice versa (Skole 
et al., 2004) (equifinality). Not surprisingly, this difficulty has led to a research bias 
focused on drivers or causes of land change that can be correlated with existing 
“pixelizable” socio-economic data.  
This research bias has hampered the ability of LSS to consider the role of illicit 
and clandestine activities in land system changes. Studying these activities is difficult in 
part because pixel-linked data and knowledge about their operation are rarely available. 
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Linking land change patterns to illicit or clandestine socio-economic processes to 
corroborate these linkages has thus been a challenge. Yet, pixelizing approaches that 
omit illicit activities as causal factors in analysis may fail to identify or even misinterpret 
the reality involved. As such, subsequent land governance policy informed by this 
approach may be ineffective.  
In the absence of data facilitating pixelizing approaches, can the “socializing” 
approach support inference about where and how illicit activities are occurring? Do 
clandestine activities create distinctive patterns of land change (e.g., illegal deforestation 
or grassland grazing) that are anomalous relative to those created by legal socio-
economic activities within the same social-environmental system? 
While directly observing illicit and clandestine activity is challenging, ‘pixelizing’ 
and ‘socializing’ approaches can be used in different but complementary ways to study 
the influence of these activities on land systems. Pixelizing approaches can leverage new 
data to observe and map land change patterns and attempt to attribute some portion of 
observed land change to suspected illicit and clandestine activities. Socializing 
approaches begin with land change patterns or other socio-economic outcomes with 
known links to illicit and clandestine activities and attempt to explain the processes 
through which those outcomes are produced. Increasing the temporal and spatial 
resolution of and improved access to remote sensing may allow for direct measurement 
or proxies for illicit and clandestine activities, adding them to the array of land change 
drivers examined by LSS and related research fields. In many cases, the data may exist 
but have not been processed in land-change studies. In others, methods used in other 
research fields and LSS could be better leveraged in the effort. 
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Figure 2. Extant and promising data and methods applicable for pixelizing/socializing 
land systems research. 
 
Pixelizing approaches  
Figure 2 outlines extant and new data and methods arranged along a spectrum 
according to the degree to which they contribute to pixelizing versus socializing efforts. 
Digital data representing aspects of human behavior at increasingly high spatial 
temporal resolution over the last few decades have become available owing to advances 
in satellite monitoring, initiatives that “open”, “leak,” or digitize data from governments 
and companies (e.g., The Panama Papers), crowdsourcing, and records of human activity 
online from twitter and the media. Pixelizing these data is expected to improve 
understanding of the causes of land change created by human behavior or societal 
structures. For example, common causal inference approaches include fixed effects 
econometrics regression, difference-in-differences- or matching approaches already used 
to study land systems (Arriagada et al., 2012; Blackman et al., 2017; Wright et al., 2016). 
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Methods that link survey data with parcel level land change is another way to understand 
land systems from a pixelizing perspective (Chowdhury and Turner, 2006).  
A few pixel-based approaches have been undertaken. These include the effects of 
the eradication of illicit coca plantations on forest regrowth (Sánchez-Cuervo et al., 2012) 
and the relationship of coca production on deforestation (Dávalos et al., 2011). Official 
government reports on coca eradication have been linked to areas of forest change 
(2012) and aerial photographs of coca production have been employed in supervised 
classification algorithms to asses where growth in the crop was correlated to 
deforestation in multi-level regression models (Dávalos et al., 2011). 
Socializing approaches 
At the other end of the spectrum, socializing the pixel involves leveraging 
process-based insights informed by theory, ethnography, and expert knowledge to 
explain observed patterns, or model them with dynamic, process-based approaches (e.g., 
agent-based models). Socializing approaches are especially useful when there is not 
enough spatial or temporal data on human behavior to pixelize. A variety of methods 
exist to render ethnographic or expert knowledge systematically and spatially (Magliocca 
et al., 2018). These process-based understandings can inform extant methods of pattern 
analysis (Nagendra et al., 2004) or agent-based land model simulations. Limitations of 
agent-based models notwithstanding (Groeneveld et al., 2017), they can simulate the 
decisions of actors made in the “arena” (from Fig. 1), yielding spatial-temporal patterns 
that can be tested in regard to their robustness and compared with observed patterns of 
land change (Brown et al., 2014).  
Methods from other disciplines that could be leveraged include event process 
tracing from political science, commodity chain analysis from economic geography, and 
investigative journalism. Event process tracing traces chains of records of official 
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transactions searching for anomalies (Holland, 2016). Commodity chain analysis is used 
to understand how, why, and where illicit economic activity is captured in spaces where 
goods are produced, transported, and consumed (McSweeney et al., 2018). McSweeney 
and colleagues (2018) used ethnographic data from fieldwork and the media to estimate 
prices paid for various types of labor required to transport cocaine and multiplied these 
unit amounts by government estimates of volume of product moving through the region. 
Investigative journalism has also documented the process of illicit activity for specific 
land parcels. For example, journalists have used names on cadastral records of land 
ownership and land-use permits to known criminals or politicians with documented 
corruption cases case studies from both narcotrafficking (InSight-Crime, 2011) and palm 
oil (Chain Reaction Research, 2018; The Gecko Project and Mongabay, 2018). Cadastral 
data are useful because land or permits are often held legally by a third party who is a 
family relative, or a shell company registered off-shore, rather than by a narcotrafficker 
directly. Ancillary data from crime records, media, business databases, or ethnography 
may be required to develop the indirect links between the legal landowner or shadow 
business and illicit actor. These examples are limited spatially (one region of Honduras, 
or specific cases in Indonesia), limiting generalizability to study landscapes 
systematically. They explain, however, the mechanisms of illegal activity and its relation 
to the environment compared to pixelizing approaches.  
Many other methods fall between the pixelizing and socializing approaches, 
including analyses of flows and networks between actors, goods, and land uses and 
machine learning/prediction algorithms. Models vary from extrapolation of trends and 
patterns towards simulating the land-use consequences of assumed theory or rule sets 
(see Brown et al., 2014 for full descriptions and examples). These models can be used to 
simulate land change patterns based on historical data before the illicit activity occurs 
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compared to simulated patterns during the time the phenomenon influences the land 
system. The challenge involved here is the differences between legal and illicit activities 
that may require different representations of land use decision making and deviations 
from trends and observed historic patterns. Some data sets are also relevant to both 
approaches, such as voting data that identify patterns of political exchanges, including 
patronage or clientelism (the contingent exchange of citizens’ votes for access to a public 
good or services (Hicken, 2011)) and relationships to land use titles or changes. 
Pixelizing and socializing approaches alone are insufficient to advance 
understanding of illicit-clandestine activities beyond the descriptive stage of assessment. 
The challenge is finding the right integration or pairing of pixel/social approaches given 
the state of the data. We provide a framework for integrating these approaches that 
elucidates how illicit transactions operate in land systems, providing a roadmap for 
studying any land system process or phenomenon that suffers from incomplete, 
fragmented, and/or unreliable data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  17 
Integrating illicit activities and remote sensing approaches 
Mixed methods (e.g., quantitative-qualitative) approaches for studying complex, 
multi-scalar land system phenomena are problematic in the illicit-clandestine context 
because data and knowledge gaps are so ubiquitous that compounding or cascading 
uncertainties can overwhelm attempts at causal inference. Consequently, analyses tend 
to focus on particular parts of an illicit or clandestine phenomenon, typically determined 
by data availability, which minimizes attributional errors but necessarily produces only 
partial explanations. As such, triangulating methods are proposed to leverage synergies 
between partial but complementary evidence (Fig. 3). 
Figure 3. Approaches to address illicit activities involving remote sensing data. 
When a known or hypothesized process is the starting point, pixelizing the social is at 
play. The motivating research question is: how much spatial and temporal variation in 
the land-use outcome is explained by socio-economic variables of interest? Given initial 
knowledge of key variables, alternative hypotheses or explanations are formed about 
how the process will manifest the outcome of interest differently under varying 
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contextual conditions. Data are needed to describe where and/or when the effects of 
those variables on the outcome of interest might differ. Methods for causal inference and 
correlation, which account for co-variation over space and time (most commonly, 
regression), link variation in contextual and causal factors to observed outcomes. The 
result is partial inference into how outcomes vary over space or time as the consequence 
of a process operating in heterogeneous conditions. This approach relies on developing 
or pixelizing proxy variables of illicit or clandestine behavior (i.e., the known or 
hypothesized process), advanced via new data sources identified in Fig. 2. Well 
established causal inference approaches (e.g., fixed effects models) can be used to 
identify how authorities preferentially distribute public goods, such as electricity, at 
opportune times and places to influence electoral outcomes (Baskaran et al., 2015). 
Similar techniques can be employed to develop proxy data on the political or economic 
capital exchanged in the action arena, be they votes, water access, or lax enforcement. 
These data can then be leveraged in regression models to relate the change in space and 
time of the proxy to the observed landscape change. It is critical in this approach that the 
model include the accompanying “licit” or conventional drivers of change for comparison 
to the influence of the illicit transaction. 
When a known or hypothesized outcome is the starting point, socializing the pixel is 
at play. The motivating research question is: how are variations in the known outcome 
over space or time produced by candidate socio-economic processes? Given initial 
assumptions about the structure of variable or factor interactions, alternative hypotheses 
or explanations are formed about which processes are important and how they interact 
over space or time to generate the outcome(s) of interest. Data are assembled to describe 
the varying outcomes produced by the process of interest. Deductive methods for causal 
inference then test how well alternative process-level explanations reproduce the 
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empirical outcomes of interest. The result is a process-based explanation linking 
empirical outcomes across multiple system levels or over time. Advances in the 
socializing frontier are largely driven by new methods using existing data (Fig.  2). Cases 
in which suspicious activities are taking place but the evidence is minimal (i.e., the 
known or hypothesized outcome), analysis of landscape patterns (e.g., analyzing remote 
sensing data with pattern analysis software) may reveal unusual or anomalous land 
changes. These changes can be associated with various possible causes, seeking to 
establish which is the most likely via field observations, surveys, the media, and so forth. 
If the mechanisms in the action area (Fig. 1) and interaction between actors are relatively 
well understood, simulation modelling, such as an ABM, can codify the understood rules 
to determine the efficacy of the observed patterns found in the first approach. This 
approach has been used in other land use studies (Manson and Evans, 2007), but has 
only just gained traction in the context of illicit and clandestine land transactions 
(Magliocca et al., 2019). 
In rare cases, various documents and cadasters may exist that allow a direct link 
between actors engaging in illicit or clandestine activities and third parties who register 
land titles. Examples include published actor network analysis with cadastral records, 
which have been used to link lesser known members of a cartel to specific parcels in the 
Petén (InSight-Crime, 2011), and investigative journalism at Mongabay to link illegal 
palm oil permits and shell companies with electoral dynamics in Indonesia (Chain 
Reaction Research, 2018; The Gecko Project and Mongabay, 2018). Researchers could 
make better use of investigative journalism efforts and systematize these reports at 
landscape scales. 
Pixelizing and socializing approaches should inform one another to build 
understanding. The outcomes of pixel-based approaches can be used to calibrate 
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behavioral decisions in an ABM. Likewise, ethnographic observations and pattern 
analysis may structure causal factors in a regression or other causal inference method. 
Leveraging both approaches is essential in the context of incomplete, fragmented, and/or 
unreliable data when studying illicit activity. Given the difficulty of obtaining pixel-based 
data about illicit or clandestine activities, however, greater understanding of such 
phenomena is more likely to come from synthesizing many socializing approaches, and 
leveraging that understanding to identify proxies of illicit activities for which pixel-based 
data can be obtained. 
Next to the methods derived from the people and pixels efforts, other steps are 
needed to better address illicit-clandestine processes affecting land systems. Explicitly 
examining how the agency of illicit and clandestine actors shape the land systems 
requires bridging large and small divides between research orientations, such as political 
ecology and LSS (Turner and Robbins, 2008), as well as closer collaboration with 
political scientists. The mechanisms by which actors with power differentially enforce or 
implement land-use policies to key groups in order to maintain their electoral allegiance 
have been identified in political science (Albertus et al., 2016; de Janvry et al., 2014; 
Holland, 2016). This work, however, tends to lack a spatial component such that the land 
systems impacts of the transactions are insufficient for LSS. The framework presented 
here encourages the use of new data, old methods, and new interdisciplinary connections 
to take various approaches to understand the processes behind ever easier to detect land-
use patterns. Beyond just people and pixels, power and politics constitutes a lacuna that, 
incorporated correctly, should improve LSS models for various types of social-
environmental systems. This dissertation aims to begin to fill this gap through empirical 
analysis of the clientelism in informal urban development in Mexico City and 
narcotrafficking in Central America. 
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Socializing and Pixelizing urban expansion in Mexico City and forest loss in 
Central America 
This dissertation focuses on empirical cases that exemplify contemporary, highly 
salient, urban and rural dynamics, critical at the interface of global efforts to conserve 
ecosystem services. Both cases require qualitative analysis to understand the action 
situation surrounding illicit transactions (orange circle, Fig. 1) as well as quantitative 
analysis to understand the extent and significance of these transactions on land 
conversion (blue circle, Fig. 1). While each case is distinct, under a unique set of 
institutional arrangements and ecological dynamics that define land-use outcomes, they 
were chosen in concert for this dissertation to empirically demonstrate that utility of the 
proposed conceptual framework in providing new insights to understand drivers of land 
change in diverse locations.  
Case I: Informal Urban Land Transactions in in Mexico City (Chapters 2, 3, 5) 
Underlying the influence of informal settlements in Mexico City is the severe 
housing deficit. Despite investment in public housing projects, the paucity of access to credit 
for the poor to purchase land makes the formal housing market inaccessible for a significant 
portion of the city’s population.  The majority (60%) of new housing construction is informal 
and unregulated (Connolly, 2009), comprising 65% of  total urban housing and land use, the 
highest in Latin America. Formal programs designed to reduce urban expansion in order 
to mitigate floods and increase water supply, especially in the southern fringe of the city, 
include the District’s “Zero-Growth” plan that forbids urbanization on conservation land, 
and support for farmers in the Basin to retain 17,000 ha of conservation land forested 
(Perevochtchikova and Vasquez Beltran, 2010). These formal programs are juxtaposed 
against the irregular and informal settlements that are driving urbanization patterns in the 
south of the city on conservation land (Aguilar and Santos, 2011; Tortajada and Castelán, 
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2003). The 847 irregular settlements along the city’s southern fringe exist on four 
distinct property regimes: federal land, such as a National Protected Areas; ejidos 
(communally owned properties designated for agriculture in 1917); community land 
(communally owned indigenous properties dating to the 1600s); and private lands not 
yet designated as formally urban. 
Regularization, the city’s effort to accommodate irregular settlements into formal 
urban planning, has been a problematic solution to the crisis. This process increases land 
values by guaranteeing access to urban services and the ability to sell and rent land 
legally once tenancy is established (Cruz Rodriguez, 2000).The public sector cannot 
legally supply the physical infrastructure for water, sanitation, electricity, and drainage 
to informal settlements until their lands are “regularized.”  Paradoxically, some urban 
scholars find the increase in land value can force the original settlers who cannot afford 
formal market prices onto the next informal settlement (Legorreta, 1994); others, however, 
contest the generality of these empirical findings (Duhau, 1998). Regularization is a 
complex, multi-institutional process, which is dependent on land tenure type 
(Schteingart and Salazar, 2010).  
Initial expert interviews confirmed politics permeates informal settlements and 
the regularization process at all stages. Politicians at every level—local borough, local 
representatives in the city legislative assembly, federal level senators, mayors, and even 
the President—can formally or informally influence regularization or access to urban 
services. Borough level politicians are informally incentivized to regularize settlements 
and/or provide public services as a way to gain votes for themselves in local elections or 
for their party in national elections, which facilitates their own upward political mobility. 
At the national level, Presidents have used their power to enact massive regularization 
programs, especially of informal settlements in ejidos, near election times (Herrera, 
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2005; C. E. Salazar, 2012). Commonly, politicians assist residents to obtain voting 
credentials; to avoid eviction; residents may need to provide proof of their vote in the 
form of photos of ballots or other indications of compliance. While the eviction process is 
spurred at the local level by boroughs in collaboration with the City’s Ministry of 
Environment Department (SEDEMA), it can be stopped by the higher-level mayor’s 
office, which must approve and finance the army personnel required for the eviction to 
be carried out. Much to the frustration of SEDEMA, the mayor’s office tends to prevent 
evictions from happening around election time (pers. Comm. Via interview).  
In addition to influencing land regularization and eviction process, various actors 
can directly influence urbanization via land invasion, corruption, and illicit land sales 
(Flores Pena and Soto Alva, 2010; Gilbert, 2002; Padgett, 2014; Ward, 1998). The total 
area of urban land settled via large or political motivated land invasion has never been 
estimated. Illicit land sales can occur by ejido or community members directly selling 
property on the informal land market to settlers, economic intermediaries who buy from 
ejido members and resell to settlers, or through large housing developers who acquire 
land through manipulating the ejido governance process and bribing local government 
officials to alter zoning. Ironically, these developments can then be sold back to the city 
government as public housing projects, common especially in the Northern rapidly 
expanding metropolitan area in the State of Mexico, just outside city limits. Not all 
urbanization of ejido land, or land held in common given by the state after the 1917 
Revolution, is clandestine, however, and portions of this land can be legally urbanized 
and sold since the 1992 reforms to Agrarian law.3 Of the 17,000 ha of ejido land that has 
                                                        
3 The 1992 reforms to Agrarian Law allowed certified ejidos through PROCEDE (Certification Program for Ejidos) to 
privatize legally sell some parts of their land, while other parts remain unalienable. Yet, this program was never 
implemented within the Federal District of Mexico in part because the inability to define legal property lines between 
ejidos and land titles originally given to indigenous communities, which in many cases were incongruent. These 
property lines are still being defined in Agrarian Tribunal Courts. 
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been privatized and sold in the metropolitan area, 14,000 ha were used for large housing 
developments authorized to build 800,000 homes since 1992 (Salazar, 2014). Despite 
this growth in the formal housing market in the State of Mexico, informal housing and 
development continues to grow (C. Salazar, 2012).  
Government actors tend to blame informal settlements for environmental 
damage in the conservation zone, while ignoring the key role (and responsibility) that 
formal public policy and clientelism play in the urbanization patterns. On the other 
hand, some civil society groups argue that clientelism is one of the few mechanisms to 
access housing and services for the poor, despite the political obligations this transaction 
engenders. This thesis will strive to illuminate where clientelism, a contentious political 
issue affecting urban justice and environmental services, might play a role in the urban 
landscape. 
Case II. Forest loss and narcotrafficking in Central America (Chapter 4) 
The case of clandestine rural dynamics focuses on deforestation patterns over two 
decades along the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. This case exemplifies the detection 
of illicit activities in frontier areas. Central America has maintained extensive and 
remote forested areas along the Caribbean coast. Nonetheless, land colonization and an 
expanding agricultural frontier at the perimeter of densely forested areas are common as 
elsewhere in Latin America. In contrast, and uncharacteristic for Latin America, isolated, 
rapid, and extensive forest clearing is observed in parts of Central America. Such 
deforestation over the past two decades (Redo et al., 2012) has accelerated, despite large-
scale international and NGO-led efforts to reduce deforestation in general. This 
acceleration has, to a degree, been attributed to expanded narcotics trafficking networks 
and an increased flow of drugs through Central America (Mcsweeney et al., 2014). 
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In Central America, cocaine trafficking is estimated to currently contribute 
between 5 and 15% of national GDPs (UNDOC 2011). Huge illicit sums of money need to 
be registered under “legitimate” businesses for cocaine moving through the region. 
Illegal logging, forest conversion to pasture for cattle ranching, clandestine airstrips, and 
roads, and other forms of land change are undertaken by narco-organizations as a means 
to move drugs northward and launder trafficking profits (McSweeney et al., 2017). 
Caribbean regions of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua are characterized by both 
weak and plural land-use governance (overlapping state and indigenous governance), a 
history of smuggling drugs, and have high indices of poverty. Thus, barriers are low and 
payoffs are high to illegally sell land or move drugs. Roles that have been traditionally 
the domain of state support (e.g., healthcare, schools) are sometimes replaced by 
“Narcos”, paying for or supporting such functions to win community loyalty. These social 
dynamics have been well documented in both Honduras (McSweeney et al., 2018) and 
Guatemala (Devine et al., 2018) as cartels move deeper into remote Central American 
forests in response to drug interdiction (Magliocca et al., 2019). 
I collaborate with a group of researchers, known as LITCA (Landscapes in 
Transition, Central America).4 LITCA revealed anomalous deforestation patterns 
(patches, or any contiguous area of deforestation, are statistically significantly larger in 
size and exhibit more rapid clearing rates than other deforestation patterns), showed 
high correlation with cocaine trafficking patterns in several departments in Honduras, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua (Sesnie et al., 2017). Beyond these correlations, additional 
effort was required to measure the causal effect of narcotrafficking on forest loss, 
accomplished in this dissertation.  
                                                        
4 LITCA is an interdisciplinary team of anthropologists, geographers, and ecologists who have been 
documenting the effects of cocaine on rural communities in Central America for the past 4 years. This work is funded 
through a SESYNC (National Center for Social and Environmental Synthesis) team project of which I am part. 
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Questions and Hypothesis for this dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as depicted in Figure 4.  It proceeds by 
understanding institutional conditions that promote informal urban expansion in 
Chapter 2 through interview analysis. This qualitative analysis is followed by efforts to 
“pixelize” social data and estimate causal effects using fixed effects panel regression in 
Chapters 3 and 4. These chapters measure the influence of politically motivated versus 
illicit economy driven transactions on land conversion at a landscape scale in Mexico 
City and Central America, respectively. Chapter 5 aims to “socialize” urban land change 
patterns, using methodologies similar to what has previously been achieved in studies of 
narcodeforestation, from the typology of informal urban expansion developed in Chapter 
2. The concluding chapter summarizes what was learned in previous chapters and sets 
an agenda for future research. Specific research questions and an abstract of each 
chapter follow. 
 
Figure 4. Roadmap of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2: Institutional Entrepreneurs and Informal Urban Land Transactions in 
Mexico City 
Research Questions: 
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1. What are the main types of clandestine land transactions in the Mexico City 
Metropolitan Area? 
2. What institutional incentives and constraints produce the entrepreneurs that 
drive these main types?  
3. What is the distribution of benefits and losses to actors in the action arena where 
these transactions take place? 
Informal urban growth outpaces formal urbanization in the developing world. 
Understanding why this informality exists and persists is essential to counteract the 
common characterization that it is monolithic, chaotic, and ungovernable. This chapter 
seeks to disaggregate informality and develops a typology to reveal who shapes the rules 
ordering urbanization, consolidation, and legalization of informal urban growth in the 
Mexico City metropolis. Institutional analysis elucidates the distribution of payoffs in the 
“action situation” where decisions about urban land are made, and “institutional 
entrepreneurs”, actors that repeatedly evade or alter formal rules or create new rules of 
urban land regulation. Interview data regarding the distribution of costs and benefits to 
actors shaping informal urbanization identifies potential leverage points for institutional 
change. Disaggregating informality into its component pervasive institutions and 
analyzing the distribution of payoffs in and beyond Mexico City provide insights about 
governance that may reduce threats of informality to urban sustainability. 
Chapter 3: Do electoral politics influence land titling and expansion of informal 
settlements? The case of Mexico City 
Research Questions: 
1. How does the distribution of land titles vary with the electoral cycles and voting 
patterns in private and collective land tenures in Mexico City? 
2. Does clientelism influence urban growth? 
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Hypotheses: 
1. Urban land titling of informal settlements on collectively held and private land 
reflect political business cycles and increases prior to elections. 
2. Titles are preferentially distributed to core party voters. 
3. Urban expansion increases with the ratio of votes to the core party.  
Informal settlements often lack access to basic services and have insecure tenure because 
they exist outside the formal urban zone and tend not to have property titles. Politicians 
may seek to provide support to settlers in the form of land titles, connection to urban 
services, and other ventures in exchange for their votes. While this relationship has long 
been recognized, the hypothesis that electoral politics may influence settlement 
expansion and the distribution of land titles has not been formally tested. This chapter 
tests that relationship using panel regressions to examine electoral cycles and voting 
patterns on the distribution of land titles and informal urban growth in conservation 
lands from 1997-2015 in Mexico City.  
Chapter 4: Accounting for “illicit” activity in land change: Narcotrafficking and forest 
loss in Central America 
Research Questions: 
1. Does narcotrafficking have a causal effect on forest loss, controlling for other 
drivers and causes of deforestation? 
2. Can a systematization of media reports represent narcotrafficking activities? 
Hypotheses: 
1. Forest loss covaries with the intensity and level of drug trafficking in Central 
America when it is transited through forested areas. 
2. News media events (e.g., a law enforcement seizure of cocaine) represent the 
spatial and temporal variability of narcotrafficking and complement official data 
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to determine the connection between the location and timing of trafficking events 
and annual forest loss. 
Illicit activity plays a significant role in land changes, such as forest loss. Despite this 
recognition, a paucity of data on illicit economies and behavior makes it difficult to 
incorporate into quantitative models of land change. This chapter offers a novel 
approach for an empirical demonstration of the use of data proxies of illicit activity to 
meet this challenge through the case of narcotrafficking and forest loss in Central 
America. Two narcotrafficking activity proxies were developed for modeling: i) an 
“official” proxy - government measured drug seizures for 14 sub national units; and, ii) 
and an “unofficial” proxy  - spatialized media counts of narcotrafficking events. Evidence 
continues to build that narcotrafficking plays an important, yet often unreported, role in 
forest loss as traffickers clear land for money laundering operations and territorial 
control in response to interdiction efforts. This effect has not been systematically 
compared to the other well-known non-illicit causes of deforestation in the region, 
however, such as rural population increases and expansion of pasture for cattle.  
Longitudinal data on 50 sub-national units over a period of 16 years (2001-2016) is used 
in fixed effects regressions to estimate the role in narcotrafficking in deforested areas.  
 
Chapter 5: Towards identifying informal urban land use patterns 
Research Question: 
1. Do distinct orders of social processes driving urban informality produce 
similarly ordered spatial morphology of urban land change? 
Understanding how illicit and clandestine transactions influence land change is of 
increasing interest to land systems science, but “pixelizable” data on these activities is 
often unavailable. In this chapter, we employ techniques previously used in detecting 
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illicit deforestation patterns in forest areas to the analysis of informal urbanization. We 
link distinct patterns of informal urban expansion observed in high resolution satellite 
imagery to the associated urban institutional processes each engenders. This approach 
could improve urban land prediction models and aid governance in the rapidly 
urbanizing Global South, characterized by high informality. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter summarizes the research presented on the topic and assesses the 
degree to which this dissertation successfully identified clandestine drivers of land 
change by either their unique spatial patterns of change or through correlations with 
proxies of illicit activity. It remarks on the advances and challenges making to both 
pixelizing and socializing approaches attempted in this dissertation and synthesizes 
results from case studies to remark on the role of clandestine activity in urban and forest 
systems. This chapter identifies an agenda for research in illicit activity in forest and 
urban systems, and the data and methods needed to make progress. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS AND INFORMAL URBAN LAND 
TRANSACTIONS IN MEXICO CITY 
Abstract 
Informal urban growth outpaces formal urbanization in the developing world. 
Understanding why this informality exists and persists is essential to counteract the 
common characterization that it is monolithic, chaotic, and ungovernable. This research 
seeks to disaggregate informality and develops a typology to reveal who shapes the rules 
ordering urbanization, consolidation, and legalization of informal urban growth in the 
Mexico City metropolis. Institutional analysis elucidates the distribution of payoffs in the 
“action situation” where decisions about urban land are made, and “institutional 
entrepreneurs”, actors that repeatedly evade or alter formal rules or create new rules of 
urban land regulation. Interview data regarding the distribution of costs and benefits to 
actors shaping informal urbanization identifies potential leverage points for institutional 
change. Four types of informal urban land transactions are identified:  i) urbanizing 
individual plots of land, ii) flipping or subdividing land into multiple parcels, iii) 
invading land, and iv) manipulating social and public housing developments. We find 
institutional entrepreneurs—intermediaries, developers, and politicians—
disproportionately benefit from and reinforce unplanned urban expansion. These 
entrepreneurs provide housing for the urban poor, but with social and environmental 
costs, including exploitation of informal settlers and urbanization of conservation land 
and loss of environmental services. Disaggregating informality into its component 
pervasive institutions and analyzing the distribution of payoffs in and beyond Mexico 
City provide insights about governance that may reduce threats of informality to urban 
sustainability. 
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Introduction5 
Over 90% of urban growth takes place in the Global South. A large portion of new 
urban residents move to informal, unplanned settlements where inhabitants have little 
to no tenure security, lack basic services, and construct homes in areas 
disproportionately vulnerable to “environmental” disaster and risk. Understanding why 
informal urban settlements exist and how they persist are essential to a large range of 
urban research and practice attempting to understand and govern urban land systems 
and enhance urban sustainability and equity.  
Informal urban growth, or urban informality, is often characterized by urban 
planners and government authorities as chaotic and ungovernable (Lerner et al., 2018; 
Roy, 2005). It is either ignored or presumed to operate similarly to formal growth 
(Vermeiren et al., 2012). Most land change models fail to account for the socio-political 
dynamics shaping informal urban expansion (Roy et al., 2014, but see Patel et al., 2012)). 
This omission is unsurprising, given that the political incentives governing informal 
expansion are not well understood (Navarrete, 2016; Post, 2018).  
 Urban informality has been explained as a product of under-resourced governments 
unable to absorb the overwhelming rural-urban migration of impoverished populations 
unable to afford formal housing in a neoliberal era (Márquez López and Pradilla Cobos, 
2016; Pradilla, 1995; Schteingart, 1989; Van Gelder, 2013). In contrast, De Soto (2000) 
argued informality flourishes because the process to obtain permits to urbanize legally is 
too slow and bureaucratic. As a result, residents access land more rapidly and much 
cheaper on the informal as opposed to the formal land market in Latin America. De 
Soto’s influential work promoted eliminating informality via rapid titling programs in 
cities with mixed success (Gilbert, 2002; Jaramillo, 2008).  
                                                        
5 This chapter was written in collaboration with Hallie Eakin, Felipe de Alba, and Marco Janssen 
and will be submitted for publication after final revisions. 
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The persistence of urban informality is undergirded by the political and economic 
incentives of actors with the authority and influence to shape urban expansion.  Previous 
work describes how economic profits motivate mafias to shape urban land uses in slums 
in Nairobi (Henderson et al., 2016), or government officials to clear slums for shopping 
malls in Mumbai (Weinstein, 2008). Researchers have long recognized that rural 
populations moving to cities generate political capital—their vote— that political party-
brokers seek to capture (Cornelius, 1972; Scott, 1969). As such, informal settlements are 
co-produced in conjunction with formal governance (McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2005). 
Politicians achieve political support from informality by providing services, such as 
electricity and water (De Alba et al., 2014), ensuring slums are not evicted (Holland, 
2016), promising to provide land titles (Connolly and Wigle, 2017a; Varley, 1998), and 
other such strategies.  
Extensive, qualitative research on Mexico City has long recognized the political 
economy reinforcing informal settlements and their social and environmental 
consequences (Aguilar, 2008; Aguilar and Guerrero, 2013; Pezzoli, 2000; Schteingart 
and Salazar, 2010; Ward, 1976). It profiled the role of brokers or caciques (chiefs) in 
delivering urban services (Cornelius, 1972), identified different types of informal 
expansion dependent on location and land tenure type (Ward, 1976), and examined the 
politics of efforts to regulate (or eliminate) informal growth (Connolly and Wigle, 2017b; 
C. E. Salazar, 2012; Wigle, 2014). Yet, this scholarship tends to be rooted in a diversity of 
qualitative case studies from disparate disciplines and frameworks, making it difficult to 
identify the actors, incentives, and payoff schemes ordering informal urban expansion 
across the metropolis. We address this challenge by offering a novel approach to reveal 
the pan-metropolis structure of urban informality.  
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This paper examines the institutional arrangements that produce different types of 
informal urban expansion in Mexico City, one of the largest cities in the world, and 
characterized by informal growth. The Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework, of which action arenas are a core element, is used to analyze decisions of 
“institutional entrepreneurs” or actors who repeatedly evade or alter formal rules or 
create new rules of urban land regulation. Urban informality is disaggregated into its 
component types to analyze the rules and actors governing social and institutional 
patterns. We introduce payoff surfaces as a way of visualizing the relative influence of 
material (economic) and non-material (social and political) incentives among actors. 
Examining payoff schemes reveals who profits from persistent informality and helps to 
clarify the role and root causes of clientelism, corruption, and other clandestine practices 
affecting urban development in Mexico City and elsewhere.   
Three overarching questions guide this research:  
1. What are the main types of informal land transactions and institutions in the 
Mexico City Metropolitan Area? 
2. What institutional incentives and constraints produce the entrepreneurs that 
drive these main types?  
3. What is the distribution of benefits and losses to actors in the action arena where 
these transactions take place? 
The “action arena” payoff surface in informal urbanization 
The persistence of social and ecological dynamics can be revealed through analyses of 
institutional arrangements and actors. Institutions are the sets of rules and norms that 
structure human interactions (North, 1990). The IAD (Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework) focuses on the roles of specific actors and their interactions in 
decision situations (or action situations) (Ostrom 2011). It has been used to address a 
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wide range of public policy and collective choice problems from metropolitan service 
distribution to irrigation system rules (Ostrom 2005).  
Figure 5. Institutional Analysis 
and Development Framework 
with a focus on the Action 
Situation (from Ostrom (2011)). 
 
We use the IAD and action 
situation (Fig. 5) to understand 
informality. The biophysical 
context (land), the rules in use, 
and the attributes of the community shape the action situation “… where individuals 
interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight” 
(Ostrom, 2011 pp:10). Not all actors in the arena have equal footing. Each has a position, 
set of choices, access to information, and control over the outcome (or power). Beyond 
property rights, this power asymmetry largely influences who has access to the benefits 
of outcomes (Ribot and Peluso, 2009) and how this distribution of payoffs shapes 
institutional change (Knight, 1992). The outcome of the decision made in the action 
situation affects land use, rules in use, and social arrangements which set up a 
subsequent action situation and the next decision. Overtime, this iteration forms a 
pattern of rules in use and develops into an institution governing collective behavior.  
Institutional analysis focuses on both formal and informal rules (Ostrom, 2005), and 
we focus on the latter for this paper because they largely shape informal urban 
settlement growth. We define informal institutions as  “… socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). Analyzing informal institutions requires 
documenting the extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formal rules, socially 
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sanctioned norms of behavior, and internally enforced standards of conduct (Navarrete, 
2016). 
Informal urban land transactions include rezoning, conversion, or purchases of land 
that occur outside of or in opposition to formal markets and governance processes. 
Informality in these transactions typically involves exchanges between marginalized 
urban residents who cannot afford access to formal urban land and services, and the 
actors with the power to fulfill these needs. Transactions are enforced through trust, 
intimidation, or violence (Lambsdorff et al., 2005b), characterized by clientelism6, 
corruption7, and rent-seeking8.  
Urban land transactions exhibit a wide range of other clandestine informal 
exchange, intentionally hidden from appropriate authorities or subverting informal 
norms and ethics (e.g., sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct). Not 
all informal activity is illicit or illegal, however. For example, politicians commonly 
provide cement to those building homes in urban conservation land in Mexico City, an 
activity that is not expressly illegal (Hagene, 2015). This activity is used to secure voter 
support, however, which in turn sends the message that the informal construction is 
permissible and authorities are likely to let it remain and, perhaps, supply services (e.g., 
water and electricity). This study focuses on informal land transactions as opposed to 
informal settlements, permitting a wider view than previous research focusing only 
urban land use that is “illegal” because it exists outside the regulated urban zone. An 
emphasis on transactions allows us to analyze, for example, legal urban developments 
                                                        
6 Clientelism is the contingent exchange of votes for public goods or services (Hicken, 2011; 
Stokes et al., 2012)  
7 Corruption is an unauthorized transaction between an elected or appointed official and a third 
party (Groenendijk, 1997).  
8 Rent-seeking is a special type of corruption.  It occurs when regulation (e.g., laws against 
deforestation or urbanization) increases scarcity to a good (e.g. land), and a government actor 
facilitates access in exchange for an economic kick back (Krueger, 1974). 
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generated by clandestine exchange (e.g. a bribe to payoff an official to change zone 
regulations) that are not classified as informal settlements. Analyzing formal urban 
development shaped by informal transactions is important because it may be responsible 
for more urban land change than the informal settlements receiving the majority of 
research and policy attention. 
In general, weak formal governance institutions in tandem with high rates of 
inequality or low transparency regarding the distribution of public goods makes the 
action situation favorable for clandestine activity. Interactions between powerful actors 
and less powerful marginalized urban residents may create a “Faustian bargain” in which 
the uncertainty of the livelihoods of the urban poor is reduced in the present, with the 
long-term costs of repeated unjust, risky, or even violent consequences (Wood, 2003). 
Powerful actors in this way convince marginalized actors to follow the rules benefiting 
the already powerful actors (Knight, 1992).9  
Institutional Entrepreneurs and Payoff Surfaces 
Institutional change and the formation of the action situation is dominated by actors 
with power and the ability to mobilize resources to affect outcomes (Avelino and 
Rotmans, 2009). These “institutional entrepreneurs” mobilize resources, such as 
informational, economic or political capital to create or transform institutions that favor 
his or her interest (Pacheco et al. 2010). Institutional entrepreneurs abide by, evade, or 
alter existing institutions and rules (Henrekson et al. 2010). Actors abide when they 
leverage existing institutions to their benefit, including engaging in rent-seeking, 
clientelism, graft, or leveraging existing social and political networks to access goods or 
services. They evade when they avoid existing regulations, such as by holding profits in 
                                                        
9 Other explanations for why marginalized people participate in exploitation (not covered in this 
study) may reside in the “struggle for recognition”  of informal settlers who feel ignored or 
invisible by formal actors but recognized by informal brokers and internalize their authority 
(Honneth, 1996)).  
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tax havens, bribing a government official to avert regulation, or threatening violence 
towards those who pursue to legal sanctions against them. Finally, actors alter existing 
institutions by creating new sets of rules or norms to distribute illegal goods and services 
(e.g., electricity and water). These entrepreneurs fulfil unmet demands of the urban 
poor, producing normatively “good” or “bad” outcomes depending on the constituencies 
they serve and the time scale at which the outcome is analyzed. In Mexico City, for 
example, entrepreneurs fulfill unmet housing demand for the urban poor in the short 
term, but reduce environmental (ecological) services in the long term for the city at large 
where that housing expands on conservation land (e.g., for water provisioning). 
Institutional entrepreneurs have the skills of transformative agency, such as 
recognizing or creating and seizing windows of opportunity, facilitating social 
innovation, building trust and legitimacy, and leveraging social networks (Westley et al., 
2013). Entrepreneurs leverage these skills in land transactions. They dominate the action 
situation because of their greater access to information, such as legal loopholes e.g. to 
obtain ownership via paying cadastral taxes for a specified number of years, and control 
over outcomes compared to other actors. Powerful actors distribute existing political, 
economic, and social capital to convince others to agree to their desired outcome 
(Knight, 1992). These dynamics ultimately determine a “surface” of the distribution of 
payoffs (Fig. 6).  
Payoff surfaces can be used to analyze the incentives and constraints shaping 
decisions and subsequent outcomes. This qualitative visualization highlights which 
actors— the leverage points for institutional change—receive the largest cost and benefits 
and influence the land use outcome. At the risk of oversimplifying complex social and 
political dynamics, visualizing payoffs can help disentangle material and immaterial 
costs and benefits, demonstrating why and how informal institutions emerge. The payoff 
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surface is static for one point in time; shifting rules in use, biophysical conditions, or 
power will change level of control for each actor and perceived costs and benefits. 
Figure 6.  Hypothetical payoff surface of potential outcomes of the action situation. 
Distribution of payoffs is a surface (grey) shaped by the costs and benefits to each actor 
(black circles) arranged around the radial action surface. More powerful actors, with 
larger circles, have more to lose and gain in outcomes. The degree of cost (red shaded 
area) or benefit (green shaded area) for each actor is measured by the distance of their 
vertex to the neutral line. The edge of the cost and benefit area represents neutral or no 
payoff (e.g., actors with no stake in the outcome have their vertex at or near the neutral 
line). Connecting the vertices results in a polygon representing the distribution of payoffs 
among actors.  Payoffs surfaces 1-5 are examples of potential distribution of payoffs 
given the degree of control, cost, and benefit of the potential outcome to each actor. An 
outcome is likely to occur if the green shaded area is larger than the red unshaded area 
(e.g. 1 and 3), and only sometimes occurs when the costs and benefits are similar (e.g. 4).  
 
Informal Urbanization in Mexico City 
Urbanization in Mexico City is largely informal and driven by a lack of affordable 
housing options, with nearly 9 million people in Ciudad de Mexico proper (hereafter, 
CDMX) and over 21 million in the metropolitan area extending into the State of Mexico 
(hereafter MCMA, Mexico City Metro Area, including CDMX ). Since the 1930s most new 
housing in CDMX has been informal and unregulated (Connolly, 2009; Davis, 2010). 
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Despite investment in public housing projects (Fig. 7), the paucity of access to credit for the 
poor to purchase land makes the formal housing market inaccessible to them. The housing 
deficit is estimated at 250,000 and 650,000 units for CDMX and MCMA, respectively, 
despite 50,000 and 770,000 public housing units built in CDMX and MCMA, respectively 
over the past 15 years (based on data from INVI (Housing Institute of Mexico City) 2017, 
Instituto Mexiquense de la Vivienda Social 2017).  
Figure 7. Social housing units built in the State of Mexico by Infonavit (National 
Housing Fund for Workers) (blue line) and Mexico City by  INVI (National Institute of 
Housing) (red line) since ~2000. Two axes are used since housing in State of Mexico is 
10x that of Mexico City.  
 
Informal settlements occupy land not zoned for urbanization. They exist on four 
distinct property regimes: federal land, such as a National Protected Areas, private lands 
not yet designated as formally urban, and two types of social property or land held in 
communal title, collectively termed agrarian land. Two types of social property (land  
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Figure 8. Informal settlements 
(SEDEMA 2016) and agrarian 
communities (inclusive of both ejido 
and communal land) in Mexico City 
(compiled for this study from RAN 
(National Agrarian Registry), 
SEDEMA (Mexico City Ministry of 
the Environment)). 
 
held in common instead of 
individually) include ejidos 
(communally owned properties 
designated for agriculture in 1917) 
and community land (communally 
owned indigenous properties dating 
to the 1600s).10 Social property include communal use areas and plots designated for 
individual members to use, which can be rented but cannot be legally sold.11 Both 
individual use plots and communal areas are informally sold to residents in the MCMA.  
As some communities have been unable to achieve official recognition, the tenure of 
their lands remains in dispute. Communities and ejidos in CDMX are collectively 
referred to as “agrarian communities.” 
 Most informal settlements in CDMX occur in agrarian communities on 
conservation land (Fig 8). Conservation land in the south of the city is not zoned for 
urban development. Permitted land uses there include a mixture of pasture, agricultural, 
forest, and rural agricultural homes. Productive activity in conservation land are subject 
                                                        
10 Both the Spanish Crown post-conquest (known as communal titles) and the Mexican revolution granted social property 
land titles (known as ejido titles) which could not be bought or sold until the Mexican agrarian reform in 1992. 
Considerable dispute remains over overlapping claims between communal and ejido land claims, which remains 
unresolved in Tribunal Agrarian Courts . The term agrarian land is used to refer to include both. 
11 In article 48 of Mexican Agrarian Law, any one who uses land “peacefully” (that is, in “good faith”, meaning the person 
does so with the permission of the land owner) gains ejido rights to the land in five years. In order to prove this “posesion 
pacifica”, the ejido governing board will often charge informal settlers a yearly fee and a slip of paper they can use to prove 
their “peaceful” and “good faith” possession. Though selling ejido parcels is illegal, extending a “peaceful possession” 
grant, is not. This is a common informal way ejido members “sell” land to outsiders. 
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to restrictions including requiring permits for felling trees, construction, and certain 
types of agricultural inputs. 
While no official data exist to estimate informal settlement land and population 
in the MCMA, in CDMX there are at least 3,200 ha of informally urbanized land and an 
estimated 480,000 people living in 859 informal settlements (Santos, 2013, Sedema 
2016).12These populations are economically and socially marginalized (Aguilar, 2008; 
Aguilar and Guerrero, 2013; Aguilar and Lopez, 2015; Aguilar and Santos, 2011) and are 
often engaged in social and political relations that exploit their vulnerability (Cornelius, 
1972; Flores Peña and Soto Alva, 2010; Lomnitz, 2017; Pezzoli, 2000). 
The city has attempted to control informal urban growth on conservation land 
amid growing concern regarding environmental impacts of land change on flooding and 
aquifer recharge (Santos, 2013; Schteingart and Salazar, 2005). Formal programs 
designed to reduce urban expansion in the southern fringe of the city include the CDMX 
“Zero-Growth” plan forbidding urbanization on conservation land, eviction of settlers, 
and support for farmers in the Basin of Mexico via payments for environmental services 
(Perevochtchikova and Vasquez Beltran, 2010; Pezzoli, 2000). These programs have not 
stopped informal growth.   
Regularization, the city’s effort to accommodate irregular settlements into formal 
urban planning, has been a problematic solution to the crisis (Connolly and Wigle, 2017; 
Hiernaux and Lindón, 1996; Iracheta Cenecorta and Smolka, 2000; C. E. Salazar, 2012; 
Varley, 1998; Wigle, 2014, 2010). This process guarantees residents access to urban 
                                                        
12 The population estimates are generated by the authors of this study via combined electoral and census data with the 
2017 data on informal settlements from SEDEMA. Electoral data contains population estimates in rural areas that can be 
used to estimate population outside of the urban AGEB census data which does not cover at least 30% of existing 
document informal settlements. My counts are double the official population counts from SEDUVI. These figures only 
represent the population living on conservation land, which is not zoned for urban use, and does not include the 
thousands of squatters in buildings and urban lots in the city center, homes with private title issues, and the many other 
ways that characterize some type of “irregular” legal situation with respect to land use or tenure (Connolly, 2014).  
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services and the ability to sell and rent land legally (Cruz Rodriguez, 2000). The public 
sector cannot legally supply the physical infrastructure for water, sanitation, or 
electricity to informal settlements until their lands are “regularized.” Regularization is a 
complex, multi institutional process, dependent on land tenure type and takes 5-20 years 
(Lerner et al., 2018; Schteingart and Salazar, 2010). As a result, many communities are 
never regularized. Informal urbanization has outpaced regularization.  
Government actors blame informal settlements for environmental damage in the 
conservation zone (Connolly and Wigle, 2017a; Lerner et al., 2018), while ignoring the 
key role (and responsibility) of formal public policy and clientelism play in urbanization 
patterns (Azuela de la Cueva, 1987a; Duhau and Giglia, 2008; Hagene, 2010; Varley, 
1998). Some civil society groups, however, argue that clientelism is one of the few 
mechanisms to access housing and services for the poor, despite the political obligations 
this transaction engenders (Eakin et al., 2016). Both government actors and previous 
research has focused on informal settlements, instead of on informal transactions.  
Previous work has paid little attention to the informal nature of exchange shaping urban 
expansion in formal development, such as the social and public housing sector, largely 
influenced by informal transactions. 
In a given land area in MCMA, there are four possible outcomes that take place 
on urban land, each of which are considered in the action arena and analyzed: 
urbanization, regularization, eviction, or service provision. Urbanization is an outcome 
of the decision to change land use from forest or agriculture to build a residential home 
or apartment. Regularization involves land tenure or zone changes, such as granting land 
title or changing the zone from agricultural to urban. Eviction or “mitigating” 
urbanization involves the removal of homes or other activities to prevent urban growth. 
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Providing services includes informal or formal development of utilities such as water, 
electricity, or drainage services. 
Methods 
Interviews and participant observation 
Preliminary fieldwork on informal settlements was conducted from June-
October, 2016, undertaken in Spanish by the lead author. It included 10 interviews with 
academic experts on CDMX and MCMA urbanization and 10 actors shaping and 
regulating informal urbanization, including government officials, residents, and political 
leaders. These interviews influenced the typology of informal urbanization in the MCMA.   
Interviews were selected for the various actors in each informal urbanization type 
(Table 1) based on snowball sampling (Bernard, 2006). Resident actors are those that 
purchased informal land to build a home or lived in social or public housing. Land 
owners and land “flippers” (those who resell many plots), private construction 
developers of social housing, and “intermediaries” (brokers of urban services to 
residents) were also interviewed. Other actors included leaders of political and civil 
society groups distributing urban services and titles. Formal governance actors included 
officials at ministries regulating land use and title and urban services. All interview 
personnel were selected through a snowball process, and due to the sensitive nature of 
the topic, an introduction from a trusted, existing contact facilitated their participation.13 
Fifty-four interviews took place from October 2016- August 2017 in the MCMA in 
government offices and communities where urbanization was taking place (Fig. 9 
                                                        
13 Some actors declined interviews due to safety reasons and the sensitive nature of the topic. Interpretations provided in 
this research required triangulation between other interviewees, media, and additional academic research published by 
local scholars (Flores Peña and Soto Alva, 2010; Schteingart and Salazar, 2010). The most powerful actors were notorious, 
and interviewees often repeated similar stories about the same institutional entrepreneurs, making triangulation a viable 
strategy. Developers of social housing were also reluctant to grant interviews, save one. For all other urbanization and 
actor types, interviews reached “saturation”, an indication that enough qualitative, empirical evidence was collected (see 
(Morse, 1995) for a definition of saturation). In general, interviewees were open about the topic and provided rich detail 
about corruption, clientelistic exchange, and the nature of land transactions. 
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identifies the approximate locations of 18 communities, intentionally mapped vaguely to 
protect identity of community and participants). A larger number of actors were 
interviewed for ant urbanization because it took longer to reach saturation due to the 
high amount of variance in transactions and actors involved. 
Table 1. Categories of interviewees by urbanization* and actor type 
urbanization type civil society, 
 political party 
government 
 official 
land owner, flipper, 
developer, or intermediary 
resident Total 
ant 2 10 8 7 27 
invasion 4 1 
 
1 6 
illegal subdivision 1 
 
3 2 6 
public housing 1 2 1 1 5 
regularization** 1 8 
  
9 
Total 9 21 12 12 54 
*See explanation of the classification in the results section 
**many government actors are involved in land titling. Of the 21 government actors 
interviewed, 4 regulate the environment and mitigating urbanization (PAOT 
(Procuraduría Ambiental y del Ordenamiento Territorial de la Ciudad de México/The 
Environmental and Regional Planning Attorney General's Office), AZP (Area de Zona 
Patrimonial), SEDEMA (Secretaria de Medio Ambiente de la Ciudad de México/ 
Secretariat of Environment of Mexico City)), 7 are involved in titling (CORETT 
(Comisión para la Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra/ Commission of 
Regularization and Land Tenure), DGRT(Dirección General de Regularización 
Territorial/Ministry of Land Regularization), RAN (Registro Agrario Nacional/National 
Agrarian Registry), FIFONAFE (Fondo Nacional de Fomento Ejidal/National Ejido 
Growth Fund), INSUS (Institutio National de Suelo Sustenable/ National Institute of 
Sustainable Land), 3 in urban service provision (CFE, SACMEX, city legislators), and 6 
with urbanization directly (Local government, SEDUVI (Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano 
y Vivenda de la Ciudad de México/Secretariat of Urban Development and Housing for 
Mexico City), INVI (Institutio de Vivienda de la CDMX/ Institute for Housing, Mexico 
City).  
 
Semi-structured interviews were employed, aimed at understanding the 
perceived costs and benefits to each actor from the four land use outcomes: urbanization, 
regularization, eviction, or service provision. Interviews involved questions about buying 
or selling land, the motivations for exchange, conditions of transaction, the price, the 
time and process to access services and titles, and government agencies that hindered or 
facilitated the process (see appendix A for survey instrument). Government regulators 
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were questioned regarding their role in regularization, eviction, and service provision, 
and other agencies that facilitated or obfuscated their mission. Selected quotes from the 
interviewees illustrate the results. Pseudonyms replace actual names.  
Participant observation in field sites allowed for collection of additional 
information on actors, especially intermediaries. Government meetings attended include 
the CREX (Special Commission for 
Regularization, where representatives of 
government agencies decide which informal 
settlements receive title) and meetings to 
plan evictions. Leaders of political groups 
well known for leading squatter groups to 
settle in the land invasion type included 
Antorcha Campesina and the Frente Popular 
Francisco Villa Independiente. Leaders were 
asked to delineate the territories they were 
responsible for urbanizing using a GIS.  
Figure 9. Map of field sites (approximate location) to informal urbanization sites across 
The Mexico City Metropolitan Area. 
 
Coding and Analysis 
All interviews were recorded and the transcribed notes thereof were analyzed using 
the qualitative analysis software Dedoose. Codes were based on the action situation 
variables, including access to information (high, medium, or low), control (high, 
medium, or low), and payoffs (positive, neutral, or negative) to each actor in four 
potential outcomes (or variables) of the action situation: urbanizing, regularizing, 
evicting, or providing services. Categories of high, medium, and low access to 
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information and control were determined qualitatively based on interview quotes which 
directly asked respondents to comment on these factors. 
In order to visualize the data as payoff surfaces, data for each of these variables from 
the action situation per actor were recorded in an institutional matrix for each of the four 
urbanization types studied. Qualitative information from these tables were recoded into 
level of control (high=3, medium=2, low=1) and presence or absence of payoffs 
(positive=1, neutral= 0, and negative = -1). The payoff surfaces (Fig 6) for each outcome 
are displayed by multiplying the level of control by the payoff (to plot the vertex of each 
actor) and drawing a polygon connecting all vertices. Thus, the most powerful actors 
(control = 3) shape the payoff distribution surface three times that of the least powerful 
actors (control=1). Payoffs include social, political, economic, and land based costs and 
benefits, detailed in the institutional matrices and indicated in action situation surface 
radial plots. 
Results 
Three types of informal urbanization have been identified previously and are 
confirmed in this study, and we add a fourth not recognized in previous assessments : i) 
ant urbanization (direct sale of one plot to one settler), ii) illegal subdivision (one actor 
who buys and sells many plots of land), iii) land invasion (a group of settlers illegally 
squatting on land), and, the added type, iv) social or public housing (city or federal 
subsidized housing for low or middle income populations).  
Ant urbanization, or locally “urbanizacion hormiga”, is the direct sale of a small 
plot of land between two parties, resulting in incremental settlement growth (Aguilar 
and Lopez, 2015; Aguilar and Santos, 2011; Ruíz-Gómez, 2006). Based on my results, ant 
urbanization likely represents the highest number of total informal urban transactions 
on conservation land and is the most common way of accessing informal urban land in 
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CDMX. Typically, a member of an agrarian community needs to sell an asset, or no 
longer wishes to farm and, advertises a parcel for sale on a sign or light poles, in the 
newspaper, or in a local store. Interested parties in purchasing land on the informal 
market, commonly from a rural area, call to arrange a price and sign a “compra-venta”, 
or buy-sell contract with a notary. Often the seller offers credit to the buyer who pays in 
installments. This informal “sale” is not against the law, but the contract has no legal 
standing in court because the plot is either social property or of uncertain tenure.14 
Subdivision is the second most common way to access CDMX conservation land, 
and the most common form of access in the MCMA. Most subdivision occurs exclusively 
on social property, unlike ant urbanization, which includes private land. In this 
arrangement, an intermediary typically purchases a large area with many plots, 
sometimes obtained through bribery, violence, or by exploiting legal uncertainties in 
ownership. These institutional entrepreneurs are locally referred to as “fraccionadores”, 
which we translate to subdividers or land flippers. Large-scale subdivisioning (100+ lots) 
is common in the MCMA, with smaller scale subdivisioning on conservation land 
prevalent in CDMX. Together, ant urbanization and subdivision account for the 3,200 ha 
of informal urban growth in conservation land in CDMX (Connolly and Castro, 2016).15 
The least common way to access land is land invasion. It is colloquially referred 
to as paracaidismo, or parachuting, indicating the arrival of many people suddenly 
descending onto a plot of land and constructing homes. Invasions are typically directed 
by a political leader and occur on public or federal land, such as parks, trash dumps, 
small urban plots, or buildings with uncertain legal status.  This form of urbanization 
                                                        
14 Only parcels registered in the Public Property Registry have institutional backing for individual ownership. Some 
settlers may have “posesion pacifica”, which does not guarantee legal ownership rights, but may be useful supporting 
documentation to “regularize” the property (give a private land title) if the settler seeks to gain legal title. 
15 While exact numbers of informal urbanization are unavailable for the greater metropolitan area, census districts with at 
least 50% of their population in “colonias populares”, which include both ant urbanization and subdivision, represented 
66,000 ha (Connolly and Castro, 2016). The actual amount of urbanized land within these 66,000 ha is unknown. 
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was prevalent in Mexico City in the 1940s-1970s (Moctezuma, 1984; Ward, 1976), and 
immediately after the 1985 earthquake, but has since declined. New invasions continue 
to occur in CDMX and the MCMA, however, under the auspices of two groups, Antorcha 
Campesina, and Frente Popular Francisco Villa (FPFV). Participatory mapping with 
these two groups revealed they claim 37 communities on 600 ha, less than 2% of the area 
of urban land growth in the MCMA.  
Public and social housing is commonly ignored in studies of informal 
urbanization, perhaps due to its mostly “legal” nature. Informal rules and transactions 
largely shape its development, however, warranting consideration when analyzing 
informality. This form of urbanization consumes the largest total land area, representing 
up to 11,000 ha of new urban growth on ejido land in MCMA (Salazar, 2014).  Most 
government investment in social housing goes to the Infonavit (National Housing Fund 
for Workers) program. Access to such housing, however, is limited to those with jobs in 
the formal sector and incomes five times the Mexican minimum wage (see Flores Peña 
and Soto Alva, 2010).  Infonavit homes are built in State of Mexico on the MCMA urban 
fringe by development construction companies on cheap agricultural, often ejido land. 
Developers leverage their political or economic capital to re-zone the land from 
agricultural to urban and build housing units sold to the government, which, in turn, 
offers subsidized housing credit to eligible citizens. Municipalities are required to 
provide urban services to Infonavit homes built in their region, even though developers 
make the profit from the capital gain this infrastructure generates. The government pays 
developers for the homes before they are occupied, which reduces uncertainty for the 
developer, keeps their profit margins high, and encourages construction in cheap land 
far from urban amenities.  
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Figure 10. The main types 
of payoffs for the four 
urbanization types studied 
in the Mexico Metropolitan 
Area. Political returns 
include votes, political 
power used to climb position 
in one’s political party, or 
ability to convene mass 
mobilization. Economic 
returns includes money 
receive through bribes, 
taxes, profits, or land sales. 
 
The four types of 
urbanization can be 
summarized by the degree of political and economic payoffs in each informal 
urbanization institution based payoff surfaces described in detail below (Fig. 10). Ant 
urbanization generates the smallest concentration of economic and political capital 
relative to other types. The direct seller of land makes a modest amount money, but the 
returns are distributed through the various landowners. Subdivision generates larger 
economic returns than ant urbanization, concentrated in one actor. The political returns 
(e.g. votes, ability to climb party ranks, and capacity to convene protests) may be 
somewhat higher, but are similar to ant urbanization. Land invasion generates large 
political returns. The economic returns can be higher than subdivision, or similar, 
depending on the size of the invasion. Social housing generates the highest economic 
returns, concentrated in one developer. It is the largest and most concentrated set of 
economic returns to the development and, potentially, the ejido or municipality involved 
via taxes or kickbacks.  
Distribution of benefits and losses and the emergent entrepreneurs in four informal 
urban settlement types 
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Four types of informal urbanization and their corresponding payoff surfaces 
identify the institutional entrepreneurs (with larger font) and distribution of losses and 
benefits (via payoff surfaces) in each four potential land use outcomes (Figs 11-14). Land 
outcomes are more persistent when payoff surfaces shade a larger portion of green area 
(benefits) compared to a revealed red area (costs). Details about the types of payoffs are 
summarized in the institutional matrix for each urbanization type in the supplementary 
materials (SI Tables 1-4).  
Ant urbanization 
Payoff surfaces promote urbanization and service provision but not 
regularization or environmental mitigation in ant urbanization.  Most actors in the 
action situation gain when land is urbanized or services provided, only some gain when 
land is regularized, and only one actor, the Ministry of the Environment, gains when 
urbanization is mitigated via conservation efforts. The city at large may also gain 
ecosystem services when urban growth is prevented, but is not an actor making decision 
in this arena (except indirectly, via their vote in local elections). 
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Figure 11. Payoff surfaces for ant urbanization. Benefits in green, losses in red. Low 
information/control in white, and higher information and control in darker grey. Payoff 
types for capitals in the following symbols:* = political (votes, climbing party ladder), $= 
economic (pesos, taxes, budgets), ^= land , #= social (exclusion, violence, prestige, 
control), 0= no stake, no payoff. 
 
Intermediary actors or institutional entrepreneurs provide urban services. 
Intermediaries are either residents with higher political capital than their neighbors or 
political party brokers who profit by collecting fees from residents (~10,000 pesos [$500 
USD] for enabling illegal services), a portion of which is paid to government utility 
employees that make the service connections. Intermediaries reportedly use violence and 
threats to enforce informal contracts with residents, especially in the case of non-
payment or complaints about fees. As one resident reported:  
“Darla16 comes and she sells the electricity. And she passes the money 
to CFE [the federal electricity company]. She charged 10,000 pesos 
for electricity and another 10,500 for water and we must pay in cash. 
She is violent…one woman from a nearby community came and 
informally added her cable into our system, and she received threats 
[from Darla].”  
                                                        
16 All names are changed to protect identities. 
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In some cases, political brokers, often borough leaders or local legislators, provide 
services like electricity in exchange for political support in campaigns: “Jones [a city 
legislator] helped with the electricity, but the local government put in the other 50%. 
We had to sign a promise to support his campaign.”  High need, fear of losing services, 
and low access to information regarding rights leads to residents’ compliance with these 
conditions of exchange.  
Regularization rarely occurs, in part because of competing interests among actors 
(Fig. 11). Regularization benefits residents who gain certainty over land tenure and 
access to affordable legal, urban services, but provides mixed payoffs to land owners. 
Interviewees mentioned regularization enables legal landowners to “sell the land twice,” 
first on the informal land market to the resident, and second to the government who 
compensates them for land expropriation to “formalize” the informal sale. Yet the 
economic benefit of expropriation is lower than informal market value of the land, and 
losing land to expropriation is an opportunity cost because that parcel can no longer 
benefit from use for tourism, agriculture, or environmental services. 
In contrast, regularization represents a cost to institutional entrepreneurs (Fig 11) 
who lose opportunities to profit from “selling” informal services. Political actors often 
attempt to capture votes through the promise of regularization in campaigns, but 
ultimately are unable or unwilling to grant title. Regularization may also be blocked by 
environmental and civil protection agencies because it contradicts their institutional 
mandates to protect conservation land or to ensure residents do not live in areas with 
environmental hazards like landslides or flooding.  
Actions to mitigate urbanization seldom occur because the costs largely outweigh 
the benefits. Only the Ministry of Environment benefits from preventing urbanization on 
conservation land, which is part of its mission. While it is the most informed actor 
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regarding the rate and location of informal urbanization, it is under-resourced and must 
be selective in enforcing regulations, such as preserving conservation land, because 
eviction of informal settlements requires large portions of its small budget.  
Institutional entrepreneurs, especially government officials, stand to gain both 
politically and economically from thwarting urbanization mitigation strategies. 
Interviewees explain that evictions are often blocked by ejido presidents, local borough 
leaders, or mayors, all who have legal jurisdiction to prevent an eviction. Evictions are 
prevented at inconvenient political periods [e.g., immediately before elections] or when 
entrepreneurs are profiting from urban services or charging “right to stay” fees. 
Interestingly, even when evictions occur, residents often return and rebuild.  
Those who sell conservation land rarely experience consequences. Interviewees 
claim they do not report land-use violations unless they have a bad relationship with 
their neighbor: “unless your neighbor really does not like you, they won’t report you”. 
Even if the neighbor reports, government officials are easily bribed by residents to avoid 
sanction. Indeed less than 1000 reports of this kind were generated between 2000-13, 
about one percent of the Ant homes build over this time (Rodriguez Lopez et al., 2017a). 
Ejido or community members rarely sanction the member who sells a single plot of land. 
Importantly, the sale of conservation land resides in an “a-legal” grey area. Construction 
by residents on conservation land, however, is a punishable crime. The costs of 
regulating urbanization is highest for residents, even though they gain less relative to 
other actors in the informal land market (Fig. 11). 
Financial incentives to landowners to increase the value of land for non-urban 
uses are lower than potential benefits from selling land informally (Fig. 11, in mitigation, 
the land seller vertex is close to the neutral line, but in urbanization, the vertex moves 
out into the green benefits space). Incentives include rural agricultural support programs 
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(Bausch et al., 2018) and payments for ecosystem services (Caro-borrero et al., 2015). 
Yet both ejido members and environment ministry employees agreed that environmental 
service payments (~1 peso/ha) are too far below opportunity costs of agricultural 
production (6 pesos/ha) or selling land on the informal urban market (50 pesos/m2). 
Subdivision 
Payoffs for subdivision are similar to ant urbanization but profits are more 
concentrated in the “land flipper” (Fig. 12). In this case payoffs promote regularization, 
and there are no independent intermediaries providing services. Rather, a political party 
or group, a government official, or an ejido leader facilitates the transaction to provide 
services.  
 
Figure 12. Payoff surfaces for subdivision. 
Subdividers include a diversity of powerful actors whose political and economic 
gains increase in accordance with their institutional influence and area of land they 
transact. Subdividers include “corredores” who facilitate land subdivision for a fee at 
10% interest to the land owners (Cruz Rodriguez, 2000), and entrepreneurial ejido or 
community members who buy land from extended family and resell lots through a 
  56 
lawyer (typically 10-50 lots). Ejido presidents may sell large tracts of land or facilitate 
sales for other members, and yet other illegal sub-dividers may sell land they do not own 
(100+ lots). The most influential subdividers are political parties that broker large deals 
with agrarian leaders and resell to poor residents with credit (100s-1000s of lots).   
 Of all actors in subdivisions, the subdividers receive the largest benefits for 
urbanizing land, gaining up to 1000% profit in some cases by our calculation. This power 
asymmetry ensures they can extract economic profits from informal land transactions, 
reportedly used to payoff government officials to avoid sanctions “…. ‘if you each give me 
10,000 pesos, nothing happened here.’” These institutional entrepreneurs are reported 
to exploit legal uncertainty in communal property systems by falsifying property 
documents from other states outside CDMX through political connections, sell social 
property in communities awaiting legal title, and pay property taxes on lots they do not 
yet own to establish ownership. 
Ejido members receive money from selling land to subdividers. Ejido members 
sell land to land flippers because legally selling the land themselves requires 
disincorporation from the ejido, requiring a high transaction cost. In other case, they are 
sometimes exploited when faced with significant pressure to sell. Ejido members also 
report being tricked by subdividers who disappear before full payment is received. 
Regularization in subdivision benefits residents who receive title, and 
government officials facilitating the transaction gain politically and economically. 
Regularization represents an opportunity for graft in the centralized federal agency that 
regularizes ejido land where reportedly “…expropriation is a business of corruption.” 
Regularization represents a relatively small benefit to ejido members because 
expropriation compensation is small. 
  57 
 Only the Ministry of Environment benefits from preventing subdivisioning, and 
there are rarely consequences for subdividers. Both interviews and previous literature 
documents how ejidos struggle to sanction members because of uncertain legal 
boundaries, social norms, threat of violence and even death (Ruíz-Gómez, 2006). They 
cannot sanction non-ejido family members who are often the entrepreneurs selling land. 
Agrarian communities cannot afford to pay the legal fees to agrarian courts to obtain the 
rights to sanction subdividers. Strong social norms prevent sanctioning: “we don’t get 
involved in people’s inheritances. How do we sanction someone’s grandson?”  
Local governments are incentivized to protect subdividers due to increasing tax 
revenue new settlers generate. One government official explained that his supervisor told 
him not to sanction a subdivider because his settlements brought more than two million 
pesos (~100,000 $USD) to the municipality annually. Subdividers exploit residents who 
don’t understand formal property rights. In one court case, “… the people [residents] 
showed their contracts on a napkin.” If eviction is evoked, the distribution of losses falls 
squarely on the resident who loses their home. Sometimes other institutional 
entrepreneurs reportedly use threat of eviction to punish bad voting behavior or extort 
residents for money. 
Invasion  
The payoff surface of urbanization, service provision, and regularization in land 
invasions generates political benefits to three entrepreneurs—informal service providers, 
political groups, and government actors—with little cost to other actors with influence 
(Fig. 13). As a result, all three of these land outcomes happen frequently and rapidly in 
land invasions. The information asymmetry between residents and the political groups 
offering land is smaller for land invasion than that for subdivision and ant urbanization.  
  58 
 
Figure 13. Payoff surfaces for invasion. Inf. Ser. Prov.= Informal service provider, such 
as the Mexican electricians union. NA is marked for outcomes in which they have no 
stake. 
 
The distribution of costs and benefits between landowners and “invading” groups 
is unclear and sometimes the process of invasion and subdivision becomes fused, 
depending on the degree of consent attributed to actors in the process. While political 
groups like Antorcha Campesina are typically associated with land invasion in media 
and academic discourse (e.g., Hiernaux and Lindón, 1996), interviews revealed a more 
complex picture. Antorcha leadership and some public officials reported sales are always 
done with the consent of ejido leadership, and should not be considered invasions. 
Nevertheless, some ejido members characterized “consent” as coercion: ”Members of 
Antorcha steal crops, beat, or kill other members, so it’s just better to sell [to 
Antorcha].” A government official confirmed the use of violence to gain consent. : 
“Antorcha…they make deals with the ejido members...with a pistol!”  
 For the resident, land and services are more cheaply acquired through these 
political organizations than through intermediaries in subdivision or ant urbanization. 
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The organizations rely on political power, not bribes, to enforce contracts. Invading 
organizations sometimes have prearranged contracts for service provisioning, for 
example, with the Federal Electricity Agency (CFE) or the Union of Mexican Electricians. 
In other cases, invading organizations successfully broker services with local 
governments through mass mobilization. As one government official in the borough of 
Iztapalapa noted, “…they take what they need. They don’t ask for things, they demand 
them.” Local governments may facilitate informal service provision, for example, by “… 
allowing a water pipe to lay around nearby so that someone can connect to it 
magically in the middle of the night.” Invading organizations solve the problem of 
service provision for informal settlements and in return, the government official enjoys 
political support from these groups and their residents.  
It is through this political participation and support that residents pay the cost of 
urban service access. Antorcha requires a minimum of two years participation in 
protests and meetings for the right to purchase a plot at relatively low prices. Control 
over electric service provision is used to enforce participation with the politics of the 
organization, although the rates for utilities is also relatively low : “They each pay 800 
pesos, but we [land invasion leaders] cut their electricity if they don’t participate---if 
they don’t go to the protests. Cutting electricity is our control.”  Yet for other residents, 
the transaction costs of political participation can be too high: “we go to marches, and 
meetings each Sunday. We have to sign records of our attendance at protests and 
marches [when requested by the political party] We can’t miss three events or they kick 
us out! …We have no secure life…. We can’t even go to work!” Despite the burden of 
time, residents enter the exchange because they have few alternatives, or perceive these 
terms to be better than ant urbanization or engaging in a subdivision. 
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 The political transactions between residents and entrepreneurs facilitates 
regularization and can impede evictions. Politicians, often former invasion leaders 
themselves, use their invasion constituencies to climb the political ladder: “that 
legislator put names on housing lists because there were electoral clients. She did not 
do it to keep her existing position, but to gain power in the same party”. One powerful 
politician changed the boundary of a protected area to grant titles to her supporters. In 
one notorious case, an interviewee explained a politically powerful institutional 
entrepreneur enjoyed 10 years of political protection before an eviction was attempted. 
In other cases, former land-invasion group leaders became leaders of environmental 
regulatory agencies, using their position to prevent evictions for the groups who brought 
them to power.  
Public and Social housing 
Fewer actors constitute the action arena for social and public housing compared 
to other types of informal urbanization (Fig. 14). As no actors are working to mitigate 
social and public housing, it is not an outcome in the action arena and has no payoff 
surface.  Benefits are largely distributed to developers and the government actors 
receiving their kickbacks.  
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Figure 14. Payoff surfaces for public and social housing. There is no potential 
mitigation strategy to consider outcome since this cannot occur on conservation land- so 
is not a policy option. 
 
The primary institutional entrepreneur is the developer. Their power resides in their 
access to regulatory information and their influence over local land zoning plans. Lack of 
planning capacity in local governments makes it easy for developers to manipulate land-
use zoning to favor their interests. This control allows them to ensure profits from 
purchasing agricultural land and selling homes on newly zoned urban land with services 
supplied by the local government. Interviewees report that the “external” audits of these 
transactions are often done by the developers themselves. These political and economic 
arrangements allow the developer to secure significant payoffs:  
“The State and local government have been our silent business 
partner….there are prearranged deals. They never oppose us. The 
developer says, ‘how do we get this done,’…manages the environmental 
impact study…and pays for the new altered land zoning plan.” 
 
Similar to subdivision, while the ejido earns some money from land sales, 
another institutional entrepreneur, the developer, captures larger profits (Fig. 
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14). Ejido land sales must be offered to members at a lower price before being 
sold to an outside entity (derecho al tanto in Mexican agrarian law). Interviewees 
asserted developers take advantage of this law by becoming an ejido member to 
purchase this discounted land but selling it for market value.  
 The benefits to municipalities of building social housing are mixed. Social 
housing tax existing under resources urban services, because municipalities are required 
to supply services. Municipalities benefit from increased tax revenue, however, some 
politicians enjoy kickbacks or even formal profit shares as many are investors in these 
development companies.  
 Paradoxically, the distribution of costs from social housing fall on the actors 
whom social housing is intended to benefit: residents and the public. Due to poor 
construction and distance from urban amenities, only 30% of constructed social homes 
are occupied. Residents often abandon homes, which developers attempt to recover and 
resell. In a bizarre overlap with land invasion, one architect reported developers made 
deals with Antorcha Campesina to invade abandoned social homes. This process brings 
the case in court, where the judge annuls ownership of the missing homeowners, and 
developers can resell.  
 In contrast to social housing, public housing in CDMX is accessible to low income 
residents, and with less interference from developers. However, the high transaction 
costs of paperwork to get one’s name on a list is so high that citizens must work with 
political groups to access a home. The housing ministry recognized political groups 
influence the distribution of homes:  “They [political groups] buy their homes from the 
workers in the housing ministry. All the housing is distributed in the PRD [ruling left 
party] party. Then the leaders offer their members homes. The political and social 
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benefits get mixed up.”  Thus, the costs for public housing in CDMX to residents are 
similar to invasion, because access requires political participation. 
Discussion 
Informality influences urban expansion beyond informal settlements 
This study disaggregated informal urban expansion for CDMX and MCMA, 
adding social and public housing, typically absent from studies of urban informality (Fig. 
10). Previous work did not consider the last category, in part, because their approach to 
informality did not focus on transactions and the institutional analysis that guided our 
research (Connolly and Castro, 2016; Rodríguez, 2001; Ward, 1976). Other types of 
formal urban expansion are influenced by informal transactions to some degree (e.g. 
bribes to expedite construction permits), but social and public housing merit special 
attention in our typology for three reasons. First, social and public housing is intended to 
provide access to housing for the same populations living in informal settlements (via 
invasion, ant urbanization, and subdivision), but has been inefficient and inaccessible to 
them. Second, social housing represents a significant portion of MCMA’s urban extent 
growth from 2000-2016. Finally, powerful rent-seeking actors who accrue benefits from 
the publicly funded housing that puts pressure on under-resourced municipalities for 
services. Studies of informal urban expansion in Mexico City and elsewhere should 
examine informal transactions in the public and social housing sector in addition to the 
more tangible informal settlements.      
Payoff surfaces highlight how actors and their incentives shape persistent land use 
outcomes 
  The payoff “surfaces” depicted in Figures 11-14 favor urbanization, disfavor 
conservation and mitigation strategies, and illustrate conditions in which regularization 
stagnates (e.g., ant urbanization) versus succeeds (e.g., subdivision, invasion). Previous 
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literature on Mexico City has made similar general conclusions regarding this pattern. 
This study, however, systematically identifies what and who generates these dynamics, 
expanding understanding of the processes with benefits for land system models and, 
potentially, for governance. 
 Urban expansion persists in Mexico City because “everybody wins”, as noted 
previously (Flores Peña and Soto Alva, 2010). However, our results nuance this 
observation, identifying how some actors win more than others, and the type of benefits 
they accrue depends on the urbanization type (Fig. 10). From developers to the 
corredores, to the political broker, to the ejido member, it is the person directly selling 
land, homes, or urban services to the poor that captures the majority of benefits from 
informal exchange. These actors use their access to information and existing economic 
and political capital to distribute goods to a marginalized population whose range of 
choice to fulfill these needs is limited.  
Our results indicate differences in the degree of political and economic gain among 
the institutional entrepreneurs. Developers of social housing reap larger economic 
benefits than any other actor. The entrepreneurs directing land invasions, blocking 
eviction, providing services, and accessing land titles capture the highest political 
returns. Entrepreneurs aggregating larger tracts of land, such as a subdivider selling 
1,000 lots, exert more influence over the conditions of exchange than those in ant 
urbanization. Recognizing this difference in agency among entrepreneurs is key for the 
operation of various land models, such as ABMs, and hints at the means to provide 
regulation, if such regulation is desired. 
 Extant research asserts that “inaction” toward informality in Mexico City (Azuela de 
la Cueva, 1987b; Connolly and Wigle, 2017b; Iracheta Cenecorta and Smolka, 2000) and 
elsewhere (Roy, 2005; Van Gelder, 2013) is produced by ineffective or politically 
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motivated urban authorities and bureaucracies. We extend this finding, showing inaction 
is also shaped by intermediaries and political groups receiving specific payoffs. Efforts to 
eliminate informality (e.g., through eviction) or reduce it by rendering it legal (e.g., 
through regularization) are unlikely to succeed as they represent large political and 
economic costs to a variety of institutional entrepreneurs. Local governments receive 
tangible benefits from informal expansion and ensuing population growth via increasing 
budgets, tax revenues, and new votes to capture. As a result, strategies to eliminate 
informal settlements (eviction) run counter to incentives promoting expansion. 
Institutional incentives are compounded by personal incentives for political and 
economic gain. Actors preventing eviction gather clienteles of informal residents and 
receive promotion within their political party. Government officials may receive bribes 
and kickbacks from intermediaries, residents, or land flippers who seek to avoid 
sanction.  
Previous work on regularization claims governments stall regularization for 
territorial control in conservation land (Connolly and Wigle, 2017b) and land titles are 
distributed via clientelism (Azuela de la Cueva, 1987a; Duhau, 1998; Varley, 1998). 
Stagnation or acceleration of land titling differs across types of urbanization, however, a 
distinction clearly made in this study. As examples, payoff surfaces favor regularization 
(e.g., zone changes and titling) for invasions, social housing, and subdivisions, but not 
ant urbanization. In land invasion, subdivision, or social housing, political and economic 
returns concentrate in institutional entrepreneurs with power to affect outcomes.  
In contrast, because ant urbanization is dispersed across conservation land, cost and 
benefits of regularization are diffused among a diversity of actors (Fig. 11). 
Regularization represents a cost to intermediaries who distribute public goods informal 
residents cannot access, and to the Ministry of Environment who fears it incentivizes 
  66 
more urban growth. Regularization benefits local governments and political parties with 
informal residents’ votes. These conflicting incentives generate inertia in land titling and 
perpetuates informality.  
Consequences and benefits of informal urban expansion 
Ultimately, this research raises questions not only about the effectiveness of 
current policies to control informal urban growth, but also why it is considered a 
problem in the first place. Perhaps the problem lies in the negative externalities 
associated with informal land transactions, and how they shape housing for the urban 
poor, degradation of conservation land, social exploitation of informal settlers, and rent-
seeking of public officials.  
Until housing needs for the urban poor are addressed, informal settlements will 
represent potential political and economic rents. Ant, subdivision, and invasion, 
emerged to fill this unmet demand and together provided housing for nearly twice as 
many residents (~100,000) as the public housing ministry (~54,000) from 2000-2015 in 
CDMX (INVI), almost all with electricity. The access created by land flippers, 
intermediaries, and political groups is pivotal in providing access to urban plots for the 
poor. In a sense, the “success” of urban expansion is made possible by the institutional 
innovation of entrepreneurs and the functional role clientelism, corruption, and rent-
seeking plays in the existing system.  
Reliance on informal settlements to meet housing needs has environmental costs, 
however (Aguilar and Santos, 2011; Santos, 2013). The potential consequences of 
informal growth in both water security and flooding is well recognized by residents and 
urban decision makers in Mexico City (Lerner et al., 2018). Yet the public and academic 
discourse focuses on ant urbanization, which only represents 3,200 ha, about 25% the 
land area compared to the 11,000 ha of inefficient and mostly vacant social housing 
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constructed in MCMA. If environmental disservices are the issue of concern, subsequent 
research should compare the impact of ant urbanization to social housing, and consider 
which plays a larger role in eroding the aquifer. 
Social costs of informality include exploitation and corruption. Institutional 
entrepreneurs who take advantage of residents’ information asymmetry, legal 
vulnerability, already meagre paychecks, and votes. The degree of exploitation differs by 
urbanization type. Contrary to academic discourse, which has accused land invasion 
groups like Antorcha Campesina of “lack of transparent interests, violent action, and 
fascist tendencies” (Hiernaux and Lindón, 1996), residents may be less exploited in land 
invasions than the alternative informal processes. Corruption is a concern because it is a 
non-transparent distribution of public resources. There are two types of corruption:  an 
adaptive response to high transaction costs and an opportunity for economic gain (rent-
seeking). The latter is of larger concern for a variety of reasons. For example, in the 
CDMX 2017 earthquake a Mexican Watchdog NGO investigated 28 of 38 collapsed 
buildings and found evidence of public corruption in every case by construction 
companies avoiding regulation or paying off building inspectors (Mexicans Against 
Corruption and Impunity 2018).  
Interventions to tackle negative outcomes of informal urban growth 
 Existing policies could be reexamined based on their ability to address the 
aforementioned issues of concern, instead of their ability to eliminate informality. Once a 
negative externality is identified, payoff surfaces locate the associated actor advancing 
undesirable outcomes. Potential strategies include regulating people, not (only) land, 
working with local institutions, and improving transparency and sanctioning of public 
actors. 
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Existing policies regulate land-use, not actors. Current initiatives to mitigate urban 
growth on conservation land include both carrots (environmental incentives (PES) to 
agrarian communities) and sticks (eviction). A growing set of land regulation 
instruments and “politics of containment” (Pezzoli, 2000) was implemented in the 1990s 
but has failed to mitigate growth. Local governments “regulate” urbanization through 
forgiveness rather than planning, updating land plans to reflect the most recent illegal 
urban expansion (Lerner et al., 2018). Eviction policies blame residents as the engines of 
environmental destruction instead of the actors who largely drive these processes. 
Policies could regulate actors with influence — intermediaries and government 
officials providing or facilitating informal services, actors selling land, and local 
government. Increasing payments for environmental services or developing long-term 
conservation easements could disincentivize owners from selling conservation lands. The 
Ministry of the Environment currently has low to moderate power (and small budget!) to 
mitigate urban growth. As a result, in Mexico City and elsewhere in Latin America, local 
politicians block evictions to gain political capital with settlers (aka “forbearance” 
(Holland, 2016)). Centralizing decisions in a ministry with unelected officials would be 
one way to remove political capital from the equation and encourage efforts to mitigate 
urban growth. Increasing transparency via improved monitoring efforts of public actors 
and intermediaries and following through on sanctions could combat rent seeking and 
exploitation. 
 Working with, rather than against, the existing institutions providing material and 
urban services could reduce the environmental impact of urban growth. The 
entrepreneurship of existing intermediaries and government officials providing informal 
urban services illegally could be leveraged to transition communities in conservation 
land to environmentally friendly services. Local governments could offer subsidized 
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rainwater capture, solar power system, or compost based sewage. Residents themselves 
could become institutional entrepreneurs. In the borough of Xochimilco, which has 
primarily been settled informally, residents in both formal and informal neighborhoods 
demonstrate the agency and ability to build social innovation and seize windows of 
opportunity  (Charli-Joseph et al., 2018). Decades of research in urban planning support 
examples of institutional entrepreneurs in informal settlements who have successfully 
transformed social environmental conditions (e.g (Jane Jacobs, 1965).  
Conclusion 
Informality is often discussed as external to the norm. Informal rules are the norm in 
the urbanizing Global South, however. Framing informality as normatively bad or 
immoral can obscure the function these transactions perform in cities. Analyzing 
informality as an institution (set of rules and norms) allow us to understand the logic 
responsible for its persistence.  
Focusing on the institutions, informal urban expansion in Mexico City and its 
environment maintains four major types: ant urbanization, subdivision, land invasion, 
and social and public housing. Institutional entrepreneurs—developers, political groups, 
rent-seeking politicians, and intermediaries—largely shape the processes and capture 
most of the political and economic benefits in each. Using institutional analysis to 
elucidate payoffs schemes among component types of urbanization could make the 
“chaos” of urban informality interpretable for land simulation modeling efforts, like 
agent-based models, used to predict scenarios of urban growth. Previous qualitative case 
studies do not systematically identify the actors, rules sets, degree of control, and 
structure of incentives in each type of informal urban expansion identified in this study. 
The typology and payoff surfaces presented here disentangle urban informality, making 
its dynamics more legible not only for modeling, but also for governance. 
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Discourse and policy has focused on eliminating informality by either regularizing or 
evicting residents who are, paradoxically, the victims and assumed source of the 
problem. This study points to the kind of analyses that provide critical information for 
potential interventions to mitigate identified harm to society and the environment from 
existing informal urban expansion. 
Informality is not an unpredictable, unusual, or even merely a “material” part of the 
urban growth process. Cities are constructed by people, and incentives and rules are 
formed by the conditions in which people make decisions. Urban sustainability relies on 
the ability to analyze the patterns and consequences of these decisions, and to reshape 
institutions to improve social environmental outcomes.    
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CHAPTER 3 
DO ELECTORAL POLITICS INFLUENCE LAND TITLING AND EXPANSION OF 
INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS? THE CASE OF MEXICO CITY 
Abstract 
A large portion of urban expansion occurs informally and in the developing world. These 
settlements often lack access to basic services and have insecure tenure. By definition, 
they exist in areas where urbanization is not permitted and thus lack formal title. 
Politicians may seek to provide support to settlers by facilitating land titling, connection 
to urban services, and other ventures in exchange for their votes. While this relationship 
has long been recognized, the hypothesis that electoral politics may influence settlement 
expansion and the distribution of land titles has not been formally tested. This research 
tests these relationships using fixed effects panel regressions to examine the influence of 
electoral cycles and voting patterns on the distribution of land titles and informal urban 
growth in conservation lands in Mexico City from 1997-2015 . Parties attract voters 
through activities including distributing cement for housing, paving roads, and illegally 
connecting communities to urban utilities. We find that the distribution of land titles for 
informal settlements on private land increases in the months leading up to local 
elections, and that more titles are given to core voters of the historically dominant party. 
Land titling for settlements on collective property, however, has no apparent electoral 
signature. Urban expansion increases within districts with high electoral competition on 
both collective and private property.  These results demonstrate empirically the influence 
of politics on urban growth both in terms of land cover and expansion of the legal city 
boundary.  
Introduction17 
                                                        
17 This article will be revised and submitted for publication with Meha Jain, Hallie Eakin, Felipe 
de Alba, and Dylan Connor. 
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Over 90% of all urban growth takes places in the Global South. A large portion of this 
growth occurs via informal settlements (30% in Latin America), where inhabitants have 
little to no tenure security and lack basic services (UN Habitat, 2016). One effort to 
improve welfare for households in these settlements has been to provide formal property 
titles, enabling connection to urban services. Increasingly pluralistic municipal electoral 
processes, and political and administrative decentralization has accompanied these 
efforts in “regularizing” land tenure (Post, 2018). The synergy of increasing informal 
growth, mass suffrage in local elections, and local urban management provides an 
opportunity for electoral candidates and actors elected to office to capture votes from 
informal settlers. 
Previous research demonstrates politicians fulfill the property titling and urban 
service demands of marginalized residents living in informal settlements in exchange for 
political support (Ch 2, Cornelius, 1972; de Alba and Hernández Gamboa, 2014; Eakin et 
al., 2016, Post et al 2018). Despite evidence of this causal mechanism, no study has 
empirically tested or estimated the causal effects of electoral politics on the distribution 
of titles and informal urban expansion. Various research and initiatives of practice are 
affected by this empirical gap.  For example, urban initiatives that seek to improve 
responses to extreme events, such as UN Habitat III or the 100 Resilient Cities 
initiatives, may prove to be inadequate owing to lack of consideration of these dynamics 
in urban planning (Eakin et al., 2017). This study seeks to fulfill the gap in question by 
estimating the relationship between electoral politics, land titles, and informal urban 
growth in conservation lands from 1997-2015 in Mexico City using fixed effects panel 
regression. 
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Clientelism and electoral cycles in urban property titling and land-use 
changes: The Research Problem Defined 
Researchers have long recognized and theorized how politicians decide who receives 
public (non-excludable) and private goods and when they are distributed (Cornelius, 
1972; Guasti et al., 1977; Scott, 1969). The temporal distribution of goods is predicted to 
occur just before elections, a phenomenon known as the “political business cycle.” 
Incumbent politicians seeking to maintain their office increase fiscal spending just 
before elections to demonstrate their legitimacy when voters are paying the most 
attention to the electoral process (Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Khemani, 2004; Rogoff, 
1990). The political business cycle has been empirically demonstrated in India, where 
electricity is redistributed during election years to help incumbents win legislative seats 
(Baskaran et al., 2015; Min and Golden, 2014). The electoral cycle of land change has 
also been demonstrated in forest systems in both Brazil and Indonesia; forest loss 
increases in the year of election in incumbent candidate districts (Burgess et al., 2012; 
Pailler, 2018). After the agrarian reform in Mexico in 1919, collective titles of agrarian 
land that where inalienable (e.g. could not be sold) were offered to communities and 
groups of farmers, called ejidos. These titles were more likely to be distributed in 
electoral years (Albertus et al., 2016). Many of these agrarian lands, however, have since 
been informally sold and urbanized, and many settlers have no legal title to the 
urbanized land. To our knowledge, no research has yet examined the role of electoral 
cycles in influencing land titling in urban informal settlements. The significance of 
electoral politics for urban land tenure could have important implications for accurately 
modeling and planning for urban growth. 
Competing theories exist regarding who is more likely to receive public and private 
goods. Goods could be rewarded to patrons and core-voters of a dominant party, used to 
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recruit new voters in competitive electoral districts, or distributed in districts where core 
voters support is declining to prevent defection (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). The 
distribution of goods can be clientelistic, or contingent on reciprocated exchange of votes 
and services between patrons (politicians) and clients (voters) (Hicken, 2011). In this 
version of clientelism, goods are rewarded to loyal voters and withheld from defectors. 
Likewise, voters reward politicians for distributing goods, and punish them by voting for 
another party if services are not delivered. In contrast, when politicians consistently 
distribute goods to their core voting population but do not punish defectors or reward 
new voters, this strategy is labeled “pork barrel” instead of clientelistic (Stokes et al., 
2012).  
Clientelistic goods could be targeted either to loyal and core voters, to recruit voters 
in swing districts, or prevent defection in declining support areas (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 
2016; Stokes et al., 2012). Studies of clientelism in urban systems find that core voters, 
instead of swing voters, are usually targeted (Post, 2018). Urban utilities, such as water, 
are subject to clientelistic distribution, which results in unequal access to water for 
citizens and erodes performance and maintenance of public infrastructure systems 
(Herrera, 2017). Additional views posit that goods that can be finely targeted in urban 
areas, such as policing, local taxation, and variations in zoning, will be distributed to core 
voters (Cox and Mccubbins, 1986). Diaz Cayeros (2016) tested this theory empirically 
with the cash transfer programs in Mexico, finding transfers were distributed to areas 
with core voters of the main party, the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party). Among 
these core voting areas, more transfers were given to places that had started to defect 
from the PRI, with a notable decline in core support and an increase in votes to new 
parties (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). 
  75 
Informal settlers without land tenure are also targets of clientelistic strategies by 
politicians, who condition permission to stay on political support (Post, 2018).  This 
particular type of clientelism is known as forbearance, or the “intentional and revocable 
government leniency towards violations of the law” (Holland, 2016 p233). Holland 
(2016) found forbearance was practiced by politicians who ensured continued support by 
preventing eviction of informal settlements in Lima, Peru, and Bogota, Colombia.  One 
study examining the role of clientelism in land title distribution within informal 
settlements in common property (ejidos) across Mexico from 1994-2012 (Larreguey et al. 
2015) found that voters were less likely to reward incumbents in municipal elections 
after receiving title, but had no effect on federal elections. No studies to our knowledge 
have examined the role of clientelism on land-cover change of any kind, including urban 
expansion. 
While property titles may be distributed preferentially to key voters, paradoxically, 
the formalization of property rights may decrease the conditions under which clientelism 
flourishes. Property rights can liberate citizens from relying on “patron” political parties 
for economic development. This liberation is supported by empirical analysis of Mexico’s 
PROCEDE program (Certification Program for Ejido Rights and Titling for Urban 
Centers), which privatizes collective ejido lands and allows individual farmers to sell 
property on formal land markets. Rural regions benefitting from increasing titling efforts 
have tended to vote for the opposition party, suggesting that property rights may erode 
clientelism (Castañeda Dower and Pfutze, 2015; de Janvry et al., 2014). It remains 
unknown if these findings translate to urban areas, however. Research suggests 
formalizing property titles in informal settlements can, in certain conditions, improve 
household welfare (Webster et al., 2016), but does secure land tenure reduce the need for 
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informal urban residents to rely on political exchange to secure services like water and 
electricity? 
Given the need to better understand the social-political nature of urban form among 
various research communities, this study examines the spatial-temporal distribution of 
land titling and informal settlement expansion in Mexico City from 1997-2015 using 
remote sensing and government voting records.  It is guided by three working 
hypotheses:   
1. Urban land titling of informal settlements on collectively held and 
private land exhibit a political business cycle and increases prior to 
elections. 
2. Titles are preferentially distributed to core party voters. 
3. Urban expansion increases with the ratio of votes to the core party. 
This study represents the first empirical examination of political dynamics of 
urbanization and land titling in an urban land system.  Previous research has quantified 
the political business cycle of deforestation in rural land systems in Indonesia and Brazil 
(Burgess et al., 2012; Pailler, 2018), but this mechanism has never been tested in an 
urban system. This research seeks to clarify the role politics plays in land use in Mexico 
City, potentially advancing efforts in urban growth modeling and governance of land 
titling. More generally, it demonstrates that politics in urban land systems can be 
quantified, contributing to a range of research such as that undertaken in political 
science, land systems science, and vulnerability studies  (Eakin et al., 2017; Post, 2018; 
Tellman et al., n.d.) 
Informal Settlements and Political Relationships in the Study Area: 
Backdrop for Analysis 
Land titling and informal settlements in Mexico City’s conservation lands 
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Most of Mexico City’s urban expansion since the 1930s has been informal, 
undertaken on lands not formally designated as urban (Connolly and Castro, 2016). 
Much of the ensuing urban growth occurred in the southern portion of the city, an 
important area of aquifer recharge and other environmental services. In part to protect 
this part of the urban watershed, the city established a conservation zone in 1992 and 
ecological zoning constraints in 2000 (Sheinbaum Pardo, 2008). These declarations 
recognize the presence of rural settlements and agrarian communities who were long 
settled in these conservation lands. Seventy percent of the conservation land in question 
belonged to agrarian communities, who held collective title in ejidos (communally owned 
properties designated for agriculture in 1917) and communities (communally owned 
indigenous properties dating to the 1600s).18 These communities were permitted to 
continue practicing agriculture, pasture, and forestry, albeit with some restrictions. They 
were not allowed to sell land, construct homes, or pave roads. 
 Nonetheless, informal purchase of conservation land represents one of the most 
affordable ways to access land for housing in Mexico City for the urban poor (Ch 2). 
Currently, an estimated 480,000 people in over 800 informal settlement communities 
have urbanized 3,200 ha of conservation land (Fig. 8). Local governments are prohibited 
from building infrastructure for formal services, such as piped water and electricity. 
Intermediary actors, sometimes with tacit support or via bribes with government actors, 
commonly provide illegal services to residents at high economic cost or through forced 
political participation (Ch 2). In conjunction with the Mexico City Ministry of the 
Environment (SEDEMA), local governments may also evict residents and destroy 
housing structures. Paradoxically, politicians campaigning for or in office may offer to 
                                                        
18 Both the Spanish Crown post-conquest (known as communal titles) and the Mexican revolution granted social property 
land titles (known as ejido titles) which could not be bought or sold until the Mexican agrarian reform in 1992. 
Considerable dispute remains over overlapping claims between communal and ejido land claims, which remains 
unresolved in Tribunal Agrarian Courts to this day. The term agrarian land is used to include both. 
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help consolidate informal communities through service provision, housing materials, or 
participation in government programs, especially during electoral periods (Hagene, 
2015, 2010; also Ch 2). In order to obtain formal urban services, gain secure land tenure 
secure, increase the property value of their plot, and avoid exploitation by 
intermediaries, many residents desire to be “regularized”, or have their property 
included in the formal urban zone and be given a formal property title. 
Land titling in communal and private property in Mexico City 
There are distinct processes for informal settlers to obtain land titles in agrarian 
communities (blue area, Fig. 8) as opposed to private lands (green area, Fig. 8). The 
former requires a federal agency, CORETT (Commission of Regularization and Land 
Tenure) to remove the area from the collective property land register by the government 
claiming ownership, known as expropriation. Expropriation is initiated by a presidential 
decree. CORETT pays the agrarian community for the land purchase based on a price set 
by another federal agency (INDABIN, Institute for the Administration and Evaluation of 
National Goods). CORETT then emits land titles to each resident, which can then be 
registered in the National Land Registry. This bureaucratic process can take 5-20 years, 
and for some informal settlements, is never completed. 
 Obtaining an individual property title on private lands, however, is managed by 
the Mexico City agency, DGRT (Ministry of Land Regularization). The process involves 
informal residents petitioning the local borough/delegation government to change land-
zoning plans to allow urban development. This change (prior to 2012, year of 
implementation differs by borough) must be approved by the city’s legislative assembly, 
ALDF (Legislative Assembly of Mexico City), and the ministry of urban development 
(SEDUVI, Secretariat of Urban Development and Housing for Mexico City) before the 
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land can be registered in the National Land Registry and land titles are distributed to the 
residents. 
 Some delegations established processes specific for regularization on 
conservation land in the late 2000s, establishing a “Special Commission on 
Regularization,” or a CREX, which includes various city ministries including water, 
housing, urban development, environment, and civil protection.19 These commissions 
vote on changing land zones to “urban” for settlements based on their level of 
consolidation (e.g., how long they have been there and if they already have acquired 
services) and exposure to environmental hazards. These commissions can change land-
use zones directly without requiring approval from the legislative assembly, and may 
require residents to pay environmental harm fees before property titles are procured. 
Obtaining land titles for private land, similar to agrarian land, can take 5-20 years. 
 There is a significant amount of corruption, political negotiation, side-payments, 
and other informal transactions involved in the regularization and land titling process 
for both agrarian and private land. Regularization is a “political chip” (moneda politica) 
politicians regularly use in campaign promises in local elections in southern Mexico City 
where informal settlements reside (Connolly and Wigle, 2017). Residents also report 
incumbents and candidates appear in electoral periods to pave roads, install water and 
electricity services, and dole out bags of cement in exchange for political support (Ch 2). 
Previous research demonstrates that water supply to informal settlements increases in 
electoral periods (de Alba and Hernández Gamboa, 2014). An extensive literature 
documents the mechanisms by which politicians distribute titles and urban services in 
exchange for political support across the city (Castro, 2004; Cornelius, 1972; Eakin et al., 
2016; Pezzoli, 2000; Varley, 1998,; alsoCh 2). Yet none of these studies has attempted a 
                                                        
19 CREX have been established for Xochimilco (2008), Tlahuac (2008), Tlalpan (2010), and are in 
the process of implementation in Milpa Alta and Magdalena Conteras.  
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quantitative analysis of land titling and urban growth in relation to electoral data that 
could indicate the degree to which politics influences urban outcomes.  
Electoral Politics in Mexico City 
The government of Mexico instated borough chief, legislative assembly, and 
mayoral elections for Mexico City in 1997 to meet growing urban demands for 
representation (Davis, 2010). Legislative and borough elections are held every three 
years, with mayoral elections every six years. From 1997-2015, the PRD (Revolutionary 
Democratic Party) has retained the mayoral seat, and the large majority of the boroughs 
(white areas, Fig. 15) and 40 legislative seats.  It controls urban administrations and the 
distribution of services, such as water. Environmental regulation and land-use zoning 
and titling is co-managed by the city in conjunction with the local borough, and 
sometimes the legislative assembly.  
 Legislators are important brokers and intermediaries who may pressure city 
urban administrations to expedite titling or urban service processes (Ch 2). There are 
two kinds of legislative representatives, proportional representation and relative 
majority.  Legislators are elected directly with their names on the ballot for each of the 
40 districts for the relative majority seat, and an additional 40 seats are distributed for 
each party to appoint based on the party level vote received. The legislators elected 
directly via relative majority are typically the brokers facilitating urban services in 
informal settlements.  
The PRD, which included urban social movement leaders, has enjoyed 
widespread support from urban populations in Mexico City since the early 2000s ((de 
Alba, 2016; Moctezuma, 2001). Support for the PRD, however, has declined since the 
emergence of a new left party, MORENA (National Regeneration Movement) in 2015, 
which won both the presidency, mayoral seat, and most borough districts in Mexico City 
  81 
in 2018. During the 2000-2015 period, other parties, the PAN (National Action Party) 
and PRI, controlled the presidency and federal agencies responsible for land titling of 
informal settlements in collective property. 
Methods and Data 
Urban land titles on both private and ejido land from 1997-2012 were digitized 
and georeferenced from official documents. Urban expansion data in conservation lands 
was provided by the Mexico City Ministry of the Environment, which was produced by 
manual digitization via very high resolution (<2m) satellite imagery from 2005-2015. 
Voting records for ~5,530 districts were obtained for local elections from 2000-2015, 
which occurred every 3 years. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this study are land titles and urban expansion 
(summarized in Table 2, * denoting dependent variables). Land title data were obtained 
for collective property from the National Agrarian Registry (RAN) (2017), which contains 
information on the land tenure history of each agrarian community in Mexico. This 
study used the area of land in hectares expropriated by CORETT for every agrarian 
community in Mexico City from 1971-2007 (the date of the last presidential decree). 
Information regarding the number of lots regularized in the informal settlement was not 
available. 287 original paper maps of the areas of expropriation in each of 85 decrees 
were obtained through visits to the CORETT Mexico City office in 2017-2018, and 
subsequently georeferenced and digitized (Fig. 15a). Expropriation areas were only 
digitized for agrarian communities or in boroughs with conservation land area20 The 
spatial data are represented in Figure 15a and temporal data in Figure 16 regarding seven 
                                                        
20Private land titles were thus not digitized in Azcapotzalco, Venestuziano Carranza, Itzacalco, 
and Coyoacan. Collective land titles were not digitized in Azcapotzalco, Venestuziano Carranza, 
Itzacalco, Benito Juarez, Migual Hidalgo, and Coyoacan. 
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presidential electoral periods (July of election year to July of the previous year, a 12 
month period) marked in pink (Fig 16). 
Land title data for private property were obtained by searching the archives of the 
Gaceta Oficial, or Official Gazette, which publishes legal decrees in Mexico City 
(Conjesuria Juridica y de Servicios Legales, 2017). We used the search term 
“regularización” or regularization, to identify 275 documents with information about 
titles given to informal settlers in private lands for 11 boroughs with conservation lands 
from 1997-2012, when the titling decree ended20. Each of 475 unique land titling 
observations (identified by a date, location, and decree number) were recorded, 
including the date and number of parcels (individual households) receiving title, area 
regularized, and coordinates or cross streets of the location. Thirty-six updates to these 
decrees (Fe de Erratas) were recorded and used to update additional lots that were given 
title. Digitizing individual lots of each title was not possible because coordinates were 
only published with some decrees, and in most cases the projection information needed 
to translate and map coordinates was not provided. Instead, we used a coordinate point 
to approximate the central location of titling using the cross street information and 
community name provided. Georeferencing was done using OpenStreetMap data. These 
spatial data are represented in Figure 15b with the time series of parcels “regularized” or 
titled in Figure 16, with 6 local electoral periods. 
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Table 2. Variables created from digitized data for this study. *for dependent variables 
Name of 
variable 
Explanation Method Spatial and 
temporal 
scale 
Unit Source data 
Area of 
ejido title* 
Polygons of area 
expropriated 
from ejidos 
Georeferencing 
topographic maps, 
relating to 
presidential decree 
1997-2012 Date of 
Decree, 
Hectares 
CORETT and 
RAN (Registro 
Agrario 
Nacional) 
Area of 
private 
property 
title* 
Points of 
regularization 
decrees 
Place point at 
crossroads mentioned 
in official city decree, 
record area, location, 
number of lots 
1997-2012 M2 Gaceta Oficial 
Number of 
private 
property 
titles* 
Number 
of lots 
Area of 
urban 
expansion* 
Area of informal 
expansion in 
years of 
available 
imagery 
Handtracing 
structures in 
conservation land 
from very high 
resolution satellite 
imagery  
~2m2, 2000, 
2005, 2008, 
2009, 2011, 
2012, 2015 
M2, 
46,026 
polygons 
SEDEMA 
(Mexico City 
Ministry of 
Environment) 
Months to 
election 
Months from 
the date of the 
decree of land 
title until the 
next election  
Calculate months 
until next local 
elections for private 
property and 
presidential elections 
for collective property 
Month, per 
decree 
month Gaceta 
Oficial/Corett 
Core voter 
statistic 
Degree to which 
a district 
outperforms the 
city level vote 
market over 
time 
𝜶
= 𝑽𝒅
− ቆ
𝑪𝒐𝒗[𝑽𝒅𝑽𝒄]
𝑽𝒂𝒓 [𝑽𝒅]
ቇ 𝑽𝒄 
Vd = district votes to 
PRD 
Vc= city votes to PRD 
(Diaz-Cayeros et al., 
2016) 
2000-2012 
(summarized 
across the time 
when PRD was 
dominant) 
5523 
districts 
IEDF (Instituto 
Electoral de 
Distrito 
Federal) 
Percent 
voting for 
PRD 
Percent of 
district voting 
for the mayor’s 
party (PRD) 
% PRD= votes for 
PRD/total votes 
2000-2015 
(elections every 
3 years, n=6) 
Margin of 
win 
Measure of 
electoral 
competition 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑛௜
= (𝑉ௗଵ௜ − 𝑉ௗଶ௜)/𝑉௧௢௧௔௟௜ 
𝑉ௗଵ௜=votes to highest 
ranking party time i 
𝑉ௗଶ௜= votes to second 
highest ranking party 
time i 
𝑉௧௢௧௔௟௜= total votes per 
district time i 
  84 
Figure 15. Regularization and land titling in private and collective lands. A. Titles in 
collective property (ejidos) from 1971-2007 in boroughs with conservation land. Tan 
areas indicate original agrarian community areas for ejidos and communities from RAN 
(National Agrarian Registry). B. Approximate locations of titling in private property from 
1997-2012. Size of dot indicates number of lots receiving title in that area, colored yellow 
for older titles, and blue for more recent titles. 
 
 
Figure 16. Temporal variability in land titling in collective and private property and 
elections. A) Monthly time series of land titling data for collective property (ejidos) and 
B) private property (bottom). Pink bars indicate the 12 months leading up to the next 
election (for collective property, presidential only, every 6 years; for private property, 
local elections, every 3 years). 
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Urban expansion data of informal settlements in conservation land were obtained 
from the Mexico City Ministry of the Environment (SEDEMA) (Fig. 17). These data were 
produced by tracing constructions on very high-resolution satellite imagery (~2m2) when 
available, resulting in 46,026 polygons. The first year of data, 2000, represents all 
settlements existing outside of permitted urban or residential areas identified in the 
Ministry of the Environment Ecological Zoning Ordinance. Subsequent years (2005, 
2008 ,2010 ,2011, 2012, and 2015), represent all areas constructed and identified as 
“urban” that occurred between the last year of available imagery and appeared in the 
next available image for the first time. For example, urban areas identified in 2008 could 
have been constructed in 2006, 2007, or in 2008 before the image was taken. Data are 
identified by the temporal resolution of “year” (months and dates are not provided in the 
SEDEMA dataset). Attempts to reconstruct a consistent annual time series of informal 
urban growth with Landsat data (30m) using methods from Goldblatt and associates 
(2018) proved unsuccessful because small informal settlements were not captured in 
lower resolution Landsat data.  
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Figure 17. Urban expansion of informal settlements in conservation land in Mexico 
City, 2000-2015. 
 
Independent Variables 
Independent variables used to test hypotheses regarding the political business 
cycle of land titles and political dynamics of urban expansion were selected from political 
science theory and previous studies. These variables are listed in Table 2 and described 
below. Testing if the timing land titling distribution increase near elections and follows 
the political business cycle (Rogoff, 1990) required calculating the time, here measured 
in months, until the next election when each title was given. The hypothesis that land 
titles were preferentially distributed to core voters is tested based on the number of titles 
given to each electoral district and how consistently that district supported the main 
party in power based on the core voter alpha statistic (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). Finally, 
testing the relationships between urban expansion increases and patronage or electoral 
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competition involved measuring the percent of votes to the main party in power and 
margin of win in each election per district, respectively. 
Months to Election Variable 
 Months to election are calculated by taking the date of each land title and 
counting the number of months until the next election. As expropriations in ejidos are 
controlled by a federal agency and through presidential decree, it is expected that 
collective property titles will follow the presidential electoral cycle, which occurs every 
six years. Months until election are calculated until the next local election (borough 
chief) for private property titles, because this process is controlled by coordination 
between the local borough, who must change land zoning regulations from agricultural 
or forest to residential as the first step in the regularization process. Another key part of 
the titling process, approval in the city legislative assembly (ALDF), is controlled by 
actors who are up for re-election every three years.  
Electoral Competition, Core Voters, and Patronage Variables 
Electoral data on voting records for the mayoral, legislative, and municipal 
elections were downloaded on the IEDF (Electoral Institution of the Distrito Federal) 
website for each election. These data included the number of voters registered and 
participating in elections in each district and year. The 5,539 electoral district 
boundaries for 2015 and 2012 were available for download online as a geospatial .kml 
file. Previous electoral districts (2009, 2006, 2003, 2000) were only available in .pdf 
format, and were digitized and georeferenced using ArcGIS. Twenty-five electoral 
districts have changed over time, shifting boroughs, fusing with other districts, or 
appearing for the first time as informal settlements grew and population changed. 
Digitizing the unique electoral district geography in each election preserved these 
changes and ensured urban expansion and titling data were attributed to the correct 
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district for the correct year.  Delegation heads and legislative officials have the largest 
agency in the private property land titling and activities that could influence urban 
expansion. 
A proxy for patronage in each electoral year was calculated as the proportion of 
votes in each district in borough chief and legislative elections that went to the dominant 
party in Mexico City, the PRD. Note that in some years, party coalitions formed in joint 
tickets for legislators and borough chiefs. If the PRD was a part of that coalition, we 
counted that coalition vote as a vote for the PRD.  
Electoral competition was calculated for each electoral year via the margin of win 
for each district as in Eq. 1. 
Eq. 1 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑛௜ = (𝑉ௗଵ௜ − 𝑉ௗଶ௜)/𝑉௧௢௧௔௟௜ 
Vd1i is the total number of votes cast for the party that received the majority votes for 
district d in time i.  Vd2i  is the votes cast for the party receiving the second highest 
number of votes. Vtotali is the total votes cast for that district in election i. This statistic 
calculated is a measure of electoral competition, such that a lower margin of win signifies 
a more competitive or divided district. Figure 18 shows how margin of win varies over 
elections across the city for borough chief elections.  
The core voter statistic measures the degree to which an electoral district “out-
performs” other districts over time in voting for the dominant political party. It is not 
calculated in each electoral year, but represents one number over a long time period. 
This statistic was originally proposed by Cox and Mccubbins (1986) and replicated by 
Diaz Cayeros (2016) to demonstrate risk averse political party strategies, whereby parties 
in power distribute goods to their core constituency. Equation 2 shows how this statistic, 
alpha, is calculated 
Eq. 2 𝛼 = 𝑉ௗ − ቀ
஼௢௩[௏೏௏೎]
௏௔௥ [௏೏]
ቁ 𝑉௖ 
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Vd is the proportion of district votes to PRD, and Vc is proportion of city votes to 
PRD. Alpha is calculated by taking the average district support for the PRD, and 
adjusting by risk (the covariance of district and city votes divided by district variance and 
multiplied by average support for the PRD across the city). Alpha represents how well a 
district outperforms (if the number is high) versus underperforms (if the number is low) 
the city-level vote market. High alpha indicate local offices (like delegations or 
legislatures) and brokers assure high support levels above the city level average. Lower 
alpha indicates places where the main party is likely to lose and does not have a core 
base, based on past behavior. We calculated the core voter statistics for the PRD using 
data from 2000-2012, because in 2015 a new left party began to split the left and the 
electoral situation changed.  
Generating Panel Time Series across Heterogeneous Spatial and Temporal 
Units 
Independent and dependent variables were available at distinct spatial and 
temporal resolutions. Land titles data contain the date of title and are represented 
spatially via point centroids of the approximate city block where the titles were extended. 
The land titling data was temporally auto correlated at the daily time step, and was thus 
aggregated into a monthly time series so each observation would be independent in 
regressions. Due to lack of precision in the land title locations, they were aggregated to 
the electoral district spatial scale. 
 Testing the influence of voting patterns on the distribution of private titles 
required aggregating titles in each three year electoral period, since electoral data is only 
available in the year of election. Testing the influence of core-voter statistic on land title 
distribution required summing land titles over the 2000-2012 period, because the core-
voter statistic is a measure over time of patronage from many elections, and does not 
  90 
measure year-to-year fluctuations. Likewise, the total area urbanized per districted was 
calculated from 2000-2012 and used as a control in the OLS (ordinary least square 
model) in hypothesis 2b. 
Annual urban growth data was unavailable for this study, and a data set from the 
Mexico City government that measured urban growth when satellite imagery was 
available was used. Testing the influence of voting patterns on urban expansion involved 
aggregating urban growth between each election from 2006-2015 (e.g. 2005 growth to 
the 2006 election, 2008+ 2009 growth to the 2009 election, 2011+2012 growth to the 
2012 election, and 2015 growth to the 2015 election). Urban growth data, which was a 
vector dataset hand digitized from 2m resolution imagery, was aggregated to the coarser 
spatial unit of electoral district, the highest resolution unit at which spatial voting data is 
publicly available No urban expansion data were available prior to 2005, and the 2000 
and 2003 election could not be examined. Any year and unit for which either urban 
expansion or land titling was not observed received a value of zero.  
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Figure 18. Time series of electoral data for 5,539 districts in Mexico City, 2000-2015. 
Margin of win displayed for each election per district, with more competition in red 
colors, and lower competition in green colors. 
 
Model Specifications for Hypothesis Testing 
The models and approach used to test the hypotheses are summarized in Table 3. 
All outcome data (except for sum of titles over time, Hypothesis 2b) were log linearly 
distributed, but with a mass point at zero, with the variance much higher than the mean, 
violating the assumptions of the Poisson distribution. As a result, generalized linear 
models were used with a negative binomial distribution, with fixed effects for time and 
unit as in equation 3. Coefficient estimates are fit through maximum likelihood 
estimation. 
 𝑒𝑞. 3 𝑓(𝑦௜௧) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽ᇱ𝑥௜௧ +  𝛼௜ +  𝛾௧)  
Y = the dependent variable measured in each unit of time(t) per spatial unit (i)  
𝛾௧ = the time fixed effect 
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I = is the spatial unit intercept 
𝛽ᇱ𝑥௜௧= independent variables  
Table 3. Models and variables used to test each hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable 
(s) 
Regression 
technique 
Spatial and time 
unit, temporal 
period & # 
observations 
1a.Titling in Ejidos 
follows the Political 
Business Cycle 
(Presidential 
Elections) 
Area (ha)  Months until the next 
presidential election, year 
Generalized 
Linear Model 
with Fixed 
effects 
 
Borough, months (1971-
2007),n=85) 
1b.Titling in private 
property follows the 
Political Business 
Cycle (Local 
Elections) 
Titles (number 
of lots) and 
area (m2) 
Months until the next 
local election, year,  
Borough, months 
(1997-2012), n=475 
2.a Private property 
titles are distributed 
to clients of the main 
party (PRD) 
Titles (number 
of lots) and 
area (m2 
Percent voting for the PRD Electoral district, 6 
local elections (2000-
2012), n=1,065 
2.b Private land titles 
are distributed to core 
voters 
Titles (number 
of lots) 
Core voter statistic in 
borough and legislative 
elections, informal 
settlement area 2000-
2015, Hectares 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Electoral district with 
land title >0, n=388 
3. Informal urban 
expansion increases 
with competition 
Area urbanized 
in m2 
Margin of win, percent of 
votes for main party 
(PRD) borough 
Generalized 
Linear Model 
with Fixed 
effects 
 
Electoral districts with 
informal urban growth 
>0, 4 elections (2006-
2015) n=1231 
 
Fixed effects are used to help control for omitted variable bias in hypothesis testing, 
assuming that the errors are correlated with the spatial unit. This control allows for 
consistent estimation of coefficients and standard errors in comparison to random 
effects models. Any variation between units that is constant over time that could 
influence either titling or informal settlement growth (e.g., size of unit, slope, distance to 
urban center, distance to roads, etc.) is implicitly included in the intercept term of the 
model.  
 As both the urban growth and land titling data were gamma distributed with a 
mass point at 0, a negative binomial distribution was used. However, fixed effects panel 
models with negative binomial distributions using conditional maximum likelihood do 
not provide a true fixed effect (Guimarães, 2008). We thus either add in dummy 
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variables for each unit in negative binomial regressions, or used a Poisson distribution 
with adjustments to standard errors as suggested by Allison and Waterman (2002).  All 
fixed effects models were run in STATA version 15 (StataCorp, 2017).  We did not use a 
Hausman test to examine whether fixed effects is a better choice over random effects 
because this test is not useful in generalized linear models. Importantly, urban growth is 
not count data, in contrast to land title data. No continuous distribution, however, with 
true 0 measures for a fixed effects model is available for estimation. 
 One hypothesis test, the influence of the core voter statistic on land titling 
distribution, was formulated with the Ordinary Least Squares Model (OLS). In this 
model, only the districts that had received titles were used as observations, and the 
distribution was not zero inflated, so an OLS model was used. This model included 
dummy variables for borough and total urban growth from 2000-2015 to control for the 
availability of homes for titling.  
Results 
Does land titling of informal settlements follow the political business cycle? 
Regression results confirmed hypothesis 1b but not 1a: land title distribution 
follows the political business cycle for private property, but not for collective property. 
Specifically, land title distribution significantly increases in the months leading up to the 
election for private property titles and titled area, but not for collective property titles 
(Table 4). These results were robust to monthly lags and leads, up to one month in a lag 
and 3 months leading the dependent variable (SI Tables 2 and 3). In private property, 
the months to election continued to predict increased property titles for up to a three 
month lead, with the magnitude of the coefficient declining from the one month lag (-
0.0332, P<.001) to the three month lag (-0.0183, P<.1) (SI Table 2). Likewise, the 
months to election continued to predict area titled in private property for months until 
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election for up to 5 months, and a similar decline in magnitude in each passing month 
(e.g., lag month 1= -0.0349 p<.001, and lag month 5= -0.0264, p<.05). This suggested 
that while the months leading up to the election predict increase titling, this result was 
not precise at the monthly time step, but rather, within a 3-5 month period.  
Table 4. The political business cycle of land titles in private and collective property. 95% 
confidence interval in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Titles, Private PropertyArea Titled, Private Property, m2 Area Titled, Collective Property, ha
Months until Election -0.0352*** -0.0354*** -0.000349 
 [-0.0548,-0.0156] [-0.0555,-0.0153] [-0.0115,0.0108] 
    
1999 -1.819* -2.193**  
 [-3.278,-0.360] [-3.683,-0.703]  
2000 -1.359* -1.638**  
 [-2.490,-0.228] [-2.800,-0.477]  
2001 -0.962 -1.356*  
 [-1.979,0.0544] [-2.393,-0.319]  
2002 -1.382* -1.622*  
 [-2.625,-0.140] [-2.893,-0.351]  
2008 -2.015** -2.363***  
 [-3.242,-0.788] [-3.614,-1.113]  
2010 -1.554** -1.761**  
 [-2.730,-0.378] [-2.950,-0.572]  
2011 -1.875* -2.203**  
 [-3.303,-0.447] [-3.651,-0.755]  
2012 -1.115* -1.295*  
 [-2.204,-0.0255] [-2.394,-0.196]  
Azcapotzalco   1.376 
   [-0.277,3.028] 
Coyoacan   -14.48 
   [-1823.5,1794.6] 
Cuajimalpa -1.055** -1.145*** 0.703 
 [-1.789,-0.320] [-1.815,-0.475] [-1.189,2.595] 
Gustavo Madero -0.602 -0.695* 1.362 
 [-1.244,0.0396] [-1.281,-0.109] [-0.240,2.963] 
Iztapalapa -1.523*** -1.420*** 1.679* 
 [-2.293,-0.753] [-2.119,-0.722] [0.114,3.243] 
Magdalena Contreras -1.131** -1.051** 1.093 
 [-1.857,-0.405] [-1.719,-0.382] [-0.549,2.735] 
Milpa Alta   -14.99 
   [-2410.4,2380.5] 
 -1.369*** -1.376***  
Tlahuac [-2.174,-0.564] [-2.089,-0.662] 2.090** 
   [0.545,3.636] 
 -1.263*** -1.158***  
Tlalpan [-1.985,-0.541] [-1.831,-0.485] 1.404 
   [-0.221,3.029] 
 0.166 0.0866  
Xochimilco [-0.450,0.783] [-0.468,0.641] -0.0641 
   [-2.099,1.971] 
    
_cons -0.106 -0.569 -4.970*** 
 [-1.213,1.001] [-1.698,0.561] [-6.474,-3.466] 
N 438 440 616 
AIC 2026.8 4045.6 1159.2 
*years with no significant effects removed from this table to preserve space. See SI tables 
1-3 for full results. 
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Is private property title distribution correlated with core voters of the PRD? 
Hypothesis 2b was confirmed, although with caveats. Private property land titles 
over the 1997-2012 period are positively correlated to core voter support of the PRD 
party, but the core voter statistic only explains a small portion, 2-4% of variation in both 
number and area of titles distributed (SI Figs. 1-4). Regression models in general 
explained a small but significant portion of variance in title distribution when using the 
core voter statistic for both borough (R2= 0.0704 for area titled and 0.085 for number of 
titles) and legislative elections (R2= 0.081 for area titled and 0.108 for number of titles) 
(Table 5).  
The results also varied by borough. Interaction models reveal variations in 
coefficient estimates of core voters and land titling, with a significantly stronger 
relationships between core voters and titling in Gustavo Madero and Tlahuac (Map, 
Figure 19).  
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Table 5. Distribution of land titles based on core voter statistics for each election type, 
prediction area of land titles and number of titles. Standard error in parentheses. Model 
5 interacts borough with core voter for borough elections and Model 6 interactions 
borough with core voter for legislative elections. 
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Figure 19. Core voter coefficient for land title distribution, by borough. Coefficient 
estimates from model 5, Mexico City borough elections and core voter support measure. 
 
Null results were found for hypotheses 2b, which examined if changes in 
patronage that varied over time explained distribution of titling. A fixed effects panel 
regression finds no significant effect on the number of titles in a given electoral period 
with voting data. Neither patronage nor competition influence the number of titles 
distributed. This indicates that while more titles are distributed to core voters, titling 
does not increase in concert with changing voter behavior in a specific election. Spatial 
analysis of land titling data also yielded that 24% of all land titles occurred in 
conservation land. Of these, 72% were in areas already built before 2000.  
Does electoral competitiveness or patronage explain urban expansion?  
Overall, results from urban expansion models indicate electoral competitiveness 
(lower margin of win) increases with urban expansion in borough and legislative 
elections. As patronage decreases, urban expansion increases (Table 5). These results are 
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significant only in the contemporaneous year with the negative binomial distribution. 
Lagging and leading the dependent variable by one electoral period caused electoral 
variables to lose significance (SI Tables 6 and 7). Using the Poisson distribution, 
however, electoral competition remains a significant predictor of urban growth when the 
dependent variable is subject to both a lag and lead of one election, respectively (SI 
Tables 8 and 9, p<.0001). In addition, in one robustness check, contrary to other results, 
higher patronage significantly increases when urban growth is led by one electoral 
period. The failure of these robustness checks suggests endogeneity; that urban growth 
and electoral variables may influence each other. 
Table 6. Informal urban expansion and electoral competition vs. patronage in borough 
and legislature elections. Brackets indicate standard error. ***, **, * indicates 
Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
 Negative 
Binomial Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial Poisson 
Null Model 
(Poisson) 
 Borough Elections Legislative Elections  
Competit
ion 
-
1.81**
* 
 
-
2.6151*
** 
 -0.465  
-
0.4908*
** 
  
[0.2783] [0.0103] 
 [0.3226] [0.0129]  
Patronag
e 
 
-
1.52532*
** 
 
-
5.5263*
** 
 
-
0.9688
9 
 
-
5.6903*
** 
 
 [0.305891] [0.016421] [0.4240703] [0.019263] 
2009 
 
-
1.232*
** 
-1.071*** 
-
1.482**
* 
-1.264*** 
-
1.021**
* 
-
1.166*** 
-
1.147*** -1.625
*** -1.194*** 
(-
12.46) (-11.80) (-9.61) (-9.22) (-8.73) (-8.18) (-4.89) (-3.50) (-13.43) 
2012 
 
-
0.971*
** 
-0.631*** 
-
1.091**
* 
-
0.760*** 
-
0.690*
** 
-
0.799**
* 
-
0.707**
* 
-1.073** -0.776*** 
(-
10.03
) 
(-7.52) (-8.15) (-6.82) (-7.16) (-7.01) (-5.95) (-3.28) (-6.35) 
2015 
-
1.356*
** 
-1.590*** 
-
1.279**
* 
-1.124** 
-
1.045**
* 
-
1.273*** -0.574* -1.494
* -0.600*** 
(-
12.27) (-11.41) (-6.60) (-2.85) 
(-
7.84) (-6.85) (-2.18) (-2.04) (-3.92) 
Pseudo 
R2 
  .8491 .8624   .8327 .8562 0.8322 
 
Figure 20 displays borough level model coefficients, with solid bars for those that 
are significant. If patronage universally caused urban expansion, all the bars in the 
  99 
Figure 20 would be positive and significant, indicating that higher margin of win and 
patronage to the PRD, the dominant party, correlates with urban expansion. If 
competitiveness universally caused urban expansion, the reverse would be true; all bars 
would be negative. Instead, the results are mixed and vary by borough. While the mean 
effect across the city indicates urban expansion increases with electoral competition, the 
borough analysis indicates this result is potentially largely driven by Xochimilco.  
Patronage to the PRD significantly increases with urban expansion in three boroughs 
(Gustavo Madero, Milpa Alta, and Cuajimalpa). Reduced competition significantly 
increases with urban expansion in only two boroughs, Milpa Alta and Alvaro Obregon.  
Notably, Xochimilco is the only borough with increasing urban growth in 2015 
(Fig 21), the same year the PRD in Mexico City split, creating a new competitor party, 
MORENA. MORENA won elections in three boroughs in 2015 (Table 6). Tlahuac, the 
only other borough where electoral competition increases with urban expansion in a 
borough level analysis, also switched to the MORENA party in 2015, and was the 
borough with the second highest area of urban expansion. In Tlalpan, however, 
MORENA won local elections, but electoral competition does not significantly increase 
with urban growth. 
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Figure 20. Coefficient plots for each borough in Mexico City for competition versus 
patronage in explaining variation in urban expansion from 2006-2015 across 4 elections. 
Solid bars indicate significant coefficients at the P<.05 level. Patterned and lighter bars 
are insignificant. 
 
 
Figure 21. Total informal urbanized area in m2 per borough 2006-2015. 
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Table 7. Initials of the winning borough party in each election. Electoral flips to a new 
party highlighted in yellow. Estimated percentage of population living in informal 
settlements (based on Ministry of Environment and Census Data collected in 2010) 
Borough 2015 2012 2009 
200
6 
200
3 
% of 
populatio
n informal 
Alvaro Obregon PRD_PT 
PRD_PT_M
C 
PRD_P
T PRD PRD 
1.3 
Cuajimalpa  PRI-PVEM PRI_PVEM PAN PRD PRD 27.7 
Gustavo a. Madero PRD_PT 
PRD_PT_M
C PRD PRD PRD 
.9 
Iztapalapa 
PRD_PT_N
A 
PRD_PT_M
C PT* PRD PRD 
.8 
Magdalena 
Contreras PRI-PVEM 
PRD_PT_M
C PRD PRD PRD 
10.1 
Milpa Alta PRI-PVEM 
PRD_PT_M
C 
PRD_P
T PRD PRI 
54.5 
Tlahuac MORENA 
PRD_PT_M
C 
PRD_P
T PRD PRD 
16.5 
Tlalpan MORENA 
PRD_PT_M
C PRD PRD PRD 
16.0 
Xochimilco MORENA 
PRD_PT_M
C PRD PRD PRD 
35.2 
*The PT (Workers Party) is left and aligned with the Party of Democratic Revolution 
(PRD). Due to issues with the PRD candidate for the 2009 elections in Iztapalapa (Clara 
Brugada), Andres Manual Lopez Obrador, the mayor of Mexico City instructed voters to 
vote for her on the PT party ticket. Here the PT is considered the with the PRD. MC = 
Citizen Movement party; PVEM = Ecologist Green Party of Mexico; NA = New Alliance 
party. 
 
Discussion 
Urban informality and clientelism in Mexico City 
 Land titles are distributed in a political business cycle in private but not 
collectively titled lands. This initial test of relationships about the distribution of private 
property titles in Mexico City and the political business cycle echoes dynamics regarding 
titling and clientelism in rural Mexico, that is, privately targeted goods are preferentially 
distributed to core voters (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). Contrary to findings from studies 
conducted in rural areas, (Albertus et al., 2016; Castañeda Dower and Pfutze, 2015), we 
did not find titling in Mexico City induced defection from the core party, PRD, in 
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contrast with what was found with the PRI in rural areas. This result indicates that titling 
is a pork barrel policy, given to supporters, but is not withheld nor rewarded to 
supporters or defectors.  Consistent with existing literature for Mexico, the rural PRI 
tactics of clientelism and particularistic distribution of benefits (de Alba, 2016; Hagene, 
2015) was reproduced by the PRD in Mexico City (de Alba, 2016) in the distribution of 
land titles from 1997-2012. While land titling is legally an administrative procedure, the 
clear temporal signature of when these titles are distributed indicates political 
manipulation of what has been assumed to be a bureaucratic process in Mexico City.  
 The distribution of land titles in private property, under administrative purview 
of Mexico City, followed political business cycles, with titles increasing in the months 
leading up to local elections. Interestingly, titling in collective property, controlled at the 
federal level with either the PRI or PAN administrations, did not follow this same trend. 
This result is in line with core voter theory explaining the distribution of privately 
targetable goods by governments. The PRI or PAN parties cannot reliably recruit voters 
in the PRD-dominated informal settlements of Mexico City. It is not surprising these 
administrations would not waste resources to focus titling efforts on a population that 
would likely yield little to no electoral returns. In addition, neither PRI or PAN have won 
the mayoral seat in Mexico City since local elections were established in 1997. Notably, in 
2018, a left party, MORENA, won the Mexican presidency for the first time, and secured 
the mayoral seat in Mexico City and most of the southern boroughs.   
One surprising result of this study was that the majority of land titled occurred on 
private lands that had already been urbanized by 2000. This indicates that the titling 
process likely takes many years, and does not occur in newly established urban 
settlements. Additional analysis and a much longer time series would be required to 
assess if land titling has an effect on urban expansion, and to estimate the average time 
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from initial construction to property titling. Importantly, many urban authorities in 
Mexico City, especially in the Ministry of Environment, assume that land titling will 
exacerbate urban expansion on conservation land. This assumption has resulted in the 
establishment of new regulations to require settlers pay environmental fees as well as the 
completion of environmental impact studies, both of which have stagnated the titling 
process (Wigle, 2014, 2010). Indeed, the number of titles has decreased over time in 
Mexico City (Fig. 16), despite continued urban expansion in regions like Xochimilco 
(Figure 21).  
 Urban expansion is associated with electoral competition, but only in two 
boroughs where there was high electoral competition between two left parties that split 
in 2015 (Xochimilco and Tlahuac). Xochimilco is the only borough that increases urban 
growth rates in this electoral period, and it has the second largest percentage of 
population living in informal settlements (35.2%). Informal settlements in the south of 
the city have been an important voting block for the PRD, the main party in power. 
MORENA, the new left party, competes for voters in these same informal settlements. 
Therefore, it is possible that urban growth only increases with electoral competition 
between two parties similar in ideology competing for the same voting bloc. 
Results indicate that on average urban expansion increases with electoral 
competition in boroughs, which is the administrative level with greatest ability to 
promote or restrict settlement consolidation via eviction. In the absence of annual 
temporal resolution urban expansion data, it is difficult to assess if political parties are 
attracted to already expanding urban areas, or if the arrival of parties causes expansion.  
Urban expansion is also correlated with increased competition in legislative 
districts. Legislators typically influence urban expansion by acting as brokers to exercise 
political capital within their party to, for example, bribe the electricity utility to install an 
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illegal system (Ch 2). They may also act as intermediaries to intervention in eviction 
process by filing legal protections (amparos) in court. Some legislators are current or 
former leaders of informal settlements themselves. While some empirical data from this 
research and previous articles supports these mechanisms, more work is needed to 
understand why these relationships vary by borough and region across the city, and tease 
apart potential endogeneity.  
Paradoxically, urban growth is associated with patronage in five boroughs. In 
these locations (Cuajimalpa, Gustavo Madero, Milpa Alta, Alvaro Obregon, and Tlalpan), 
urban growth was highest in earlier electoral periods (2006). Notably, electoral 
competition was lowest in 2006 compared to other years, and the core party (PRD) won 
every borough election (Table 7). The fact that these results vary by region could suggest 
that political parties may shift strategies overtime, engaging in activities to recruit new 
voters or reward supporting core voters dependent on specific spatial and electoral 
contexts. 
The strength and significance of relationship between land titles and core party 
support also varied by region (Figure 19). Notably, this relationship was strongest in the 
Eastern side of the city (Iztapalapa, Tlahuac and Gustavo Madero), and only significant 
in two boroughs (Gustavo Madero and Tlahuac). This could be because patronage to the 
PRD was very high in this region of the city in both 2003 and 2006 (Figure 18), 
incidentally the electoral periods when that land titling was highest on private lands in 
Mexico City. 
 Land titles, which are an excludable good, are correlated with increased core 
party support. In contrast, urban expansion increases in areas of competition instead of 
core support. The seemingly contradictory finding that more land titles go to core voters, 
yet assistance in urban consolidation (e.g., building roads and urban utilities) may be 
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directed to recruit new voters, is consistent with previous literature regarding clientelism 
in rural areas in Mexico. Diaz Cayeros (2016) found that goods that are private and 
excludable, such as cash transfers, are typically given to core voters, while goods that are 
public, such as installing a park, are typically directed towards competitive districts. This 
appears to be because excludable goods are expensive, and it is too risky for parties to 
waste the most expensive resources on voters who may not vote for them. Likewise, in 
Mexico City, goods with private benefits (i.e., land titles) are associated with areas of 
higher core voter support. We assume the mechanism of urban expansion is due to the 
efforts of competing political parties aiding informal settlement consolidation through 
non-excludable goods (e.g., roads, urban services, and eviction prevention of that 
community). These findings suggest that political parties may influence the urban land 
system in Mexico City by granting titles to supporters but helping informal settlements 
consolidate in competitive electoral districts. 
Quantifying political transactions in informal urban land use and tenure 
This study helps clarify and quantify how informal settlements and land markets 
respond to political incentives, a need identified in research from sustainability and land 
system science to political science (Eakin et al., 2017; Post, 2018). It underscores that 
politics shape land tenure change and land use, influencing both when and where these 
activities occur, and which populations benefit. Administrative procedures, such as land 
titling in the case of Mexico City, are manipulated by governments. This particularistic 
distribution distorts urban services in ways that may benefit the party in power, instead 
of distributed evenly to citizens with demonstrated needs in a defined institutional 
procedure. While this mechanism has been asserted and demonstrated in qualitative 
studies (Azuela de la Cueva, 1987a; Connolly and Wigle, 2017a; Varley, 1998), this study 
sheds new empirical light to confirm this mechanism operates at the city scale by the 
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main party in power. It further clarifies that only private property titling, not collective 
property titles controlled by national level governments, follows electoral cycles. This 
suggests that local urban politics, as opposed to national politics, may play a larger role 
in influencing land tenure changes in informally settled areas.  
Land tenure changes can have wide-ranging impacts on the urban socio-
ecological systems. Land titles can improve well-being of populations in informal 
settlements by increasing the value of land, allowing the installation of urban services, 
serving as collateral for loans, and preventing the threat of eviction. One study on 
informal settlements in China found titles can reduce poverty under certain conditions 
(Webster et al., 2016). Other studies in rural Mexico have found titling efforts can 
“break” clientelism and poverty traps by allowing farmers to rely on the market, instead 
of political parties, for economic well-being (Albertus et al., 2016). Lack of title and legal 
uncertainty can increase social and economic marginalization of informal residents and 
subject them to in relationships with intermediaries that exploit their vulnerability (Ch 2 
Aguilar and Guerrero, 2013).  Other studies have found elite capture of the benefits of 
urban land titling efforts in Buenos Aires, for example (Van Gelder, 2013). The 
distribution of secure land tenure is thus a question of justice, human rights, and urban 
resilience. Quantifying the political influence on titling makes the political nature of this 
distribution, and to what degree it is distorted, more transparent than otherwise. The 
proliferation of urban land titling efforts promoted by the World Bank since De Soto’s 
(2000) influential work to promote formalization of land tenure has paid little attention 
to the possibility that these processes would be used for political gain (Gilbert, 2002). 
While politicians need to wield capital and prove their effectiveness to voters to win and 
retain office, whether land titles should be included as part of their strategy is a 
normative question. 
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Electoral politics may influence urban expansion. Yet, virtually no land change 
models, agent based or otherwise, or even empirical studies of what drives of urban 
growth, include electoral competition or patronage as a potential factor. Future work to 
examine the relationship between politics and urban growth, as in this study, in both 
formal and informal areas for a wide range of cities, is needed to inform models of land 
systems, urban or rural. Elucidating the connection between complex political incentives 
to land use and land tenure outcomes is not straightforward, but this study showed a 
significant mechanism exists. Studies that fail to capture this mechanism, especially 
those that exhibit a high degree of informality, are not capturing the system as it is and 
reduces the accuracy of land system models. Ever increasing open data sets from cities, 
and the increasing spatial temporal resolution of satellites, should make it possible to 
begin to quantify political dynamics long asserted in qualitative research.  
Limitations 
The relationship between electoral politics and urban expansion is complex and 
context dependent, and the models presented here lack the specification or sample size 
to tease apart these complex relationships. Future work could involve developing an 
annual time series of urban expansion, or surveys with informal settlers about specific 
relationships with legislators and their borough chiefs. Additional efforts in increasing 
the sample size may also allow for improved model specification with fixed effects to 
control for variation. While this research employs a negative binomial distribution with 
fixed effects, the model does not converge when dummy variables for each electoral 
district were added. Without adding these dummy variables, a negative binomial model 
may not provide a “true” fixed effect (Allison and Waterman, 2002; Guimarães, 2008). 
Instead, a correction for over dispersion was applied to standard errors for hypothesis 
testing in the Poisson model, which provides a true fixed effect. Finally, the negative 
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binomial and Poisson distributions are typically used for count data. While number of 
land titles qualifies as a count, urban growth (while it is a positive integer of area 
constructed per year in meters, and gamma distributed) may not fit this definition. 
Future work should explore other ways of modeling non-linear urban growth patterns 
with electoral data beyond the methods approached here, such as the tweedie 
distribution (Zhang, 2013).  
Urban growth in unregulated areas, for example, the conservation lands of 
Mexico City, can erode environmental services like aquifer recharge. Informal 
settlements often occur on marginal lands that are of low value and exposed to 
environmental hazards, such as floodplains and hillsides at risk of landslides (Fraser, 
2017). While monitoring where this growth occurs for its regulation, of equal importance 
is ascertaining if an actor in power is promoting it. Improving methods to estimate 
relationships between urban growth and ancillary data (like electoral data) could identify 
regions where politicians are potentially inducing the growth they are charged with 
regulating.  
Conclusion 
Land tenure and land use change maintains a strong political component that is 
muted in much of the research and modeling about land systems. This study found 
electoral politics influence the pace, timing, and distribution of land titles to informal 
settlements in Mexico City in private but not ejido lands. Results also indicate political 
parties may influence informal urban expansion in conservation land, but this 
relationship is complex and varies by context. Public discourse assumes informal 
settlements are responsible for urban expansion on conservation land (Lerner et al., 
2018), but this study indicates political parties may also play a role. Bridging political 
science research and methods with geographic approaches to understand the spatial 
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temporal distribution of land tenure and use changes is required to improve 
understanding of how urban land systems work and improve land system models. Given 
the large expected increases in informal urban expansion in the coming decades, 
especially in decentralized urban political systems, improved understanding of how 
politics influence titling efforts and land use changes is essential for a large range of 
research and practice. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ACCOUNTING FOR ILLICIT ACTIVITY IN LAND CHANGE WITH NEWS MEDIA: 
NARCOTRAFFICKING AND FOREST LOSS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Abstract  
Land Systems Science aims to understand why land use changes, but has struggled to 
understand the role of illegal economies in environmental change. Illicit activity from 
illegal logging to drug cultivation has been inferred as a driver of land changes, such as 
forest loss. Despite this recognition, a paucity of data on illegal economies and behavior 
makes it difficult to incorporate illicit activities into causal inference models of land 
change. This study presents a novel empirical strategy to meet this challenge through the 
case of narcotrafficking and forest loss in Central America by using media reports as a 
data proxy for increased narcotrafficking activity. Evidence continues to build that 
narcotrafficking plays an important, yet often unreported, role in forest loss as traffickers 
clear land for money laundering operations and territorial control in response to 
interdiction efforts. This effect has not been systematically compared to the other well-
known causes of deforestation in the region, such as rural population increases and 
expansion of forest clearing for cattle pastures.  Longitudinal data on 50 sub-national 
units over a period of 16 years (2001-2016) are used in fixed effects regressions to 
estimate the role of narcotrafficking in deforested areas. Two narcotrafficking activity 
proxies were developed for modeling: i) an “official” proxy - government measured drug 
seizures for 14 sub national units; and, ii) an “unofficial” proxy  - spatialized media 
counts of narcotrafficking events. Both proxies indicate narcotrafficking is a statistically 
significant contributor to forest loss in the region, especially in Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and Guatemala. This study showed the ability of media, despite an urban bias, to capture 
the signal of illicit activity in land use changes such as forest loss. Similar methods to 
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those used in this study could be applied to estimate the causal effect of illicit activities in 
other land systems.  
 Illicit and Clandestine Drivers of Land Change21  
Land Systems Science (LSS) is an interdisciplinary field focusing on 
understanding where, why, and how land systems change (Turner et al., 2007). One of 
its major aims is to identify the relevant drivers and establish the causes of land 
change.22 Establishing a driver as a cause of change requires evidence of both a causal 
mechanism and an estimated causal effect (Meyfroidt 2016). LSS has addressed 
individual behavior, collective and state actions, market enterprise, and globalization as 
drivers (Meyfroidt et al., 2018; Munroe, McSweeney, Olson, & Mansfield, 2014; Turner 
et al., 2007). Illicit activity has been inferred as a driver of land change in studies 
including illegal logging (Hosonuma et al., 2012; Lawson et al., 2014), “land grabbing” 
(Davis et al., 2015; Ruilli et al., 2012), crop production (Dávalos et al., 2011; Grau and 
Aide, 2008), and cocaine transit (Devine et al., 2018; McSweeney et al., 2018, 2017). 
There has been limited attempts to date, however, to estimate the causal effects of illegal 
economies on land systems (Tellman et al, nd). Establishing causality is necessary to 
incorporate illicit activity into existing theory, modeling, and governance of land 
systems.  
Part of the challenge of incorporating illicit drivers in models or tests lies in the 
difficulty of collecting spatial and temporal quantitative data sufficient to permit causal 
inferences.  Illicit activities are intentionally hidden. As a result, observations of them are 
                                                        
21 This chapter will be revised for an article co-authors, Steven E. Sesnie, Nick Magliocca, Erik 
Nielsen, Jennifer Devine, Kendra McSweeney, David Wrathall, Meha Jain, Anayasi (ghost 
author), Karina Benessaiah 
22 Henceforth in this study, a driver constitutes a phenomenon associated with an outcome. A 
cause is a driver for which processual mechanisms exist that are at least partially responsible for 
the outcome constituting an explanation (Meyfroidt, 2016). A factor is any variable that mediates 
an outcome.  
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often incomplete, fragmented, or unreliable, whether they are based on ethnographic 
anecdotes, tangential information obtained during field surveys, official statistics, data 
“leaks” (e.g., The Panama Papers), or the media (Tellman et al., nd; Hudson, 2014). 
Collecting field data on illicit activities can be dangerous, often precluding researchers 
from broaching the subject directly (Hall, 2012). The research community requires 
methodological and even epistemological innovation to overcome these challenges. 
One promising approach to collect spatial and temporal data on illicit activities 
safely is the use of news media reporting. Investigative journalism and media reports are 
one of the only sources of data beyond official statistics documenting them (Hudson, 
2014). News media has recently been used as an effective data source to monitor the 
illegal wildlife trade (Basu, 2014; Nijman, 2015; Patel et al., 2015; Siriwat and Nijman, 
2018). Yet outside of wildlife studies, to our knowledge, online news media have not 
been developed as a primary data source for illicit activities and land changes such as 
forest loss. This study compares media reports with official drug trafficking statistics 
across the region to evaluate their congruence and assess the potential of news media 
data as a proxy for trafficking intensity. 
Narcodeforesation in Central America 
Narcodeforestation in Central America is a unique case of illicit deforestation 
(McSweeney et al., 2014). Central America is central node of transit in the cocaine supply 
chain. An estimated 86% of cocaine move through the region, accruing 9,0000-10,000 
$USD of additional value per kilo and $6 billion dollars in total annual profits (UNODC, 
2010). Central America is a central battleground in the War on Drugs, where the United 
States government spends over $3 billion annually to intercept cocaine in transit. These 
interdiction activities cause highly adaptive cartels to move and shift cocaine transport 
sites around Central America in response to risks in their supply chain (Magliocca et al., 
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2019).  The movement of the cocaine supply chain and it associated capital across 
Central America occurs in remote forested regions. 
Despite some evidence of a forest transition and reforestation for dry tropical 
forests in Central America over the past two decades (Aide et al., 2013; Hecht and 
Saatchi, 2007; Portillo-Quintero and Smith, 2018; Redo et al., 2012), forest loss in wet 
tropical areas remains high. Identified causes, drivers, and factors of forest loss include a 
growing agricultural frontier, infrastructure development, human colonization, and in 
particular, expanded pasture lands in Honduras, Northern Guatemala, and Nicaragua 
(Armenteras et al., 2017; Bebbington et al., 2018a; Carr et al., 2009; Graesser et al., 
2015; Schlesinger et al., 2017; WCS and CONAP, 2018). The Wildlife Conservation 
Society (2017) estimates that nearly 90% of all deforestation in protected areas in Central 
America is due to illegal cattle ranching. 
Beyond these conventional causes of forest loss, profits and activities associated 
with narcotrafficking could be an underlying cause in forest loss because of cartels’ need 
to launder money and establish territorial control. Drug dollars must be “legitimized” 
legally, and one of the easiest ways to do so in rural areas is through cattle ranching and 
agribusiness. Narcotraffickers in eastern Honduras and Guatemala clear forest land in 
protected and indigenous areas for pasture and agribusiness, using these “businesses” to 
legitimize profits from cocaine (Devine et al., 2018; McSweeney et al., 2017). Cartels also 
re-title and illegally invade forest land in remote protected areas to establish control of 
their ever-changing supply chain routes in response to U.S. interdiction. Acquiring this 
land is a way that the cartel signals to rival drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) 
territorial control. The land is used for airstrips and to move supplies inland and 
northward.  Drug traffickers also engage in illegal and speculative land acquisition to 
further increase their profits, using forest clearing to establish usufruct ownership 
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(McSweeney et al., 2017). Drug trafficking, therefore, does not directly cause forest loss 
in Central America as does coca production in South America (Dávalos et al., 2011). 
When the capital influx from drug trafficking lands in remote rural economies like 
eastern Honduras, it exacerbates existing pressures to clear forested land.  We 
hypothesize drug trafficking indirectly causes “narco-deforestation” through activities 
such as cattle ranching, fires, airstrips, roads, and clear cuts to establish ownership. 
The scale of narco-deforestation from 2001-2004 in parts of Central America is 
illuminated by Sesnie and associates (2017) based on analysis of spatial patterns of 
remotely sensed forest loss and official statistics on drug seizures from the U.S. 
interdiction coordinator. Rapid and unusual forest clearings were correlated with 
increased drug shipments in at least five Caribbean departments in Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Guatemala. These rapid clearings, assumed associated with narco-
trafficking, accounted for 15% to 30% of forest loss in the region. This important 
research, however, did not establish a causal effect, which the LSS community seeks for 
theory building and modeling, because it did not account for counterfactuals (rapid 
deforestation not linked to narcotics) or use causal inference methods. The study was 
also limited in geographic scope (only 14 of the 50 departments in Central America) and 
relied on official drug seizure data with many missing values and biases due in part to 
underreporting of hidden illegal transactions. 
From Driver to Cause: Illicit Narcodeforestation 
This study seeks to i) determine if media data can estimate spatial and temporal 
changes in trafficking intensity, and ii) assess if narcotrafficking has a causal effect on 
forest loss in light of other established causes and mediating factors. To accomplish this 
goal, media accounts of a specific instance of spatially explicit drug-related activity (e.g., 
a law enforcement seizure of cocaine in a named municipality) were collected across 
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Central America. The media event analysis was developed to provide a more spatially 
and temporally complete time series compared to official statistics. Fixed effects 
regression models, including relevant causes of land change beyond drug trafficking, 
were used to estimate causal effects of forest loss. With these new data and methods, we 
seek to move illicit drivers to the status of causes of land change.  
Data 
Study area 
The fixed effects regressions required consistent annual data for sub-country 
department units in Central America over multiple years on the dependent variable of 
forest loss and independent variables of conventional land change drivers and drug 
trafficking activities. Country level analyses would represent too small of sample size 
(n=5) for this method, while villages and municipalities represent administrative units 
that were too small given locational uncertainties of drug trafficking activity reports.  
We focused on moist tropical forest, the biome that has the highest rates of forest 
loss in Central America, in comparison to dry forest which has been stable over the past 
two decades (Portillo-Quintero and Smith, 2018).  Departments with moist forests were 
identified by calculating the area of forest with >50% canopy cover in 2000 (Hansen et 
al., 2013) inside the boundaries of the Moist Tropical Forest Terrestrial Ecoregion (Olson 
et al., 2001). Departments containing >300 km2 of identified moist tropical forest in 
2000 (n = 50 departments, Fig. 22) were used as the study area. 
Dependent variable: Forest loss data 
Annual, spatially explicit (30 m), and validated forest loss data consistent over 
the Central American region was obtained from the University of Maryland Department 
of Geographical Sciences Global Forest Change version 1.4 (see: 
https://earthenginepartners.appspot.com/science-2013-global-
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forest/download_v1.4.html accessed 2/1/2018-4/1/2018; Hansen et al., 2013). 
Continuous forest patches measuring ≤2 ha, representing minor areas of forest loss or 
potential noise, were removed from the analysis. Forest loss percentages, 2001-2016 
(Fig. 22) were aggregated by administrative departments in Central America using the 
GADM (Global Administrative Unit) Department or Province Areas (GADM, 2015).  
Figure 22. Forest loss and study area. A) Study area highlighted in red and orange with 
forest cover in 2000.  B) Total standardized forest loss percentages (following 
(Puyravaud, 2003)) from 2001-2016 for each department in Central America. Calculated 
by Authors from Hansen et al. (2013) forest loss data.  
 
Independent variables: drivers, causes, and factors of forest loss in Central America  
Conventional land use change drivers and causes include crop and pasture 
expansion, population (growth and density), road infrastructure and economic 
development. Mediating factors include fires, primarily anthropogenic, rainfall patterns, 
and policy and institutional changes (i.e., changing boundaries of a protected area, 
indigenous tenure/titling, political changes). Consistent, annual data across Central 
America at the department scale exist for a subset of these variables (Table 8). Cropland 
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and pasture expansion was estimated by calculating the annual total percent of cropland, 
plantations, and pasture per department (Graesser et al., 2015). Annual estimates of 
rural population growth were generated by masking out urban areas as defined by 
GRUMP (Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project), and summing population outside these 
areas per department from the annual Landscan population data set (Bright et al., 2016). 
Annual GDP growth rates served as a proxy for changes in economic development. 
Anthropogenic burning, associated with agriculture, constitutes a driver, especially fires 
that extend beyond the intended agricultural lands, for example, in the Petén 
department in Guatemala in dry El Niño years (Radachowsky et al., 2012; WCS and 
CONAP, 2018). Two variables estimated this factor: an estimate of annual burned area 
and dry season precipitation. Other known factors of forest loss for which data were 
unavailable at the time of this analysis includes road infrastructure and resource 
extraction (Bebbington et al., 2018b), land tenure changes such as titling indigenous 
lands (Liscow, 2013; Stocks et al., 2007). Plantation crops, such as oil palm are not a 
driver of forest loss in Central America (with the exception of the Petén) because they 
mostly replace previous cropland and pastureland (Furumo and Aide, 2017). Note that 
because we used fixed effects for political departments in regressions, time invariant 
variables that may influence forest loss, such as slope, size of the department, protected 
area, and other features are not explicitly incorporated in models as variables, but rather 
are indirectly incorporated through model intercepts for each department. 
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Table 8. Annual Central America-wide model covariates attributed to each study area 
province or department  
Variable  Description Temporal 
Scale, 
Resolution, 
Unit 
Source 
Agricultural 
Production 
Cropland, pasture, and citrus/coffee 
(plantations), aggregated as percent per 
department 
2001-2014, 
100m. % 
(Graesser et 
al., 2015) 
Population 
total  
People per department 2001-2016, 
1km, people 
LandScan 
(Bright et al., 
2016) 
Rural 
population 
Rural population calculated by using 
grump to mask out urban area 
population 
2001-2016, 
1km, people 
From 
LandScan 
and GRUMP 
(Balk, 2009) 
Economic 
development 
GDP growth 2000-2016, 
Country, rate 
(The World 
Bank, 2018) 
Fires Area burned 2000-2017, 
monthly, 500m, 
ha 
NASA (Giglio 
et al., 2013) 
Climate Dry season precipitation  2000-2017, 
1km, mm 
CHRIPS 
(Funk et al., 
2015) 
 
Independent variables: Drug trafficking data used in regressions 
Two data sources represent drug trafficking activity in regression models (Table 
9): counter narcotics data, extracted from the Consolidated Counter Drug Database 
(CCDB), and media reports analyzed and coded by the authors. The CCDB data managed 
by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator are the officially vetted and sole source of 
interdiction and cocaine flows data used by the US government to assess drug policy 
performance (Joint Drug Control Interagency Policy, 2010). They are generated by a 
variety of U.S. government agencies, and vetted in an interagency working group. These 
data were obtained from the interdiction coordinator. CCBD data have been used in 
previous studies to analyze anomalous patterns of forest loss (Sesnie et al. 2017) and 
model interdiction patterns in an agent-based model (Magliocca et al 2019). For this 
study, the annual quantity of cocaine detected includes the amount of cocaine (kg) seized 
(confiscated by law enforcement), lost (discarded over land or sea during interdiction), 
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or delivered (known to be received) to a destination in Central America. The vast 
majority of these data represent cocaine “delivered” at the country, and for some regions, 
department scale (SI Fig. 1). Hereafter, the term CCDB SLD to refers to these data. 
The CCDB SLD data have known limitations and bias. The first is that 
department level data are not available for all regions and years leaving spatial and 
temporal gaps in information on drug flows with in a department. Second, they are 
considered to be conservative estimates for actual cocaine flows because they focus on 
non-commercial marine and air traffic routes directly from South America and do not 
consider overland or the “secondary” movement of drugs along commercial routes- such 
as in shipping containers. Location specific data are only added if SOUTHCOM (U.S 
Southern Command, Department of Defense) and the Coast Guard agree on the exact 
location of activity. If an exact geographic department of delivery is uncertain, which is 
often the case in tracking illicit activity, that event is not included in the dataset. Finally, 
counter narcotics data suffer from a form of bias called the “spot light effect”, meaning 
that assets for data collection are focused on areas of suspected activity, according to 
available intelligence. Data tend to be collected after trafficking routes have been 
identified, and due to resource limitations, in strategic locations with a high likelihood 
for seizures. This spotlight effect creates a spatial and temporal lag in the data and an 
uneven pattern of interdiction effort across the region. CCDB data are largely incomplete 
before 2003, and most department observations have less than 10 years of data 
available. Together these limitations reduce sample size, power in statistical analyses, 
and ability of CCDB data to measure causal effects, increasing the risk of type II 
statistical error (Crewe et al., 2016).  
To address these limitations, a new dataset was created using news media reports 
clearly attributing drug trafficking events as a proxy to capture a much wider range of 
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narcotrafficking activity than what is accounted for in the CCDB. We considered relevant 
media reports if they documented events including cocaine traveling over land, capture 
of property of known narcotraffickers, conflicts in communities with competing DTOs 
(drug trafficking organizations), discoveries of clandestine airstrips, as well as a range of 
other “events” linked to specific geographic locations. One media report could contain 
multiple narcotrafficking events. 
Although media cover a larger spatial and temporal range than the CCDB data, 
media reports are also subject to different types of bias. Central American media are 
subject to urban bias, with underreporting in rural areas. An additional limitation is that 
economic elites, who are sometimes involved in narcotrafficking, own many newspapers 
and may selectively influence the content of coverage in order to protect drug trafficking 
routes (Salzman and Salzman, 2009) 
How events from media reports were recorded and coded to create a dataset 
(hereafter referred to as “media data”) are detailed in the supplementary methods, but 
are summarized here. For each country, key search terms were used to scan digital and 
hard copy media for drug trafficking activity reported in national newspapers. Discrete 
trafficking events in each media report were coded by date, location, and amount or 
values seized. The data were manually checked by Spanish speaking technicians to 
ensure no duplicate events were recorded. Media events were summarized per 
department and year and used as a proxy for narcotrafficking activity in regressions. 
In contrast to CCDB data, where the U.S. interdiction coordinator told us that 
missing data could not be considered evidence for no cocaine flows due the spotlight 
effect, the absence of media reports could either represent missing data (no reporting 
was available) or truly indicate no narcotrafficking activity (e.g., 0 reports). Therefore, 
we ran three separate regressions using CCDB data alone, media data with an absence of 
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events coded as a zero, and using media data with an absence of events coded as a 
missing value for that year and department.  
Table 9. Annual department level narcotrafficking data  
Data Explanation Unit and N Spatial and 
Temporal Scale 
Source 
Counter 
narcotics 
data 
Cocaine seized, lost 
or, delivered as 
tracked by US 
military 
 
Kilos of 
cocaine, 135 
observations 
Select departments, 
14 of 56 f2000-2014, 
but only 114 
observations due to 
missing years 
Consolidated 
Counter Drug 
Database 
(CCDB) 
Media 
Data 
Media report with 
department specific 
narco trafficking 
activity events  
2217 events  All departments from 
2000-2017. Some 
missing years when 
no events are 
detected 
Coded 
newspaper 
articles from 
major media 
outlets 
 
Additional narcotrafficking data to assess media data validity 
 The media data was tested for its ability to represent the spatial and temporal 
variability in drug trafficking activities via comparison with independent datasets at both 
the country and department scale. Media were compared at these two scales because 
while drug trafficking data at the country level is more spatially and temporally 
complete, this coarse spatial resolution is not the unit of analysis selected for this study. 
Often, data will correlate at coarser scales of aggregation (countries) but not at finer scale 
(departments), known as the modifiable areal unit problem (Openshaw, 1984). 
Therefore, even if media data show congruence with country level narcotrafficking data, 
these results could not be extended to assume congruence at the department 
aggregation. The country and department data that we used in comparisons to assess the 
validity of using media data as a proxy for drug trafficking are described below (Table 
10), followed by a description of the method used to assess media validity. 
Country level drug trafficking data to assess media data validity 
We used three country-scale annual measures of narcotrafficking activity: i) 
seizures in kilos reported by UNODC 2000-2017 (United Nations Organization on Drug 
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Control) (Unodc, 2017), ii) seizures in kilos reported by INCSR 200-2017 (U.S 
International Narcotics and Strategy Control Report), and iii) number of cocaine 
shipments received, reported by CCDB 2001-2014. UNODC seizure data relies on self-
reporting by each country. In the years countries do not self-report, UNODC uses 
information from INCSR (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report), CICAD 
(InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission), and reports from national drug 
enforcement agencies. These data are subject to country-level biases, including 
interdiction effort, resource allocation (sampling effort), and politically motivated over-
reporting (UNODC, 2018). The INCSR data are prepared by the U.S. State Department 
using a variety of intelligence sources. The CCDB data at the country level is reported in 
number of drug shipments of cocaine into each country in Central America from the 
cocaine producing country of origin. INCSR and UNODC data supply an additional three 
years of data, but CCDB data is generally considered to be of higher quality. 
Department level drug trafficking data to assess media validity 
We tested the media data against three other proxies of drug activities at the 
department scale: sites of clandestine airstrips in Gracias a Dios Honduras, cartel land 
holdings in Petén, Guatemala and land seizures in protected areas in Petén, Guatemala.  
Data include coordinates for 66 airstrip locations obtained from the Honduran military 
in interdiction efforts called “Operation Hammer,” and an additional 23 airstrips 
identified by local ethnographers and field contacts in the Caribbean reaches of 
Honduras (SI, Fig. 3). The year each airstrip emerged provided by the Honduran military 
was identified in Landsat Satellite imagery in Google Timelapse, and 23 airstrips where 
secondarily verified using high spatial resolution imagery accessed via the Digital Globe 
Enhanced View webhosting service (www.digitalglobe.com/products/enhanced view-
web-hosting).  
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Data in Petén, Guatemala, include the locations of cartel land holdings and seized 
property in protected areas (SI Fig. 3 and 4). Cartel land holdings were identified via 
registered private lands under names of drug cartel members identified in a 2011 InSight 
Crime report. We calculated the area of forest loss per year in each of these holdings. 
These data were digitized and georeferenced, and used to estimate hectares of annual 
forest loss. Seized properties in protected areas are known to be linked to 
narcotrafficking activity (Devine et al., 2018). Both data sets, reported annually from 
2000-2017, were obtained from the Guatemalan government. The SI provides details. 
Table 10. Additional narcotrafficking data to assess media data validity 
Data Explanation Unit and N Spatial and 
temporal scale 
Source 
Country 
seizures 
Self-reported country 
seizures of cocaine in 
kilos to UNODC 
Cocaine seized 
in kilos 
2000-2014, 
annual, country 
UNODC 
US intelligence from 
various sources 
2000-2018, 
annual 
INCSR 
Country 
shipments of 
cocaine 
Detected shipments 
of cocaine arriving  
75 shipments, 
15 per country 
2000-2014, 
annual, country 
CCDB 
Landing 
strips, 
Honduras 
Points of recognized 
landing strips in 
Google Earth 
identified by research 
team plus airstrips 
from US funded 
“operacion martillo” 
73 Airstrip 
point 
coordinates 
2000-2017, 
annual, Gracias a 
Dios, Paraiso, 
Olancho, and 
Colon, Honduras  
Honduran 
Military, 
ethnography 
Land 
seizures in 
protected 
areas, 
Guatemala 
Accusations 
registered by the 
Guatemala 
government of illegal 
land seizures in 
Protected Areas 
20,000 
accusations 
registered per 
municipality 
2000-2017, 
annual, 
Guatemalan 
municipalities 
Ministerio 
Publico, 
Guatemala 
Forest 
cleared in 
cartel land 
holdings, 
Petén 
Summary of forest 
loss per year in 
digitized and 
georeferenced private 
land holding linked to 
identified cartels 
80 polygons 
over 100,000 
ha 
Land holdings 
present from 
2004-2011, Petén, 
Guatemala 
Insight Crime 
(2011) 
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Methods 
Media Validity Analyses 
Media data were assessed for quality in three ways: i) in terms of the data’s 
spatial and temporal congruence with additional drug trafficking data, ii) the spatial 
representativeness of the data based on expected narcotrafficking patterns, iii) expert 
opinion with field-based researchers who interpreted the results of the congruence and 
representativeness analyses. 
Media data were compared to country and department level drug trafficking data 
(Table 10) to understand the spatial and temporal correlation and potential lags between 
datasets. Spatial agreement was assessed by comparing total number of events to kilos 
estimated in CCDB using linear regression to calculate a coefficient of determination 
(R2). Temporal correlation was assessed using cross-correlation analysis, which served to 
estimate temporal lags between media and country seizure data in seven departments 
with CCDB SLD kilo data with ≥10 years of observations, the airstrip data in Gracias a 
Dios, Honduras, and land seizure data and cartel land holding forest loss in Petén, 
Guatemala (R version 3.5.2, ‘stats package’ [Venables and Ripley, 2002]). Given the 
potential for the spotlight effect to cause delays of several years, we report correlation 
coefficients for up to 5 years in both directions (lags and leads). 
An analysis of the spatial representativeness of narcotrafficking as reported in the 
media was required due to the urban and reporting bias of Central American media. This 
quantitative analysis was completed by comparing the spatial distribution of media 
events to an expected spatial distribution of narcotrafficking activities from Magliocca et 
al, (2019) (see SI for details, but summarized here). The expected spatial distribution of 
narcotrafficking activities is based on a suitability surface developed for the Narco-Logic 
ABM (Magliocca et al 2019) which assumes activities are more likely in protected areas, 
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near coasts and borders, in remote areas, and in less developed areas (e.g.,. in forests 
instead of croplands). Representativeness analysis (Schmill et al., 2014) was completed 
for each country by calculating the average narcosuitability score for each municipality. 
Fifteen equal frequency bins of the narcosuitability distribution were calculated for each 
country. Media counts were summed for each of these bins. Graphing the media counts 
per narcosuitability bin allowed for comparisons between the expected narcotrafficking 
distribution and the media reports. The results of the temporal and spatial correlation 
and representativeness analyses were interpreted by country experts and are reported in 
the SI. 
 Fixed Effects Panel Regression 
We used panel regression models to determine which factors were significant 
drivers of forest loss and to estimate the causal effect of narcotrafficking on forest loss. 
All drivers noted above were included in the analysis, run together with drug trafficking 
variables (Table 8). Separate models were estimated using the two different measures of 
drug trafficking (Table 9) and compared to the coefficient of determination in 
conventional models using the same spatial and temporal scale (see Table 11 for a 
summary of models). 
Table 11. Models used to estimate causal effects of narcotrafficking on forest loss 
Name Explanation Spatial  and Temporal 
Scale 
Conventional  Includes conventional drivers 
of forest loss. Excluding drug 
trafficking data 
50 departments with moist 
forest (regional), 14 
departments with official 
data, or country subsets 
2001-2016 
Drug trafficking with official 
data 
Includes conventional drivers 
of forest loss and CCDB data 
14 departments with official 
data 2001-2014 
Drug trafficking with media 
data 1 (absence of report = 0) 
Includes conventional drivers 
of forest loss and media data 
50 departments with moist 
forest (regional) and country 
and subsets 2001-2016 Drug trafficking with media 
data 2 (absence of report = 
missing data 
Includes conventional drivers 
of forest loss and media data 
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Models subsets were first run at the level of departments (n = 14) where CCDB 
SLD data were available, and with all departments with moist tropical forest where 
media data were avaialble (n = 50, Fig. 2). We also ran fixed effects panel regression 
models for each individual country with the media data to understand if there are 
different associations between narcotrafficking and deforestation across countries. In all 
cases, we compare model fit using R2 between forest loss models including and excluding 
drug trafficking as an explanatory variable. Fixed effects panel statistics were employed 
to control for any time invariant departmental factors that could influence forest loss 
(e.g., slope or area) We used the plm R package (Croissant and Millo, 2008) for 
computation in a two-way fixed effects model using the following equation: 
 𝑒𝑞. 1 𝑌௜௧ =   𝛼 +  𝐵௜௧𝑥௜௧ … + ∁௜ +  𝛾௧ + 𝜀௜௧  
Where 
Y is the total number of hectares of forest area lost each year (t) per department 
(i);  
𝛾௧ is the time fixed effect at time t ;  
C is the department fixed effect; 
  is the average of fixed and time effects across all department 
 and 𝐵ଵ𝑥௜௧. are the independent variables listed in Tables 8 and 9. 
𝜀௜௧ is the error term for each year (t) per department (i);  
 is akin to determining an intercept that is the weighted mean of time and individual 
effects (Gould, 2013), which controls for variation in forest loss explained by factors or 
causes in the linear model that are constant over time. This model is useful for 
hypothesis testing, not prediction, because the fixed intercept controls for other factors, 
allowing us to isolate how increases in narcotrafficking are related to forest loss.  
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A two-way fixed effects model was used to test for the influence of cocaine 
trafficking, while controlling for time invariant differences between departments that 
influence the amount of forest loss (e.g., size of extant forest, protected areas, road 
networks, and other unobserved differences) and year of measurement. Our expectation 
was that trafficking variables would explain variation in forest loss beyond that already 
controlled for by the conventional drivers (rural population rates, increases in pasture 
and cropped area, changes in precipitation and burned area), and by time (e.g., 
deforestation has a temporal trend). These considerations reduce the chance that 
endogeneity or omitted variable bias would influence the results. An omitted variable 
would have to be correlated with both departments and temporal trends of deforestation 
to cause bias and confound results.  
Robustness checks included lagging and leading forest loss variables to more 
concretely assess causal inferences for factors showing a positive effect on forest loss. We 
expected significant explanatory variables to lose significance when the dependent 
variable is lagged by multiple years. If we were to find, for example, that narcotrafficking 
remained significant when leading or lagging deforestation several years, it would 
indicate that narcotrafficking is correlated with places of high deforestation, but that it 
does not cause deforestation at a specific time point. The square root of the variable 
inflation factors (VIF) were measured for all linear models, and any combination that 
was > 2 was discarded. Residual plots were examined for every model to ensure no 
outliers were outside of 0.5 for cooks distance. Fixed effects models used a log 
transformation of deforested area in hectares, which improved the normality of 
residuals. Coefficient plots transform coefficients and standard errors by two standard 
deviations of each variable so that regions coefficients of independent variables are 
directly comparable to each other (Gelman, 2008) 
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Results  
The results are reported in two sections: (i) reporting the media data validity 
analyses; and (ii) the land change regressions. The results of collecting narcotrafficking 
data in the media and the validity analyses used to assess representativeness as well as 
spatial and temporal congruence with other indicators of drug trafficking are undertaken 
at the country and department scale. Finally, the results from fixed effect panel 
regressions using both CCDB and media data are reported for the Central American 
region and in country-specific model subsets. 
Media Validity Analyses 
Media data were correlated spatially at both the country and department level 
when compared to other drug trafficking data (R2 ranging from .44 to .70). Data were 
temporally correlated with an average of drug trafficking data lagging 2 years behind 
media data (r= .35-.74 depending on the country and dataset). 
Honduras had the greatest number of events (826), followed by Guatemala (566), 
Panama (327), Nicaragua (165), and Costa Rica (124). Media data increased the sample 
size relative to CCDB data (700 vs 114 department- year observations, respectively) and 
enlarged temporal and spatial coverage (SI Fig. 2, Fig. 23). Completeness, as measured 
by the number of years of non-zero data (e.g. no absence of CCDB data or media reports) 
available for that department, is shown in C and D in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23.  Media and CCDB data coverage and completeness over Central America. A) 
Total media events per department from 2000-2017. B) Total kilos of cocaine seized, 
lost, and delivered from 2000-2014, with labeled names of departments. White areas 
represent no data. C) Completeness measured in years of media observations present per 
department. D) Completeness measured in years of CCDB data per department, shared 
legend with C. All white areas are no data. 
 
Media Validity at the Country Level: Spatial Correlation 
The number of annual media events at the country level were compared to three 
national level drug trafficking datasets to determine if media was capturing the intensity 
of narcotrafficking spatially (Fig. 23). A linear regression was used to compare media 
events for each country-year observation, controlling for country level effects, to 
compare the spatial correlation between datasets (SI table 4). CCDB department level 
data had the highest total correlation (R2 with media data = 0.70, followed by UNODC 
seizures [R2=0.59], CCDB Shipments [R2=0.55], and INCSR seizures [R2=0..44]. The 
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high correlation with CCDB SLD data was influenced by outliers in Honduras (Fig. SI 8). 
Media events and UNODC seizure data showed a significantly greater positive 
correlation in Guatemala and Honduras than for other countries (SI Table 4, Fig. SI 8). 
 
Figure 24. Country comparisons of media events to other measures of trafficking 
activity. CCDB shipment versus media data per country. Red lines are kilos of cocaine 
reported by CCDB, green lines  UNODC; seizure data orange line, kilos of cocaine seized 
reported by INCSR;  and blue line, number of media events per year. Dotted blue line 
represents missing data with linear interpolation (Nicaragua).  
 
Media Validity at the Country Level: Temporal Correlation 
Linear regressions are not appropriate for determining correlation between time 
series dataset, thus cross-correlation analyses were used to determine if media captured 
the timing of narcotrafficking intensity at country and department scales. All cross-
correlation plots are available in the supplementary materials (SI 11-14) and the results 
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are summarized in (Table SI 6 and in Fig. SI 9). Media was correlated to CCDB 
shipments in all countries except Guatemala (r= 0.403, std 0.349). Lag times varied by 
2.14 years (std 2.15 years) on average, but this varied by country. Media was correlated to 
UNODC data at similar levels (r =.424, std .246), yet with little to no temporal lag (-.25 
years, std=1.26 years). Correlation levels and lags were similar for all countries. A one-
way ANOVA test indicated no significant difference between the mean correlations 
across countries.  
Media Validity at the Department Level: Temporal Correlation 
Media data were significantly correlated with drug activity data at the department 
level in some cases using cross-correlation analysis. Figure 25 displays department level 
data with media time series. At the department level, media was significantly correlated 
to four of the seven departments with 10+ years of CCDB, including Gracias a Dios, 
Honduras (r=0.586), Petén, Guatemala (r=0.563, with 4 year lag), Darien, Panama 
(r=0.79), and Region de Atlántico Norte, Nicaragua (r=0.97, with 1 year lag). 
Departmental data for Panama, Panama, Puntarenas, Costa Rica, and Region de 
Atlántico Sur, Nicaragua were not significantly correlated with media data.  
Media data was significantly correlated with land seizure data in Petén and 
Izabal, Guatemala with land seizures lagging two years behind media reports (r= 0.36) 
and with forest loss in cartel land holdings in Petén, Guatemala, with a one year lag (r= 
0.69). Media was significantly correlated with the date that an airstrip was observed as 
“bombed” in satellite imagery in the simultaneous year (r =.740), but not the year the 
airstrip was first observed as constructed. Airstrips were bombed in the same year they 
were constructed in most cases, but for some observations, airstrips were bombed 2-5 
years after initial construction. These results indicate media data are reporting on highly 
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visible interdiction activity in this region, but may not accurately capture all 
narcotrafficking activities.  
 
Figure 25. Media events per department and ancillary data correlations. A) Land 
seizures in the Petén are significantly correlated at a 2 year lag (r= 0.357). B) Forest loss 
in cartel land holdings in the Petén are significantly correlated at a one year lag (r=.634). 
C) Airstrips in Gracias a Dios are correlation in the same year (r-.704). D) CCDB seizure 
data correlates in Gracias a Dios (r= 0.59) with no lag, and E) with Petén at a 4 year lag 
(r= 0.56). 
 
Media Representativeness Analysis  
Countries varied widely by type of bias and coverage of narcotrafficking (Table 1 SI 
and Fig. SI 6). Of all Central American countries, Honduras had the highest proportion 
of media reports in the narco-suitability bin (41%), followed by Costa Rica (31%), 
Nicaragua (25%), Guatemala (13%), and Panama (6%). Urban bias was strong in Panama 
and Guatemala (with over 30% of reports coming from the capital city in each country), 
and to a lesser degree, Nicaragua with high reporting in Managua. Under reporting in 
rural areas was strongest in Guatemala and Panama in rural areas such as the Petén, 
Guatemala, and Darien, Panama. 
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Fixed Effects Panel Regressions of Forest Loss 
Narcotrafficking has a significant positive causal effect on forest loss at the 
regional level as measured by both official data and media proxies. In country model 
subsets, official data had a causal effect on forest loss in Nicaragua, and media data had a 
causal effect in Honduras. Drug trafficking models explain additional variance in forest 
loss overtime as compared to conventional models. The R2   reported of the fixed effects 
models is small, because it only describes the additional variation in forest loss explained 
by time variant drivers of land change that cannot be accounted for by time-invariant 
and department-specific effects. 
Regional Models 
 Table 12 reports the regression model results at the regional level. Standardized 
coefficients are plotted in figure 26.  In the conventional model, agricultural production 
(crop and pasture) and rural population growth showed a significant and positive 
relationship with forests loss. Narcotrafficking activity has a significant positive causal 
effect on forest loss, and explains an additional 4-9% of variance (R2= 0.27 and R2= 0.11, 
respectively) when compared to conventional models (R2=0.18  and R2=0.06, 
respectively).  
In conventional models, reduced economic development was significantly 
correlated with forest loss, but this effect became insignificant in models with kilos SLD. 
Robustness checks (Table 7 SI) reveal SLD was not correlated with lags or leads of forest 
loss, but media data were correlated with 1 year lag and 1 and 2 years lead of forest loss. 
This indicates that either media data, or the relationship between narcotrafficking and 
forest loss, is somewhat imprecise temporally.  
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Figure 26. Coefficient plot of regional models with point estimates and standard 
deviations. Bars rescaled to 2 standard deviations of variables to directly compare 
coefficients. Variables that do not cross the “0” line are significant at the p<.05 level. Left 
axis also identifies significance, with * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.001. 
 
Table 12. Regional model comparisons with conventional and narcotrafficking variables 
for HA of forest loss per year from 2001-2016. The Conventional subset is to 14 
departments and years for which CCDB kilos SLD data were available. NA=0 means 
department years with no media observations were given a value of 0. 
 
 
  135 
Country Level Models 
 Narcotrafficking activity has a causal effect on forest loss in Nicaragua as 
measured by official data, and in Honduras and Guatemala as measured by media data. 
Multiple drug trafficking models with media data were formed in countries with 
evidence of significantly correlated media temporal lags (from SI table 6 Panama= 1,2, 
and 4 years, Nicaragua= 4 years, Honduras= 0-4 years, Guatemala= 1-2 years). Drug 
trafficking models (R2 = .20) have improved model fits compared to conventional models 
of forest loss (R2 = .15) in Honduras. Note that because data are subset by country, the 
sample size is lower and the probability for type II error increases significantly. As a 
result, null results do not necessarily indicate that relationships do not exist between 
forest loss and narcotrafficking; a null result could have been caused due to low sample 
size. 
Conventional model results are reported in Table SI 9. The insignificant F 
statistic in the official drug trafficking data models suggests little explanatory power 
(Table 13, robustness checks in Table SI 7). Increasing agricultural production and 
rainfall also showed a significantly strong positive relationship with forest loss in 
Nicaragua, and have a larger effect relative to narcotrafficking intensity (standardized 
coefficients, figure 27). 
In drug trafficking models using media data, except for Costa Rica (F=1.00) and 
Panama (.745), all other country models had significant F-statistics (Nicaragua 
F=2.822). Narcotrafficking has a positive causal effect on forest loss only in Honduras 
(F=4.08, p<.05 ) and Guatemala (F=4.54, p<.05 ). Other countries showed no 
relationship between trafficking and forest loss (Table 14). Robustness checks in 
Honduras (Table SI 10) reveal that, as in the regional models, a one year of lag and one 
year of lead of forest loss also indicate a narcotrafficking intensity has a positive causal 
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effect on forest loss. Robustness checks in Guatemala reveal narcotrafficking has a causal 
effect on forest loss with a 2 year lag only and after 2005. Country model subsets lagging 
media data elsewhere shows no significant causal effect between narcotrafficking activity 
and forest loss. 
Significant conventional causes and factors of forest loss differ by country. 
Expanding crops and pasture cause forest loss in Nicaragua, and expanding crops with 
forest loss in Guatemala after 2005. In Costa Rica, decreasing crops and rural population 
growth are associated with forest loss. Causes and factors of forest loss in Guatemala 
differed among models. Precipitation is a significant factor in drug trafficking models 
with media data, but not in conventional models. Burned area is a significant factor in 
both conventional models and drug trafficking models with media data (SI tables 8 and 
9). The relationship between burned area and forest loss effect is strongest in the Petén, 
Guatemala (Figure 28). In Honduras, forest loss is higher in places where rural 
population is decreasing, representing an unexpected effect. 
Table 13. Country model comparisons with narcotrafficking variable of kilos SLD from 
CCDB data to predict HA of forest loss per year from 2001-2014. Guatemala and Costa 
Rica did not have enough units to produce model results.  
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Table 14. Country model comparisons with narcotrafficking variable of media counts to 
predict HA of forest loss per year from 2001-2016. NA=0 when department years with 
no media observations were filled with 0.   
 
 
Figure 27. Coefficient plot of country models with point estimates and standard 
deviations. Variables that do not cross the “0” line not significant at the p<.05 level. Left 
axis also identifies significance, with * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.001. 
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Figure 28. Peten, Guatemala time series for A) narcotrafficking measured by media and 
forest loss, B) forest loss and burned area, C) burned area and media, and D) burned 
area and dry season precipitation. 
 
Discussion  
Narcotrafficking and forest loss in Central America 
  Among a set of common drivers of tropical forest loss, we found a significant 
causal effect between narcotrafficking intensity and increased forest loss in Central 
America at the department scale. Panel models of forest loss explain a significantly 
higher amount of variation over time when narcotrafficking is added as an explanatory 
variable to forest loss models. Our results showed a consistent pattern between increased 
drug trafficking reported in official statistics within specific counties and departments, 
news media reports as a measure of drug trafficking intensity, and accelerated forest 
loss. This causal effect, complements established causal mechanisms between drug 
trafficking activities and forest loss in both Honduras (McSweeney et al., 2018) and 
Guatemala (Devine et al., 2018), providing evidence of narcotrafficking as a cause of 
forest loss in those two countries. While a causal effect of narcotrafficking on forest loss 
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was also found in Nicaragua, as yet, no published studies explain a causal mechanism 
there.  
Consistent with previous studies, we also found that increasing agricultural 
production, pastureland expansion, and rural population growth have a significant 
casual effect increasing forest loss in Central America (Aide et al., 2013; Carr et al., 2009; 
Graesser et al., 2015). In contrast to this regional trend, country level models in 
Honduras revealed a negative relationship with rural population and forest loss, 
explained by previous studies that outmigration that increases with drug trafficking 
intensity in Eastern Honduras (McSweeney et al., 2018). 
Drug trafficking had no causal effect on forest loss in two countries- Costa Rica 
and Panama. This confirms previous studies finding no correlation between anomalous 
deforestation and narcotrafficking in those countries (Sesnie et al 2017). The lack of 
correlation has three possible explanations. First, drug trafficking generates less profit, 
and thus financial capital, in these two countries because cocaine accrues per kilo as it 
moves northward. Second, alternative country-specific transit and laundering 
opportunities may do away with the necessity for forest clearing. Panama uses the US 
dollar in its economy, making it easier to launder money in the financial sector, and 
Costa Rica has higher economic development, strong property rights, and more stringent 
forest laws compared to other countries, creating high transaction costs in forest clearing 
activities. These conditions provide options for laundering narco-dollars outside of 
forested lands. Finally, in these two countries, cocaine shipments primarily arrive by sea 
in small shipments scattered over multiple routes, and continue on maritime routes 
north or via on the Panamerican highway (Mcllwaine and Moses, 2012). These routes 
require less territorial control by cartels. 
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In contrast, in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, cocaine moves into remote 
areas by air, landing in forested and often remote or indigenous territories. Cocaine 
supply then moves over land, along routes where DTOs require for territorial control of 
their supply chain and clear forest to establish usufruct ownership. Multiple studies 
show in both Honduras and Guatemala that drug trafficking profits are invested in forest 
frontiers, in pasturelands and cattle, and oil palm plantations (Devine et al., 2018; 
McSweeney et al., 2017).  
Model results in Guatemala reveal that narcotrafficking had a causal effect on 
forest loss only after 2005. This could be in part because the dominant factor of forest 
loss in regions like the Petén in the early 2000 were forest fires (Fig. 28). Notably, in the 
media, forest fires have been linked to narcotraffickers. Experts in Guatemala also 
contend that narcotraffickers established airstrips and border territories in the Laguna 
del Tigre national park in the early 2000s, and only began to invest in cattle ranching 
and large pasturelands after amassing capital in the mid 2000s. Rival drug trafficking 
organizations also began to compete for territory in the mid 2000s. Future work is 
needed in Guatemala to better understand the relationship between narcotrafficking, 
fires, and forest loss. 
Drug trafficking forest loss models using media data revealed that forest loss may 
increase up to one year before, and up to two years after narcotrafficking activity is 
detected and reported in the media. This indicates that either media data is temporally 
imprecise, or the relationship between narcotrafficking and forest loss is not immediate. 
It is likely that clearing forest land for money laundering would occur sometime after 
capital is accumulated from drug trafficking.  
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras hold the only remaining intact and 
extensive primary moist tropical forest in Central America, which are being substantially 
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reduced by drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is an underlying driver of forest loss in what 
can appear to be a business-as-usual explanation of an agricultural frontier. Illegal cattle 
ranching has been identified as a proximate driver of forest loss, but this study shows 
narcotrafficking in some cases may be the root cause in Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Guatemala. This study thus reaffirms claims that drug interdiction policy is incidentally 
conservation policy (McSweeney 2014), because interdiction efforts influence the 
location and intensity of narco-trafficking (Magliocca et al., 2019) that causes forest loss 
in Central America. Remote regions of intact forest along major trafficking routes will 
continue to be vulnerable to deforestation.  
Leveraging media to measure causal effects of illicit activity in the Earth System 
Media data is a promising proxy of illicit activity, and can complement official 
statistics that suffer from coarse spatial resolution, low sample size, and the “spotlight 
effect.” Media data, appropriately used, can provide spatial temporal data of high profile 
illicit activities that influence environmental change, including corruption, illegal 
logging, and wild life trafficking (Patel et al., 2015; Siriwat and Nijman, 2018), for which 
official data are unavailable or of poor quality. Media data can also illuminate processes 
of illicit activity not captured in official data. In our study, media capture a much richer 
picture of laundering strategies, conflicts between DTOs, violence, corruption, and bribes 
that influence environmental changes such as forest loss related to the movement of 
drugs. Media is already used to understand public discourse of environmental change 
(Cody et al., 2017; Dolšak and Houston, 2014; Le Nghiem et al., 2016), but could be 
leveraged to generate data about drivers of environmental change which have been 
previously difficult to measure, such as illicit activity. 
Collecting independent measures of illicit activity at the scale of the causal 
inference model is critical to ensure media represent spatial and temporal dynamics. 
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Official data on illicit activity is fragmented and often unavailable at sub-national scales- 
but, as is the case with drug seizure data, availability of higher quality data exists at 
country and even regional scales. Obtaining these data in this study required significant 
effort of researchers to develop relationships with law enforcement to know what data 
exist, what they represent, and how to navigate transparency laws to obtain them. More 
transparency from policy and the military tracking interdiction activities and efforts to 
make these data public would allow researchers to develop more robust illicit proxies 
from media and other sources, echoing recommendations by the National Research 
Council (National Research Council, 2001). Data proxies of illicit activity independent of 
media on sub-national scales, such as the airstrip and cartel land holdings, were 
necessary in this study to ensure media accuracy captured narcotrafficking intensity this 
spatial specificity.  
Temporal accuracy and bias in reporting must be assessed when using media data to 
measure illicit activity. Cross correlation analysis is important to understand the 
potential lag effect between media and other independent data sources. 
Representativeness analysis, which was developed to address sampling bias in meta-
analysis for land change science (Schmill et al. 2014), was useful here to understand bias 
in reporting in urban and remote areas. Experts are needed to interpret the results of 
both representativeness and spatial and temporal correlation analyses. These expert 
insights explained how political and economic dynamics of media in each country 
explain potential difference in reporting over space and time and by media source.  
Our experts were the authors on this paper with more than 10 years of field 
experience in each country. We considered Honduras media data to capture the 
temporal and spatial variability of trafficking, notwithstanding reduced reports in 2011. 
The decline is reports in 2011 is attributed locally to the consolidated power and stability 
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of DTOs, lack of interdiction activity, and general destabilization and intimidation of 
press in the region.  We note the Petén became a land-based trafficking hub in 2004, 
around the time narco-cattle ranching increased in the region. We note potential 
underreporting in western Nicaragua, and strong racial bias in the Nicaraguan media 
based on how indigenous peoples were represented as drug traffickers. Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and Panama media both show increases in the mid-2000s of trafficking 
activity congruent with UNODC seizures data, but in contradiction to CCDB shipment 
data (Figure 24). 
Using media data as a proxy for illicit activity has several limitations. For some 
countries in our analyses, media archives and databases were unavailable in some years 
(El Heraldo in Honduras and La Prensa in Guatemala) or only had partial electronic 
archives (e.g. Guatemala). Using multiple media sources can help fill in gaps. Media may 
have its own “spotlight effect”, covering visible illicit activity, such as drug seizures in 
urban areas, ports, and border crossings spatially distant from where drugs land and 
money is laundered. Future studies should address spatial displacement of urban media 
reports from the rural social-ecological systems where the impacts of illicit activity 
embed. Machine learning and other artificial intelligence textual analysis may generate a 
larger number of articles (using databases of media such as GDELT (2018)) than this 
study, which relied on manual coding by analysts. Finally and most importantly, 
journalists covering drug trafficking in Central America are under constant threat, and 
often killed, by DTOs (Rafsky, 2019; Shirk, 2010). Violence and impunity influences 
spatio-temporal distributions of reporting, causing self-censorship (Reporters without 
Borders, 2018). The representativeness analyses revealed lower than expected media 
reports from Petén, Guatemala, for example, potentially due to DTOs intimidating 
journalists after coverage of a 2011 massacre of farm workers by the Zetas, hanging 
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banners stating “Tone it down, before the war is with you.” (Rafsky, 2019). These 
conditions reduce reports of illicit activity in the region where and when it occurs most.  
Limitations  
This study used a fixed-effects panel regression to measure causal effects drug 
trafficking on forest loss by developing proxies of illicit activity, assuming 
narcotrafficking would cause forest loss contemporaneously. Narcotrafficking may be an 
underlying cause or catalyze other activities leading to forest loss in subsequent years 
with reverberating effects in frontier spaces (McSweeney et al., 2017), the dynamic 
effects of which were not captured by the modeling approach in this study. In addition, 
the coefficient measure could be inaccurate because media data or official proxies or 
drug trafficking activity capture a signal of, but do not completely represent, the spatial 
and temporal intensity of narcotrafficking. These factors likely down-bias the coefficient 
estimate and making it difficult to estimate exactly how much forest loss can be 
attributed to narcotrafficking. Non-linear econometric models capable of incorporating 
these dynamics and Agent Based Models (ABM) could build off this study, for example 
by testing the conditions under which narcotraffickers clear land versus other 
investments for laundering.  
 Conclusion 
Narcotrafficking constitutes a cause, as opposed to a driver, of the loss of moist 
tropical forests in the Central American isthmus since 2000 throughout the 
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. Significant forest loss has been attributed to cycles of 
increased agricultural expansion and frontier development, which this study shows may 
be exacerbated or caused by drug trafficking. Estimating the causal effect of these 
relationships is important, as drug trafficking continues to increase, in spite of supply-
side drug interdiction policies and the US war on drugs. This study illustrates the role of 
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illicit and clandestine activities on land change and the need to account for them in 
explanations of this change. This study demonstrates a novel use of media data to 
partially overcome data limitations regarding these illicit activities, demonstrating its 
ability to capture illicit activity enabling models to measure causal effects of drug 
trafficking on forest loss.  Creative uses of proxy data sources, such as online media, with 
methodological advances and interdisciplinary collaboration, should allow researchers to 
examine underexplored drivers of change, such as illicit and clandestine activities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TOWARDS IDENTIFYING INFORMAL URBAN LAND USE PATTERNS 
Abstract  
Understanding how illicit and clandestine transactions influence land change is of 
increasing interest to land systems science, but “pixelizable” data on these activities is 
often unavailable. Here we employ techniques previously used in detecting illicit 
deforestation patterns in forest areas to the analysis of informal urbanization. We link 
distinct patterns of informal urban expansion observed in high-resolution satellite 
imagery to the associated urban institutional processes each engenders. In this way, 
spatial-temporal patterns of land change may identify where informal political and 
economic transactions--like rent-seeking, clientelism, and corruption--take place. 
Demonstrating causality between distinct urban spatial patterns and social-institutional 
processes requires not only high-resolution spatial temporal time series data of urban 
change, but also corresponding insights into the different social transactions that give 
rise to these patterns. This approach could improve urban land prediction models and 
aid governance in the rapidly urbanizing Global South, characterized by high informality. 
Introduction23  
Over 90% of all urban growth takes places in the Global South. A large portion if this 
growth24 occurs via informal settlements, where inhabitants have little to no tenure 
security and lack basic services (UN Habitat, 2016). Understanding urban land systems 
and rapid urbanization thus requires understanding patterns of informal settlement 
growth. A wealth of knowledge in the social sciences has documented and described the 
causes and consequences of informal urbanization (see Connolly, 2009; Doshi, 2018; 
                                                        
23 This chapter will be revised and later submitted with Hallie Eakin and Billie Turner 
2470% of urbanization in Africa is via informal settlements. 10 million people move to cities 
annually, with 7 million moving to slums. An estimated 30% of urban populations in Latin 
America, Asia, and the Caribbean live in informal settlements.  
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Roy, 2005; Van Gelder, 2013). Informal growth is often associated with illicit or illegal 
activities, because settlements outside the urban zone are often prohibited from official 
access to urban services, titles, and infrastructure, which politicians may facilitate in 
exchange for bribes or votes. Despite this knowledge, informal growth in the Global 
South is often assumed to have the same causes and spatial signature as formal growth 
patterns in the Global North, and is modeled accordingly. As a result, models of urban 
growth projections could be inaccurate and prove problematic for urban planning 
efforts.  
The governance of urban land systems should be built on systematic, empirical 
analysis, addressing how much and what kind of land is consumed and the process at 
play (Solecki et al., 2013). Doing so is key to understanding what drives urban form in 
many cities worldwide, with implications for sustainability. Nevertheless, while most 
spatial urban growth models include landscape (e.g. slope or land use), location (e.g. 
distance to city center, road, or amenities), and zoning constraints (Irwin, 2010) as 
predictive variables, models do not disaggregate formal and informal growth. Urban 
growth models based on the conflation of informal and formal growth have mixed 
performance in cities in which informal growth plays a dominant role. Models perform 
reasonably well in Kampala, Uganda, for example (Vermeiren et al., 2012), while 
modeling patterns in other places of the Global South has proved challenging (Pontius et 
al., 2008). A recent review of the few existing informal growth models (Roy et al., 2014) 
found only one incorporated politics (Patel et al., 2012). No model disaggregates 
informal urban growth into component types. Failing to incorporate urbanization 
processes common in the Global South, such as informality, into land change models 
limits understanding of how to manage and predict urban expansion (Nagendra et al., 
2018). 
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Urban informality is a form of land use that is challenging to study, given its 
association with undocumented, illegal or illicit transactions. Unsurprisingly, there is a 
paucity of data regarding these intentionally hidden exchanges, making them difficult to 
“pixelize” and thus integrate into land change models (Tellman et al in revision). The 
increasing availability of high resolution time series data, however, have enabled 
researchers to identify distinct patterns of land change and link them to illicit processes 
(Sesnie et al., 2017). These methodological innovations used to “socialize” pixel data aid 
in understanding illicit activity when social data are scarce. 
Linking pattern to process, especially via Agent Based Models, has improved 
understanding drivers of land change in both forest (Curtis et al., 2018; De Oliveira Filho 
and Metzger, 2006; Manson and Evans, 2007) and urban systems (Irwin et al., 2009; 
Magliocca et al., 2011). There is only one example, to our knowledge, of using pattern 
analysis to identify illicit activity, which correlated “anomalous” patterns of forest loss in 
Central America to narcotrafficking activities (Sesnie et al., 2017). Sesnie and associates 
developed spatio-temporal forest patch metrics to represent the hypothesized process of 
narco-capitalized deforestation such as average patch size, time of forest loss, years to 
clearing. A clustering algorithm identified statistically “anomalous” patterns in 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras that were correlated to drug seizure data in 
specific regions. This paper examines if similar methods could be leveraged to link 
clandestine processes to land patterns in urban systems. 
Disaggregating different types of urbanization patterns is not only important for 
improving modeling of urbanization, but also in terms of understanding how distinct 
urban growth patterns generate distinct assemblages of land system architecture (Turner 
et al., 2013), or the spatial arrangement of heterogeneous land uses in a given landscape. 
These spatial patterns influence urban climate (Benson-lira et al., 2016), energy budgets 
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and emissions (Frolking et al., 2013), flood risk (Wheater and Evans, 2009), and human 
heath (Ahern, 2011) among other sustainability factors. While informality plays an 
important role in mega-urban development worldwide, little is known about how these 
drivers affect urban form and the aforementioned ecosystem services (Henderson et al., 
2016). As a result, existing efforts to simulate and predict patterns of urbanization in the 
developing world often fall short of accurately capturing the dynamics at play (Pontius et 
al., 2008). Moreover, the spatial patterns produced by urban informality remain 
unexplored, despite the importance these land patterns represent for urban socio-
ecological systems. Here we examine the spatial patterns of four identified types of 
informal urban growth in Mexico City, and the data gaps that must be addressed to link 
informal pattern to process in this and other cities worldwide. 
Four types of urban informality in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area 
The Mexico City Metropolitan Area is one of the largest megacities in the world, with 
nearly 30 million people, and has the highest rate of informal urban growth (an 
estimated 65%) in Latin America (Connolly, 2009). Informal urbanization has 
characterized growth in Mexico City since the 1930s, after its lakes were fully drained 
and national policies encouraged urban growth (Tellman et al., 2018). Informal urban 
growth persists because of inadequate public housing efforts, a formal housing market 
inaccessible to the poor, and economic and political gains to politicians, developers, and 
intermediaries (informal actors who provide access to services like water or electricity) 
profiting from settlement expansion (Ch 2). This informal urban expansion, often 
characterized as chaotic and ungovernable by cities authorities and urban planners 
(Lerner et al., 2018), is an ordered social and institutional process with four distinct 
types: i) ant urbanization (direct sale of one plot to one settler), ii) illegal subdivision 
(one actor who buys and sells many plots of land), iii) land invasion (a group of settlers 
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illegally squatting on land, usually facilitated by a political group), and, iv) social or 
public housing (city or federal subsidized housing for low or middle income populations) 
(Ch 2.).  While this latter type of urban development is not typically considered informal 
in the literature, evidence from Mexico City demonstrates that this development is often 
deeply embedded in social transactions that deviate from stated legal norms and 
procedures (Ch 2). 
The four types of informality are identifiable by the common type of land 
transactions of each and the economic and political payoffs to the actors involved (Figure 
29, see Ch 2 for more details). Economic returns include cash earned through bribes and 
side payments, sale of land or urban services, kickbacks paid by developers to politicians 
to change zoning or evade regulation, and increased municipal budgets from an 
expanded tax base. Political returns include opportunities for politicians to advance in 
their party or win office by gathering loyal clienteles of voters and citizens to participate 
in mass mobilization.  
Ant urbanization generates a small amount of economic capital to a landowner 
selling their plot on the informal market, and to a government official bribed by informal 
settlers to prevent foreclosure. Politicians come into ant urbanization areas to influence 
the distribution of services, provide construction materials, or encourage consolidation 
to garner votes. Subdivision generates larger economic returns than ant urbanization, 
because it is concentrated in one actor who sells dozens to thousands of lots. This actor 
purchases agricultural land from a member of a communally held property (called ejidos 
in Mexico- see Ch 2 for details) and who holds individual land use rights to farm a small 
portion of the ejido (~ 1 hectare). It is outright illegal to sell land, or expensive to sell 
land legally because of high transaction costs, so the ejido member sells it to an 
entrepreneur known as a “land flipper.” The land flipper buys many ejido plots, which 
  151 
they subdivide and sell to settlers. The political returns are often higher than ant 
urbanization due to larger numbers of settlers (and votes).  
Land invasion generates large political returns, because settlers “pay” for rights to 
land and services via political participation with the group engineering the invasion. The 
economic returns can be higher than subdivision, depending on the size of the invasion. 
Social housing generates the highest economic returns, concentrated in one developer. 
Developers may purchase cheap agricultural land far from the urban fringe and convince 
the municipalities to rezone the land as urban through bribes, offering to aid in zoning 
plans in under resourced municipalities, or demonstrating the potential of increased tax 
returns. Municipalities are required to install urban services, the government facilitates 
the sale of these homes via a social housing program, and the developer captures the 
capital gains.  
Figure 29. Economic and political capital returns in each land transaction type, and a 
hypothesized vector of how rate of change is orthogonally and positively correlated. 
 
While typologies of informality for Mexico City have been developed (Ward, 
1976), they have never been linked to specific spatial morphological patterns  each 
produces on the landscape (e.g. see Bazant, 2001; Nurko et al., 2016) . Here we ask, do 
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distinct orders of social processes driving informality produce similarly ordered spatial 
morphology? If so, can we identify the different underlying processes producing 
informality in satellite imagery?  
Spatial Patterns of Informal Urban Expansion 
The processes identified above for informal urban expansion display distinctive 
spatial attributes. Urban consolidation expands in space and accelerates in time as 
returns in political and economic capital increase (Fig. 29).  The hypothesized spatial 
pattern of each informal urban type is depicted in Figure 30, with an empirical case 
example from Google Earth Satellite imagery provided in Figure 31. Cases were 
identified via GPS points taken in the field, which were uploaded into Google Earth. 
Screen shots were taken using the Google Earth timelapse feature, but place names are 
intentionally anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the topic (e.g. potentially making 
communities vulnerable to eviction). An explanation of the hypothesized pattern and 
empirical example for each urbanization type follows. 
Ant urbanization appears near the urban fringe on existing agricultural or 
conservation lands. Ant urbanization is produced by one-off land sales in Southern 
Mexico City on land zoned as “conservation.” Urban growth is not permitted outside 
areas zoned urban in local government land use plans (which began in 1997), but some 
agricultural activity is allowed. Farmers with land rights who no longer wish to farm or 
need cash with sell plots (typically 250m2 in size) informally to settlers seeking to build a 
home. This distributed growth produces a slowly developing, dispersed settlement 
pattern (Fig. 30). Growth may accelerate or consolidate when intermediaries install 
urban services, making the land more valuable and increasing demand. Ant urbanization 
is typified by one case study community (Fig. 31) that took 15 years to develop, and is still 
slowly growing. In addition to the spatial pattern, ancillary data of land zones that 
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identifies areas not permitted for urban growth are required to identify this urbanization 
type. 
Subdivision occurs on rectangular agricultural plots (Fig 30), and the 
urbanization pattern is more rapid and spatially consolidated than ant urbanization. 
Typically, a land flipper purchases 1 ha of land of communal tenure (either ejido or 
communal rights land) and sell plots sequentially to settlers. One such community 
reached its development in about 10 years (Fig. 31). Subdivision and ant urbanization 
together represent at least 10% of all urbanization in the Mexico City Metro Area, 
occupying at least 3,200 ha in Mexico City’s conservation land. In addition to its 
characteristic spatial pattern, ancillary data on land tenure is required to identify areas of 
collective title where subdivision typically occurs. 
 Land invasion generates the most rapid and consolidated urban pattern. These 
communities construct many homes rapidly in interstitial urban areas or immediately 
adjacent to the urban fringe (Fig.  30). Urban plots are built next to one another with 
little undeveloped space, and the community (~100-1,000 homes) is completed within a 
two month period (see example in Fig. 31). Although often receiving significant media 
attention, this process represents the smallest proportion of informal growth in Mexico 
City. The two most common invasion groups in Mexico City, Antorcha Campesina and 
the Pancho Villas, have together urbanized 600 ha of land, representing only 2% of the 
city’s growth since 2000. In addition to its distinctive pattern, media reports could be 
used to identify approximate neighborhoods where an invasion process may have taken 
place. 
 Social housing is constructed on cheap agricultural land, often far from the urban 
fringe. Social housing areas are large, and develop within two to four years (Fig. 30). This 
pattern represents at least 11,000 ha of urban growth, around 30% of new urban land in 
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Mexico City from 2000-2010. Social housing has slightly smaller rates of consolidation 
compared to land invasion (Fig. 31) but the area urbanized is much larger. Ancillary data 
on permits for social housing construction could be used to identify the names and 
municipality of construction, but specific data on the polygon associated with these 
permits is not publicly available. Sometimes, the name of the developer appears in 
Google Earth, which can help identify a social housing complex.  
Figure 30. Hypothesized spatial patterns of informal urban development, illustrated 
from textual interview analysis (Ch 2). Yellow represents existing undeveloped land, grey 
is existing urban land cover. New informal urban settlement is displayed in pink to red, 
with shades representing year of development. 
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Figure 31. Empirical examples of each informal urbanization type by hypothesized 
spatial pattern and speed of development. 
 
Identifying informal land change patterns in urban areas requires higher 
resolution time series 
Mapping informal settlements requires very high resolution satellite data (Kuffer 
et al., 2016). Thus, while a set of hypothesized spatial-temporal patterns for informal 
urbanization types was developed for Mexico City, it could not be empirically tested. 
Sesnie et al (2017) leveraged a 30 m resolution annual time series of forest change to 
identify anomalous growth patterns linked to narcotrafficking operations and 
laundering. The average forest patch size ranged from 100ha in Honduras (~ 1,000 
Landsat pixels) to over 1000 ha in Guatemala. The average land invasion, in contrast, in 
Mexico City, was 1.9 ha, which is equivalent to only 20 Landsat pixels.  
Public satellites from 2000-2015 available to map annual urban expansion 
(MODIS and Landsat) are not at resolution sufficient to capture growth patterns such as 
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ant urbanization25. Efforts to map informal growth at 5m in Mexico City have been 
successful (see (Rodriguez Lopez et al., 2017b), but no time series are available. Time 
series are required to differentiate, for example, a consolidated ant urbanization 
community from a subdivision (Fig.31). Other studies that have examined patterns in 
land system architecture rely on 1m resolution image (Li et al., 2017). While we were 
unable to take advantage of the data for the analysis here, the availability of Sentinel-2 
data (10m resolution, available starting 2015) could help identify distinct informal urban 
land patterns in Mexico City and elsewhere in the future. 
High-resolution urban time series data would facilitate pattern analysis to 
address several key questions to understand informal urban land systems and aid their 
governance. First, while consolidation likely increases with economic and political 
returns to informal urban growth (Fig 1), what is the shape of this relationship? Do 
economic versus political incentives influence urban land consolidation differently? If so, 
what does this imply about the appropriate institutional mechanisms to govern such 
growth? Second, do formal versus informal urban development produce distinct and 
identifiable patterns? Can distinct types of informal growth be differentiated across a 
metropolitan area? If so, do these differentiated patterns indicate distinct environmental 
and social consequences? Finally, it is difficult to identify where intentionally hidden 
activities, such as corruption and rent-seeking, occur on the landscape. Could urban 
pattern analysis reveal, for example, specific locations where illegal urban services have 
been installed and facilitated unusually rapid consolidated growth in Mexico City’s 
conservation land? Together these data could aid impact evaluation of policies such as 
land titling and regularization, eviction, payments for environmental services, and other 
interventions designed to curb urban growth. 
                                                        
25 The average roof size for homes in ant urbanization is 60m2, and these homes are dispersed, 
this pattern was not resolvable with Landsat data. 
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Disaggregating urban informality links institutions to landscape patterns 
and environmental consequences 
Not all urbanization is driven by the same mechanisms or produces the same 
patterns. At first glance, this diversity appears seemingly chaotic, that which has 
overwhelmed attempts to model the pattern in the Global South robustly (Pontius et al., 
2008). In Mexico City, we identified explicit and distinct sets of actors and rules 
characterizing different types of informal urbanization, each with its unique spatial 
footprint. This effort allows us to demonstrate potential links between processes and 
patterns for one metropolitan area. On this basis, we posit that codifying and translating 
rule sets into urban growth models could improve their accuracy. To improve urban 
growth models, however, a series of such studies should be made across the Global South 
to enable meta-analyses. The outcomes may point to common patterns associated with 
the general type of processes involved or by regional context. Connecting institutional 
and social patterns to spatial footprints, as demonstrated here for Mexico City, provides 
a framework that could be replicated in other cases and lead to informal urban pattern 
meta-analyses. Understanding the spatial patterns of informal could lead to more robust 
modeling approaches and assessment of consequences for the environment. 
Informal urbanization is a social-ecological process that produces diverse but 
potentially predictable patterns with measurable environmental outcomes. Each pattern 
is driven by institutional arrangements that produce distinct land system architecture 
with implications for environmental services (Turner II, 2017).  In Mexico City, for 
example, land system architecture of small areas of slow, distributed ant urbanization on 
conservation land versus the large areas of rapid, consolidated social housing on 
agricultural land could have different consequences for hydrologic ecosystem services, 
such as water filtration, aquifer recharge, and flood mitigation. Yet, public discourse in 
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Mexico City assumes ant urbanization and invasion as the primary cause of reducing 
environmental services and increasing water scarcity and flood risk (Lerner et al., 2018). 
This assumption leaves other types of informal urbanization and their spatial and 
environmental consequences unexamined. Disaggregating informal urbanization based 
on institutional arrangements and landscape patterns could provide a new avenue to 
analyze tradeoffs based on environmental costs of informal growth in Mexico City and 
elsewhere. A better understanding of these environmental service impacts generated by 
distinct types of informal growth could aid urban planning efforts to improve urban 
sustainability. Yet these differentiated ecosystem service assessment are predicated on 
the ability to identify the process, spatial pattern, and local of informal settlement types, 
which is currently a challenge for the land change community. 
In conclusion, land system science has yet to fully engage with the range and nuances 
of institutional contexts that shape informal or illicit transactions. These transactions 
may result in unique landscape signatures, urban or non-urban in kind. Linking 
institutional rules and social relations to the distinct spatial footprints they engender 
requires bringing together disparate knowledge communities which have focused almost 
exclusively on either informal urban processes or urban land cover patterns. Bridging the 
pattern to process gap represents an exciting frontier for land systems scientists, and a 
necessary step to understanding urbanization in the Global South. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation calls for Land System Science (LSS) and affiliated research 
communities to incorporate illicit and clandestine activities affecting land change into 
their portfolio of research.  This dissertation demonstrates various ways in which land 
change understanding is enhanced by doing so. It identified clandestine drivers of land 
change by either their unique spatial patterns of change or through correlations with 
proxies of illicit activity through case studies involving urbanization in Mexico City and 
deforestation in Central America. The methods included examples of both “pixelizing the 
social” and “socializing the pixel”, efforts that have undergirded LSS. Attempts to 
“socialize the pixel” by understanding social processes and linking them to land use 
patterns include the institutional analysis and examination of satellite imagery in 
chapters 2 and 5. Fieldwork informed typologies of informality identifiable in high-
resolution satellite imagery in Mexico City. An effort to “pixelize the social” by digitizing 
social data linked to administrative units at which land change data could be aggregated, 
included fixed effects regressions used in chapters 3 and 4, which developed proxies of 
clientelism and narcotrafficking activities, respectively, to associate them with respective 
land use outcomes of urbanization and deforestation. Media data on narcotrafficking 
indicated a causal effect on forest loss, while the timing and distribution of voting data in 
Mexico City explained the variance of land titling and urban expansion. In a general 
sense, the aim of identifying drivers of land change in each of the two cases was achieved. 
Nonetheless, estimating the true magnitude of these drivers on land change outcomes 
remains elusive. Here, I summarize the progress made in pixelizing and socializing 
clandestine activity from this dissertation, with an extensive focus on the pros and cons 
of the LSS approaches employed in this study, reflections on the ethical implications of 
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studying illicit activity for the communities affected and as “the researcher”, and the 
research agenda for future LSS to expand on this promising work. 
Objective 1: 
Can clandestine drivers of land-use intensity be identified either by unique spatial 
patterns of change or through correlations with proxies of illicit activity?  
This dissertation demonstrated that the influence of illicit activity and political 
transactions can be studied quantitatively by leveraging existing statistical methods 
common to land system science.  Existing data from media reports, government 
archives, and elsewhere can and should be digitized (pixelized) and used in land 
system studies to expand the range of causal factors studied, albeit with caveats 
explored below. Interpreting the results of these studies, and developing appropriate 
hypothesis regarding illicit phenomena requires an understanding of the complex 
social processes involved. Understanding these processes can be developed by either 
collaborating with other researchers with long histories of field work, or preferably, for 
the researcher to spend extensive time in the field building appropriate relationships 
with the actors and organizations in question. The importance of fieldwork goes 
beyond the practical need for the researcher to understand social phenomena. Time 
spent in the field with the people involved in, and the places where, illicit activity 
occurs is critical to developing a grounded perspective of the ethical and sometimes 
troubling implications of studying illicit activity and the risks to both the researcher 
and communities implicated in the research.  
Pixelzing social data: straight forward but time consuming 
 A plethora of information indicating political and illicit economic transactions 
exist in the digital age of increasing transparency, but significant effort to georeference 
data and assess their quality are necessary to transform the data into variables in land 
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system models. Chapters 3 and 4 used fixed effects panel regressions and attempted to 
“pixelize” proxies of illicit and political transactions to estimate their respective causes 
on forest loss in Central America and urban change in Mexico City. Turning information 
about clandestine activity into georeferenced proxies that can be used for causal 
inference is relatively straight forward, but the required manual labor and financial 
resources to gain strict quality control are difficult, especially if the research involves 
much more than this effort alone. The large amount of digitized and georeferenced 
information and number of observations required for statistical analysis and causal 
inference required a research team of students I trained and supervised. I had to make 
dozens of decisions and update data digitization protocols, noticing new errors in data 
collection as it was delivered, and requiring my research team to redo the work. In this 
dissertation, at least $10,000 were required to digitize and georeference data on land 
titles and electoral outcomes for Mexico City. Another $37,000 was spent to code about 
3,000 media articles with the help of collaborations who hired over students to develop a 
narcotrafficking proxy for Central America across a 15 year time period. These data were 
proxies intended to “scale up” anecdotal evidence, for example, on clientelistic exchange 
in a given informal settlement to the ubiquity of this type of exchange across Mexico City. 
These data were also intended to extend the geographical scale of analysis, for example, 
beyond official records of narcotrafficking activities by interdiction authorities, which 
was only available in a few Central American departments.  
 In each case, triangulating the data proxies of illicit activity required either 
quantitative or qualitative comparisons to other empirical data. Quantitative 
comparisons were used, for example, for the media data with narcotrafficking with 
official interdiction data. Qualitative comparisons between electoral data and empirical 
observations were made in my own fieldwork (e.g., Chapter 2) or via conversations with 
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other political scientists. These comparisons revealed both the feasibility and potential 
limitations of the proxy data, paving the way for future work.  
 Pixelizing existing social data is likely the lowest hanging fruit for researchers 
seeking to identify a new driver of land change using a causal inference framework. It 
requires generating enough proxy data and collecting control variables such that that 
“signal” of illicit and clandestine transactions can be ascertained through frequentist 
statistics. Well-established methods in causal inference, especially those methods used in 
econometrics, and associated computation software (R and STATA), can be used to study 
drivers in land systems. Some methodological limitations persist, however, owing to low 
sample sizes in terms of temporal or geographic specificity of measuring clandestine 
activity, and the zero-inflated distribution of sporadic land changes like informal 
settlements. 
Identifying drivers of change and estimating effects: pixelizing clandestine proxies, the 
challenges of micronumerosity, and type II errors 
It is easiest to estimate the causal effect of a driver in any social-ecological 
system, including land systems, when sample sizes are large and land changes follow a 
linear (or even a log-linear) distribution. In this dissertation, as is common to land 
change studies, neither forest loss nor urban expansion were linearly distributed. Forest 
loss, however, was log-linearly distributed, and could be easily log transformed, allowing 
for estimation with linear models. Normal distributions and linear models are more 
computationally efficient and with coefficients that are easy to interpret (e.g., a one unit 
change in X [illicit activity] = a one unit change in Y [land use]).  
In contexts where land change is more “sporadic” than forest loss, such as 
informal settlements in conservation land, time series cannot be log-linear transformed. 
In Mexico City, neither land titles nor informal urban expansion are linearly distributed, 
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and the majority of observations contain a “0” (e.g., no land titles or urban expansion 
observed in unit i for time j), preventing logarithmic transformation. A nonlinear 
distribution was required for regression, meaning that the coefficients had to be 
estimated through maximum likelihood instead of least squares. Nonlinear models limit 
interpretability of coefficients as the “effect” of X on Y, are less computationally efficient, 
and may fail to converge with low sample sizes. Furthermore, non-linear time-series 
panel regression models are an area of active research with fewer estimation methods in 
R and Stata. For example, there were no options in either software to incorporate spatial 
error or lags, or even cluster robust standard errors by geographic sections of the city 
with non-linear fixed effects models, making it challenging to deal with spatial 
autocorrelation. There was no ideal distribution to fit urban growth data. The 
distribution that best fit the data (if we treat urban growth as count data), negative 
binomial, also fails to meet assumptions of fixed effect hypothesis testing (Allison and 
Waterman, 2002; Guimarães, 2008). Typical solutions, such as including a dummy 
variable for unit, were not implementable because models failed to converge with such a 
low sample size. These issues limit hypothesis testing we had to compromise in the 
“right” distribution versus the ability to control for unit variation with fixed effects. 
The second challenge in estimating spatial variation of causal effects is low 
sample size. This is referred to in microeconomics as “micronumerosity”, a term 
indicating the number of parameters required to specify a model often exceeds the 
sample size in empirical economics (Goldberger, 1991). This causes type II error, and 
forces researchers to accept a null result because the ratio of the mean to the standard 
error in a sample is small. In socio-ecological systems with high variance, where 
institutional context, spatial location, and other factors condition a response, this 
problem is even more pronounced (Franzese and Hays, 2007; Franzese and Kam, 2009). 
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These “contextual factors” must either be measured, a dummy variable (yet another 
parameter) added, sub models attempted for each region (further reducing sample size), 
or coefficient spatial variance explored through geographic weighted regression (not 
advised in small sample sizes and has no causal inference) or the even newer 
geographically temporally weighted regression (Fotheringham et al., 2015).  
The problems of context conditionality and micronumerisotiy were apparent in 
chapters 3 and 4. While narcotrafficking has a mean effect on forest loss in Central 
America, submodels per country revealed a significant relationship between drugs and 
deforestation only in Honduras. It was not possible to ascertain if this relationship is 
limited to that country or if the lower sample sizes of Nicaragua and Guatemala 
precluded inference and caused type II error (i.e., failure to reject a false null 
hypothesis). Likewise, in Mexico City, examining the relationship between patronage and 
electoral competition for urban expansion differed across boroughs and election 
processes. This variance made it difficult to answer the research question clearly, which 
was set up to test whether electoral competition versus patronage (two opposing 
mechanisms) caused urban expansion. The empirical results revealed, confusingly, that 
both cause urban expansion in different elections and different regions. Resolving these 
problems requires a larger sample size, which is infeasible because of the difficulty of 
developing spatially and temporally specific data proxies of illicit activity. Additional 
modeling techniques to account for endogeneity and feedbacks between the urban 
growth process and electoral dynamics could help tease apart this complexity in future 
work. Notwithstanding this challenge, some ideas of how to increasing sample size for 
illicit transactions are discussed in recommendations. 
Socializing pixel data- pattern analysis remains elusive in urban systems 
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Pixelizing social data commonly requires large investment for digitization, but 
socializing pixel data requires another expensive investment—fieldwork. Due to 
equifinality (i.e., multiple processes giving rise to the same pattern), linking pattern to 
process requires a deep understanding of process. The only way of arriving at processual 
understanding regarding illicit activity is by personal, one-on-one discussions with many 
people involved in and affected by these transactions. Due to the large amount of 
variance and secrecy involved in illicit exchanges, the researcher must gain multiple 
perspectives around the same “type” of exchange until data saturation (i.e., no new 
information is discovered) is reached.  Initially I had hoped to code previously published 
studies via the QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Basurto and Speer, 2012) 
method as Ostrom (1990) had done to develop a typology of informal land-use change. 
This was infeasible because so few studies of Mexico City describe the pattern of land-use 
change in spatial terms (except for a few pioneering architects such as Bazant 2001; 
Nurko, Ruiz Durazo, and Gonzalez Rodriguez 2016). The only way to link spatial pattern 
to social mechanisms was through my own empirical fieldwork presented in Chapter 2. 
Socializing pixelized patterns attempted in Chapter 5 was based on a heuristic 
typology of informality developed in Chapter 2. While the patterns of informality appear 
distinct in high resolution Google Earth imagery, testing these hypotheses across the 
landscape requires developing a high-resolution dataset currently inexistent for Mexico 
City (or any urban area in a developing country). Another approach would be using 
machine learning techniques to separate patterns on Google Earth, which proved 
successful for developing a deforestation typology of commodity loss, shifting 
agriculture, forestry, and wildfire (Curtis et al., 2018).  
Pattern analysis unfortunately proved infeasible with the Landsat urban 
detection algorithm attempted in this thesis (Goldblatt et al., 2018), because urban 
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detections were inconsistent overtime and the pixel size was too large to detect some 
types of informal expansion in Mexico City, like ant urbanization and land invasions. 
Socializing pixel patterns was feasible to link narcotrafficking to forest loss using publicly 
available data (Sesnie et al., 2017), but in urban systems, commercial imagery or new 
machine learning methods on Google Imagery must be developed. Perhaps other larger 
scale or incremental land-use changes, such as land grabbing or pasture, could also be 
assessed via pattern analysis with public satellite imagery. 
Another successful approach to socializing the pixel is to use agent-based models 
(ABM) to mimic land-use patterns as an outcome of rules between agents. ABMs have 
never been used, to my knowledge, to model illicit transactions for land outcomes, but 
they have been successfully used to model illicit behavior. Magliocca and associates 
(2019) successfully modeled the behavior of cocaine cartels in Central America based on 
decades of field work from an interdisciplinary team of place based researchers (Devine 
et al., 2018; Mcsweeney et al., 2017; McSweeney et al., 2018). This again underscores 
that socializing the pixel requires a depth of understanding only available through 
fieldwork and qualitative analysis.  Likewise, the institutional analysis, payoff surfaces, 
and typology from chapters 2 and 5, based on my own extensive fieldwork, could enable 
formalization of complex social interactions into equations to undergird an ABM of 
informal land change.  
Limits to “scaling up” insights from political ecology and political science: context 
dependence and middle range theories 
 A major intent of this dissertation was to take phenomena typically assessed in 
political science, political ecology, and affiliated research communities that study power 
and politics and place them into the post-positivist framework of LSS. While this 
dissertation made progress, it also suffered from inadequate data on social process and 
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context conditionality that has long plagued theoretical development in LSS (Meyfroidt 
et al., 2018). LSS has dealt with this challenge by focusing on “middle-range theories,” or 
contextual generalizations of causal explanation of delimited phenomenon (Merton 1968 
in Meyfroidt et al. 2018). LSS middle-range theories have incorporated some important 
factors involving land change as gleaned from political science and political ecology, such 
as the institutional analysis in Ostrom’s (2011) design principles, neoliberal frontiers, 
and recessions in urban areas. As this introduction argues, however, LSS continues to 
ignore illicit and clandestine activity in middle-range theories of land use change. 
 Using a post-positivist approach, foremost hypothesis testing, this dissertation 
required developing data proxies to represent illicit and clandestine transactions. Ideally, 
these proxies are good enough to use in fixed effects models where administrative units 
represent their own control while “exposed” to the illicit activity over time. If the proxy is 
a reasonable representation of illicit activity and a causal mechanism exists, ideally the 
proxy shows a statistically significant relationship on the land use outcome. 
Chapter 3 used voting records, land titling, and urban expansion data from 2000 
to 2015 to study clientelism in Mexico City elections. With those data, I could not 
determine the directionality of X and Y (e.g., do expanding formal settlements attract 
political transactions, or do political transactions create or consolidate informal 
settlements). Most studies of clientelism either rely on time series of electoral records 
with a large sample size across a country (e.g., Albertus et al., 2016; Castañeda Dower 
and Pfutze, 2015) or use ethnographic and field based surveys (Berenschot, 2018; 
Hagene, 2015; Hicken, 2011; Martinez-bravo, 2014; Paller, 2014; Post, 2018). Voting 
records are an indirect way to measure the activity politicians engage in on the ground 
and for which no public data exist, such as connecting electrical grids, bribes to 
bureaucrats in the water department to “look the other way” when a pipe is installed, 
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paving a road with campaign money from the party and so on. A more direct way to 
measure this relationship is through surveys, which limit the geographic scope of 
analysis and generalizability of the results across the Mexico City metro area.  
Likewise, Chapter 4 relied on counting media events to represent narcotrafficking 
activity. This could problematically induce media bias in understandings of trafficking 
activity. Although we attempted to quantify media representation, it provided no means 
of transforming the data proxy to address the bias.   
Political ecologists are correct to caution LSS’s approaches to “quantify” power 
and illicit activity. Quantification implies a reductionist approach. Data proxies will 
always be an incomplete representation of nuanced and complex processes. Yet, if 
Political Ecology were to reject the methods used in LSS as reductionist, it would result 
in minimal inclusion of power and politics in LSS models, which can have significant 
consequences. Failing to incorporate power and politics into LSS models could result in 
urban growth projections that are inaccurate for cities with informal growth, for 
example. Ignoring illicit activity in assessments of land change risks conclusions that fail 
to identify root causes of frontiers of deforestation that are narcocapitalized (and 
continue to blame, and attempt to govern, rural population growth and marginalized 
peoples as if they were the drivers of change instead of a proximate cause). Importantly, 
land change models are the bases for other assessments of ecosystem services and 
climate change projections. Incorporating illicit activity in models of land change could 
be critical to differentiating the drivers of land change and associated impacts for the 
marginalized populations, addressing power issues that political ecologists emphasize. 
   The intent of “pixelizing social data” in this dissertation was for the data proxies 
to represent a treatment effect on a unit of a land system. This required measuring land 
change outcomes before the treatment effect was present, or including similar land units 
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where the treatment effect of the illicit variable of interest was not present. An 
alternative way to estimate the causal effect of illicit transactions in land systems would 
be in a “natural” experiment, defined in the social science as when the treatment variable 
is haphazard and possibly random (Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). In social-ecological 
systems, natural experiments are rare historical accidents. Illicit and clandestine activity 
such as corruption, clientelism, and narcotrafficking is rarely random and often arise in 
places with specific historical contexts (Devine et al., 2018). Methods such as matching, 
which estimates differences in units similar in every way except the treatment variable, 
can help simulate natural experiments and have been used in LSS and political science 
(Heilmayr and Lambin, 2016; Keele et al., 2015). Matching was not used in this 
dissertation but could be explored in future work. 
Despite using time series data, or matching land units in a quasi-natural 
experiment, causality can be very difficult to estimate when endogeneity is present 
between dependent and independent variables. For example, in Mexico City, urban 
growth is potentially an outcome and a cause of electoral competition, because political 
parties may be attracted to rapidly growing settlements. Methods using instrumental 
variables could help tease apart these differences. Even with a natural experiment and 
causal effects measurement framework, outlining the causal mechanism remains 
essential to identify illicit activity as a “cause” in LSS (Meyfroidt, 2016). 
Abductive approaches, qualitative methods, and field-based studies in both 
political ecology and LSS have an irreplaceable role in informing LSS model design and 
interpreting the results of LSS modeling efforts, explaining detailed mechanisms that 
cannot yet be modeled.  More importantly, understanding the intangible, hidden 
transactions in illicit activity require disentangling social processes. Understanding these 
processes is achieved by understanding political ecology and political science theories 
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about how power works, and spending time in the field gleaning information and trust 
about informal transactions that are “invisible” in existing quantitative data. 
This dissertation demonstrated LSS type methods can be used to begin to “scale 
up” and test political ecology (as well as political science and political economy) based 
descriptions and theories of informal and illicit transactions and mechanisms. 
Methodological approaches from political ecology and LSS need and should continue to 
build from each other to improve processual understanding and estimated impacts of 
power and politics in land systems (Turner and Robbins, 2008). 
The ethical implications of studying illicit activity 
Scientists studying social-environmental change have an ethical obligation under 
the social contract of science to study problems of importance and communicate their 
findings to the public to aid decision making (Lubchenco, 1998). Illicit and clandestine 
activity, however, has unique ethical and social justice implications, both in the 
collection and dissemination of data. Illicit transactions tend to involve an unequal 
exchange and distribution of benefits between an actor with power and an actor with 
relatively less agency. The role of the researcher is to document this exchange safely and 
anonymously, and not to “name names”, feed a rumor mill, or compromise the safety of 
any actor involved.  The role of the researcher is to study a generalizable phenomenon 
and pattern, and in the case of this dissertation, expand the knowledge base of how land 
systems work. All data collection and production in this context, is unavoidably political, 
because the actors involved in the system of study have political aims that they may 
attempt to further via the research results and even the relationship to the researcher. 
This research is also political by definition, because it is about power, access to 
resources, and asymmetries in information and control. Making illicit activity more 
“legible” by quantifying it, as well as making the data collection in research open access 
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versus restricted access is a political act because it can affect the relationships the 
researcher studies.  
In Mexico City, my identity as a North American women provided me special 
privilege and access to data with political groups, government, official, and informal 
settlements because I was viewed as an outsider. This status, for example, took many 
months of fieldwork to gain the trust of a community leader of an informal settlement, 
but resulted in the gracious offer of social capital—introducing me as a trusted ally to 
residents who allowed me to interview them. Critically, this leader accompanied me to 
many interviews, which helped ensure my safety.  My interviews also represented some 
risk for the residents, who bravely discussed their difficulties and exploitation by the 
intermediaries in their community who had threatened them with eviction. There were 
many moments of turning off the recorder, and tearful off-the-record admissions of the 
fear and anxiety under which the interviewee lived. As a researcher I could only offer 
access to information about their land zone and legal status, to help them understand the 
process to get title to their land, and to listen earnestly to their story and maintain 
complete confidentiality.   
  I was also able to interview leaders of political groups who led “land invasions” 
in Mexico City. They provided access to interview residents in these squatter settlements, 
where many government officials are not allowed to enter (but often observe via drone). 
They provided me this access in part to increase their legitimacy and recruit new 
members to their political movement from other informal settlements via association 
with a North American researcher. These organizations depicted themselves as 
protagonists providing homes for people the government could not, which is not 
discussed in the public discourse of informal growth. 
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Making informal settlements “more visible” may be important for land system 
scientists, but it is also desirable for the State that wishes to govern them (Scott, 1998). 
Making data transparent and public could harm communities in informal settlements, 
for example, if the government uses it to plan evictions or cut services. Likewise in 
Central America, identifying specific locations of deforestation that are likely related to 
narcotrafficking is of great interest to law enforcement because it could aid interdiction 
activities. Drug interdiction, however, can have adverse consequences on communities in 
Central America where narcotraffickers are operating, and even push trafficking 
activities into more remote areas and move cartels around the isthmus. Paradoxically, 
interdiction has not reduced the volume of cocaine reaching the United States 
(Magliocca et al., 2019). My understanding of drug trafficking was facilitated by 
researchers who had built trusted relationships with community leaders, just as I had 
done in Mexico City. I relied on their understanding and relationships both in the field, 
and interpreting the media data in each Central American country. Other stakeholders in 
the field, including environmental NGOs and national and international governments, 
had contested visions of how to address narcotrafficking, including pro-militarization 
and interdiction. With this ethical dimension in mind, only portions of my dissertation 
data will be made public, with coarser spatial resolution such that it cannot be linked to 
specific locations or communities and used by actors who could cause harm or violence 
to local residents. 
Making illicit activity salient to environmental change, beyond specific names 
and places, has important implications for social justice. The unequal exchanges and 
power dynamics involved in land changes in both Mexico City and Central America 
included elements of coercion, social exclusion, and even violence against marginalized 
populations. Paradoxically, these same marginalized populations are often blamed as the 
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root cause of environmental change. Public discourse in Mexico City, especially among 
many government officials, blames informal settlers as the cause of hydrologic risk 
(Lerner et al., 2018). Likewise, deforestation in protected areas in Central America has 
often been blamed on rural peasants or settlers in frontier areas (Devine et al., 2018). My 
research identified these marginalized populations as both victims and agents, acting to 
meeting their needs, while focusing on the economic and politically powerful actors that 
shape land use and the conditions of exchange. This dissertation reframes corruption 
beyond a normative discussion of good and bad actors, and instead focuses on the rules, 
payoffs, and institutional contexts that incentive particular social relationships (Ch 2).  
In some cases, the actors involved in illicit land change are those in government charged 
with regulating it. Studying illicit activity and understanding the social processes 
involved, leaves the researcher with ethical obligation: providing insights about the 
problem at hand without causing harm.  
Objective 2: What is the role of illicit activities in urbanization in Mexico City and 
deforestation in Central America?  
This dissertation identified the presence of a causal effect of narcotrafficking on 
forest loss in Central America and identified both the causal mechanism and associated 
effects of political rent seeking on informal urban expansion in Mexico City. As both case 
studies used a fixed effects approach to test hypotheses, the identifying a causal effect (or 
mere association in Mexico City) could be confirmed, but the estimated area of land 
change these clandestine transactions cause could not be estimated. This dissertation 
took an important first step in establishing causal effects for these phenomena, but 
future work must seek to measure the magnitude of its effects. 
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Political and economic rent seeking and urban expansion in Mexico City 
Titles and regularization 
Chapters 2 and 3 found that politicians and other intermediaries manipulate the 
distribution of land titles for personal and political party gain, but only in private 
property titling. Chapter 2 found that titling efforts were more rapid in invasion 
urbanization, but often lagged in subdivisions and ant urbanization unless an 
intermediary who could accrue political gains was present. Chapter 3 also demonstrated 
the influence of the political business cycle of titling in private property: more titles were 
extended in the month leading up to elections. Titles to informal settlers in ejido lands, 
however, must rely on a presidential decree to initiate the titling process. These decrees 
exhibited no relationship to the timing of presidential elections, in contrast to claims in 
qualitative studies that decrees follow electoral cycles (Herrera, 2005; C. E. Salazar, 
2012). A larger number of private property titles were distributed to core voters of the 
PRD (which has held the mayoral seat in Mexico City since elections began in 2000), but 
not to informal settlements that ephemerally increased support for the PRD party. Core 
voter preferences explained a small portion of variance (3-4%) of titles extended. This 
indicates that while titles are politically timed, their spatial distribution is only somewhat 
dependent on political or clientelistic relationships. Titling timing is likely part of a 
larger strategy of the party to demonstrate effectiveness to voters across the city, not just 
informal settlement constituencies. 
Public discourse in Mexico City often claims land titles should not be given to 
settlers because it will increase urbanization in sensitive conservation land. Yet, this 
dissertation finds less than 25% of land titles have been extended in conservation lands. 
This indicates titles are not extended to ant urbanization settlements, but rather to well-
consolidated urban communities (and potentially, land invasions) that are not in 
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conservation land. Future work is needed to determine the rates of titling among the four 
urbanization types identified in Chapter 2. 
Urban Growth 
 Chapter 3 tested the relationship between electoral politics and urban growth in 
conservation land in Mexico City since 2005, which is largely where ant urbanization has 
taken place. This limitation means the results only apply to one of the four informal 
growth types identified in chapters 2 and 5: ant urbanization. There is a correlation 
between political relationships and ant urbanization, but the direction of causality 
remained elusive in Chapter 3. Electoral competition increases with urban expansion but 
it is unclear if the effect is causal, or merely correlative in places like Xochimilco.  More 
work is needed disentangle the context conditionality of these results. In sum, while 
political party strategies have a significant influence on informal urban growth, exactly 
where and how this occurs, and in what elections, remains unclear.  
The effect of clientelism and political relationships on the three other types of 
informal urban growth remains untested. This requires a “socializing the pixel” approach 
explained in Chapter 5. To achieve this, first a pattern analysis would be required based 
on a very high resolution annual time-series data of urban growth in the Mexico City 
Metro Area addressing the four types informal settlements. Ideally, with a high spatial 
and temporal resolution urban patch pattern metrics of consolidation, such as those used 
in gerrymandering studies to assess shape (Fan et al. 2015), could be applied. Other 
metrics from land system architecture to measure feature of urban patterns could also be 
used (Li et al., 2017; Turner, 2017). If informality types could be successfully identified 
based on these patterns and associated zoning data, and unique “patches” of urban 
growth could be identified, these patches or its characteristics could be the outcome 
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variable of a regression. The independent variable could be time series electoral data for 
the State of Mexico for each district, which would need to be constructed.  
Due to the lack of a monthly or even an annual high-resolution urban time-series 
for Mexico City, we could not test the significance of the political business cycle for urban 
growth as we did for land titling. This is an important research domain left for future 
research. 
Does titling increase urban growth? 
Land titles may improve livelihood of informal settlers by granting them services 
and security. On the other hand, many government officials fear titles will induce further 
urban growth on sensitive conservation lands by giving settlers confidence that if they 
weight long enough, they can always gain access to land. Evaluating the effect of titling 
on urban growth could inform this policy debate. Unfortunately, both the lack of 
specificity in titling locations (approximate neighborhoods, instead of polygons or exact 
points) and limited time series of urban growth (starting in ~2000 and limited to 
conservation land) made it infeasible to estimate the causal effect of titling on 
urbanization growth. A matched difference in difference strategy may allow for 
estimation of these effects, but geographically expanded higher resolution temporal 
urban change data are required. Most titled areas were consolidated (e.g. fully urbanized 
with services) before the 1992 designation of Mexico City’s conservation zone. The urban 
time series available for this dissertation was limited to conservation land 2005 and 
later. As indicated in Chapter 5, an annual time series of urban change at a very high 
resolution is likely required to estimate the effect of titling on urban growth in Mexico 
City. 
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Decentralizing and democratizing urban decision-making: what does it mean for urban 
form? 
 Chapter 3 notes a global trend in democratizing urban decision making through 
direct elections of local officials with increasing jurisdiction. A similar trend exists in 
forest systems (Agrawal et al., 2008). While decentralization may improve forest 
outcomes and decrease deforestation under some conditions (Wright et al., 2016), the 
effect of decentralization on preventing land conversion may not be generalizable to 
urban land systems. Mexico City could represent an interesting case to answer a larger 
question: Does decentralization of urban decision making exacerbate informal or 
environmentally damaging urban growth? Mexico City could be one of many “natural 
experiments” of cities that have decentralized and democratized urban regulation over 
the last decade. Regression discontinuity analysis, for example, could examine both 
growth and land titling patterns before and after Mexico City’s first election in 2000 to 
answer new questions. Does decentralized democracy accelerate and increase the 
number of land titles because of electoral pressure? Alternatively, do elections only 
influence when these titles are given, and concentrate distribution of titles near 
elections?  
Can or should informal urban expansion be “depoliticized?” 
 How and where urban growth occurs has implications for the socio-ecological 
system. Urban growth in Mexico City influences hydrologic services of a city struggling to 
manage water vulnerability in terms of both scarcity and flooding since its inception as 
the urban center of Tenochtitlan in 1325 (Tellman et al., 2018). Results from Chapter 2 
question the assumption that informal urban expansion is a significant hydrologic 
problem in many cases. What at the social and environmental consequences that titles 
are given to core voters just before the election or that the most socially and 
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economically marginalized populations receive support from political parties to 
consolidate their communities and improve living conditions? Research regarding these 
questions, which could contribute to the larger environmental policy debate in Mexico 
City, were not answered in this dissertation. 
 Increasing access to information regarding the application, timing, and process of 
land titles could help identify if, when, and where this administrative process is 
politically manipulated. Providing detailed locations of land titles (with coordinates in a 
common georeferenced system) would facilitate analysis of these data, rather than the 
attempt to digitize public records without geographic protocols. Reducing opacity of the 
land titling process and making it accessible and legible to residents and the public could 
lead to more informed governance. Any increase in transparency, however, may privilege 
some actors over other who can leverage this information to achieve their political or 
social goals.  
 Regardless of the directionality, Chapter 3 revealed political parties have a 
relationship with ant urbanization settlements. Chapter 2 indicates, however, that this 
urban growth represents a relatively small portion of Mexico City. Ultimately, assessing 
the political influence of any one type of urban growth may only be as important as the 
associated social and environmental impacts. Future research should assess the impacts 
of each urbanization type, which could inform public debates about what type of urban 
growth requires “depoliticizing” and how to regulate it. 
 Aside from the normative discussion of if and how to depoliticize urban growth 
and titling, future research of urban expansion in Mexico City, and perhaps all cities, 
should consider politics as part-and-parcel of the urban process.  Land system science 
has long noted that long-term projections of land change are inherently difficult because 
of the non-stationarity of the factors at play, which include policies and politics around, 
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for example, zoning (Turner et al., 1995).  This dissertation echoes this claim and those 
of others who indicate ignoring this dimension of cities means failing to study a major 
component of this social-ecological system (Eakin et al., 2017). 
Drug trafficking and deforestation in Central America 
Chapter 4 demonstrated not only that drug trafficking has a causal effect of forest 
loss in the region, but that this signal can be detected through media data. Yet because 
Chapter 4 used a fixed effects model, and the proxy of narcotrafficking was media data, 
assessing the total deforested area was not possible. Interpreting the coefficient 
relationships are difficult because, although the model may estimate the relationship 
between one additional media report of narcotrafficking and forest loss, the error and 
variance are subsumed in the year and unit fixed effects. A model that could predict 
forest vulnerability as cocaine trafficking increases would be more useful for policy 
assessments. Such a model, however, would require collecting data on difficult to 
measure conditions, such as the amount of money needed for laundering, competition 
with other cartels, the likelihood of interdiction, and the local economic conditions of 
each department and country. If these variables were available, a model of cocaine 
trafficking and forest vulnerability could be constructed in future work. 
Chapter 4, together with recent research on the complex adaptive nature of 
cartels because of the interdiction policy employed by the United States (Magliocca et al., 
2019), raises questions about the ecological consequences of the current war on drugs. 
Future work to build an agent based model (ABM) to examine cartel decision making of 
where and how much to clear forested lands in response to this interdiction could 
examine this relationship. My dissertation research and the previous published efforts 
noted inform my hypothesis that increasingly militarization against cartels forces their 
activities into more remote and forested regions, and has an indirect causal effect on 
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forest loss. This hypothesis, with policy implications beyond those of my dissertation, 
should be tested in future work. 
Recommendations and a research agenda 
This dissertation informs a research agenda for the study of clandestine activities 
in forest and urban systems. Recommendations for future work include efforts to 
improve spatial and temporal resolution of pixelizable social and land-use data, 
cumulating additional case studies to facilitate middle-range theory building, and 
studying the feedback loops between economic and political rent seeking.  
Discussions in chapters 3-5 and this conclusion, like most quantitative research, 
call for more data to explore additional findings. Specifically, an annual urban time 
series (but at very high spatial resolution, ca. 2m or less), akin to the Hansen’s (2013) 
annual forest loss data, is needed to support both socializing and pixelizing efforts. In 
Mexico City, such a dataset could allow for the many aforementioned research questions, 
including pattern analysis, ecosystem service assessments, the political business cycle of 
urban expansion, and more. A second data effort would require developing a 
methodology of automating spatial-temporal time series of media data, to create proxies 
of narcotrafficking and other illicit activity. This automation would increase sample size, 
save time and money, and is possible as increasing amounts of media are aggregated into 
databases such as GDELT (GDELT, 2018). Finally, increasing the sample size and 
estimating other variables that influence land change in these regions could facilitate 
multi-level or geographically weighted regression models to could better estimate the 
effects of clandestine activity on land outcomes.   
To develop the middle-range theory on which LSS is based (Chowdhury and 
Turner II, 2019; Meyfroidt et al., 2018), the incorporation of electoral politics relating to 
inform settlements and urban land systems requires studying a wide range of cities, 
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especially in the Global South where informality is commonplace. For example, experts 
in each city could identify the types of informality (similar to Chapter 2) and develop 
ABMs (preferably a standardized model) to simulate land patterns. Methods to 
synthesize cases to develop process based land change models have already been 
developed and could be applied to informal urban land systems (Magliocca et al., 2015; 
2014). These case studies could also be used to test new rules of thumb for urban 
simulation models, like SLUETH (Chaudhuri and Clarke, 2013), that struggle to capture 
patterns of growth in cities in the Global South (Pontius et al., 2008). Comparisons of 
hindcast model simulations of urban growth with and without political relationships or 
rules of informal growth would reveal if quantifying informal transaction patterns 
improve model fit. 
Middle-range theory to understand the role of illicit economies in land-use 
change requires building case studies of drug flows in other regions, and studies of other 
illicit commodities in frontiers. Some of comparative and theoretical work has already 
begun in political ecology to compare drug frontiers in Burma, West Africa, Colombia, 
and Central America (Ballvé, 2018). Equivalent work is needed to synthesize land system 
studies and cumulative knowledge on the role of drugs and other illicit economies in land 
outcomes (Magliocca, 2015; Magliocca et al., 2018, 2014). Better estimation of the 
influence of such activities on land change requires more complex models to explore 
synergies, spillovers, and lagged spatial and temporal effects in emerging land markets. 
A final needed area of research is to understand the feedback loops between land 
and illicit activity. This dissertation studied illicit economic activity and clandestine 
political activity in separate case studies. As narcotrafficking activities increase in Central 
America, it may reshape political institutions and land regulation that may further 
encourage narcotrafficking or expand legal commodity frontiers. Likewise, in Mexico 
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City, the political actors who reinforce and engineer land invasions used their status to 
increase political power, and in some cases, became the appointed regulator of 
environmental conservation areas. This dissertation only examined the unidirectional 
“grey arrow” in Figure 1 (introduction) that connects the social system to land change 
outcomes. The next step is to examine the blue arrows to determine how land change 
mediates the power or resources of actors and organizations with power or the needs and 
externalities for organizations and actors with needs. Analyzing these feedbacks will 
require new methods to simulate or estimate the influence of land system change on 
actors in the action arena. 
Significance of the dissertation 
This dissertation contributes to LSS, political ecology, and sustainable urbanism, 
resource management, urban studies, and global environmental change and 
sustainability science. It does so by providing new analytical methods to detect and 
quantify the relative significance of clandestine drivers of land change not otherwise 
examined or heretofore detectable as well as their consumption of critical conservation 
land. This dissertation integrated conceptual insights from political ecology, political 
science, new institutional economics, and urban planning on clientelism and corruption 
into formal approaches to land system science, and demonstrated salience of such 
concepts for urbanization and deforestation. The methods employed move analysis of 
clandestine activity from the narrative and case observation to an analytically stronger 
empirical analysis. 
The Mexico City case study assessed how clandestine transactions shape urban 
form, and in this case, serve to change conservation land and its environmental services. 
The results extend the important work of Mexican scholars by connecting theories about 
the economics and politics informal land markets (Duhau and Giglia, 2008; Flores Peña 
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and Soto Alva, 2010; Rodríguez, 2001; C. E. Salazar, 2012; Schteingart and Salazar, 
2005) with efforts to map and quantify informal settlements in Mexico City (Aguilar, 
2008; Aguilar and Santos, 2011). The regression analyses yields insight into the political 
role of regularization that have become common in Latin America cities. The methods 
employed and findings have applications in many other cities globally where clandestine 
activities are thought to be significant drivers of urban change. 
The Central American case provides a crucial step forward in understanding the 
links between cocaine and deforestation, recently termed narcodeforestation 
(Mcsweeney et al., 2014) by estimating for the first time the causal effect of 
narcotrafficking on forest loss. These findings may help bring together diverse actors in 
drug interdiction and conservation policy to work together to protect forests and the 
rural communities that depend on them. The methodological development of using 
media data to estimate causal effects of illicit activity on land use outcomes contributes 
to future students of other land systems. 
 This dissertation sheds new light on clandestine activity and bridges gaps 
between disciplines in ways that break new ground for the future of land systems science.  
In the process, it provides insights for governmental officials, non-governmental 
organizations, community groups, and urban residents to better understand and respond 
to environmental threats posed by clandestine activities. 
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Institutional Matrices 
 
 
Table SI 1. Institutional Matrix, Ant Urbanization. Benefits in green, losses in red, and neutral or 
mixed outcomes in yellow. Low information/control in white, and higher information and control 
in darker grey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Entrepreneurs Information Control 
Payoff in 
Urbanization 
Payoffs in 
Services 
Payoffs in 
Regularization 
Payoffs in Mitigating 
Urbanization 
Land Seller medium medium pesos none none violence or violating social norms 
Political Group medium or varied 
medium 
to high pesos, votes pesos, votes votes lose constituents/money 
Intermediary 
Service Providers high high pesos pesos 
lose money, 
control neutral 
Government 
Entrepreneurs high high pesos, votes pesos, votes lose control lost rent-seeking opportunity 
Other Actors             
Residents low low affordable land fulfills need 
tenure 
security, 
formal 
services 
decrease access to affordable 
land 
Local 
Government medium high votes, taxes votes lose control lose votes, pesos 
Other 
Community/Ejido 
Members 
medium medium 
lose 
communal 
land 
neutral mixed 
break familial ties 
 
 
 
Ministry of 
Environment high medium 
lose 
conservation 
land 
lose 
conservation 
land 
mixed political prestige 
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Table SI 2. Institutional Matrix, Subdivision. Benefits in green, losses in red, and neutral or 
mixed outcomes in yellow. Low information/control in white, and higher information and control 
in darker grey. *indicates assumed from other evidence (media or literature, not directly stated in 
interviews). No evidence states where no sources are available. 
 
Institutional 
Entrepreneurs Information Control 
Payoff in 
Urbanization 
Payoffs in 
Services 
Payoffs in 
Regularization 
Payoffs in Mitigating 
Urbanization 
Land owner varies, medium 
varies, 
medium pesos neutral pesos neutral 
Land 
Purchaser/Flipper high high pesos neutral neutral 
can go to jail- buts its 
rare 
Political Group medium high mostly votes, some pesos 
mostly 
votes, some 
pesos 
votes mixed (can use as a tool against others) 
Government 
Entrepreneurs no evidence medium mostly votes pesos, votes pesos pesos 
Other Actors             
Residents low low 
affordable land- 
(or because of 
access to credit) 
but opportunity 
cost sometimes 
to political org 
fulfills need 
tenure 
security, 
formal 
services, 
increase land 
value 
lost home, 
anxiety/stress, having 
to move 
Local 
Government low medium votes, taxes votes 
mixed- can 
help get more 
taxes 
lose votes 
Community/Ejido 
Members medium medium 
mixed- those who 
sell make some 
money. many 
others lose 
neutral neutral lose money 
Ministry of 
Environment high medium 
lose conservation 
land* 
lose 
conservation 
land* 
no evidence political prestige* 
 
 
Table SI 3. Institutional Matrix, Invasion. Benefits in green, losses in red, and neutral or mixed 
outcomes in yellow. Low information/control in white, and higher information and control in 
darker grey. *indicates assumed from other evidence (media or literature, not directly stated in 
interviews). No evidence states where no sources are available. 
 
Institutional 
Entrepreneurs Information Control 
Payoff in 
Urbanization 
Payoffs in 
Services 
Payoffs in 
Regularization 
Payoffs in 
Mitigating 
Urbanization 
Land Owner low low loses money neutral potential payment keeps land* 
Political 
Group high high mainly votes 
votes and 
control 
neutral, some 
votes 
mixed lose 
constituents/money- 
but can gain new 
ones 
Inf. Service 
Providers high high pesos pesos no evidence no evidence 
Government 
Entrepreneurs high high 
votes, party 
power/advancement pesos, votes 
votes and 
political 
power 
lost votes 
Residents medium low 
affordable land, but 
high opportunity 
cost 
fulfills need, 
cheaper 
tenure 
security, 
formal 
decrease access to 
affordable land 
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services, 
ownership 
Other actors       
Local 
Government medium* medium* votes, taxes votes mixed 
mixed (some use as 
a tool against rival 
parties) 
Neighbors no evidence no evidence 
reduce service 
provision no evidence neutral 
mixed (some not in 
informal settlements 
think eviction should 
occur) 
Ministry of 
Environment 
high to 
medium 
medium 
to low 
lose conservation 
land 
lose 
conservation 
land 
mixed (some 
thinks it 
encourages 
growth) 
political prestige, 
fulfilling mission* 
 
 
Table SI 4. Institutional Matrix, Public and Social Housing. Benefits in green, losses in red, and 
neutral or mixed outcomes in yellow. Low information/control in white, and higher information 
and control in darker grey. *indicates assumed from other evidence (media or literature, not 
directly stated in interviews). No evidence states where no sources are available. 
 
Institutional 
Entrepreneurs Information Control Payoff in Urbanization 
Payoffs in 
Services 
Payoffs in 
Regularization 
(ALREADY 
REGULAR) 
Developer high high big profits capital gains bigger profits 
Ejido 
President* 
(sometimes 
involved) 
low medium some pesos, sometimes a house 
land 
speculation- 
increased value 
land speculation- 
increased value 
Government 
Entrepreneurs medium high 
pesos, votes, and a new 
municipal land use plan no evidence 
pesos 
Residents medium medium 
mixed- access to a home 
but house may be too 
far or poorly built- or 
owe political favors to 
group (time cost) 
no evidence 
(services come 
with the 
house=neutral) 
no evidence (title 
comes with the 
house= neutral) 
Other Actors             
Local 
Government 
(municipalities 
for edomex, 
city for cdmx 
(INVI) 
medium medium 
mixed- some new taxes, 
municipal plan, but now 
have  burden on services 
burden on 
services 
could attract 
developers 
Public low low doesn’t meeting housing demand for poor* 
uses lots of 
resources* 
neutral* 
State/Federal 
Government? medium medium 
mixed. political prestige 
for solving housing 
problem, but lose tax 
dollars because they pay 
developers even when 
house is not occupied 
neutral 
no evidence 
Ministry of 
Housing high high ? fulfills their mission? neutral 
 no evidence 
 
Survey Instrument 
 
This survey was approved under IRB ID STUDY00001785 for DDRI 1657773. English translation 
in orange text. 
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Para actores sociales comprando tierra:  For social actors buying land: 
 Porque y cuando se mudó a esta comunidad? Why and when did you move to 
this community? 
 Como se accesó a los servicios y la regularización? Cuanto tiempo se tardó? 
How did you access services and regularization? How long did it take? 
 Que tan rápido creció la comunidad? How quickly did the community grow? 
 (Si es posible) que era el precio de esta terreno? Recibió un crédito? (if it’s 
posible) what was the Price of this parcel? Did you get credit? 
 Es importante para ti tener una escritura legal? Is it important for you to have a 
legal title? 
 Que información tenia disponible sobre este tierra antes de que se asentó aquí? 
Que entendió sobre el proceso de regularización? What information did you have 
available about this land before you settled here? What did you understand about 
the process of regularization? 
  Que capital se ocupó para comprar este tierra? (social, político, o económico)? 
What capital did you have to buy this land? (social, political, economic)? 
 Que instituciones te ayudó o obstaculizó el proceso de transacciones de la 
tierra? What institutions helped you or were an obstacle in the transactions 
process of the land?  
 Que haría si fuese desalojado? What would you do if you were removed from the 
land? 
 Que es su relación con los actores que vende terrenos? What is your 
relationship with the actors who sell parcels? 
 
Para actores sociales vendiendo tierra: For social actors selling land: 
 Porque se vendió este terreno? Why did you sell your land? 
 En cuanto lo vendió? Que otros costos están asociados con este proceso? How 
much did you sell it for? What other costs were associated with this process? 
 Ha sido involucrado en regularización o provisión de servicios para esta área? 
Cuanto tiempo se tardó? Have you been involved with regularization or provision 
of services for this área? 
 Que capital se ocupó para vender/regularizar/producir los servicios aquí? What 
capital did you use to sell/regularize/produce services here? 
 Cuales instituciones te ayudó o estorbó el proceso de transacciones de tierra? 
What institutions helped you or hindered you in the transactions process of land? 
 Que es su relación con actores comprando terreno? What is your relation with 
actors buying land? 
 
A instituciones de gobierno formales:  To formal government institutions: 
 Que es la relación de tu institución al proceso de urbanización, regularización, or 
provisión de servicios urbanos? What is the relationship of your institution to the 
process of urbanization, regularization, or provision of urban services? 
 Como los asentamientos informales logran regularización, agua, drenaje, luz, o 
materiales de construcción? Cuanto tiempo tarda? How do informal settlements 
achieve regularization, water, drainage, electuricity, or construction materials? 
How long does it take? 
 Los comunidades que aceden a servicios y regularización mas rápido- porque 
será? The communities that access services and regularization more quickly, 
why is that? 
 Como disuade la urbanización el gobierno? (Si sí, porque?) Es el desalojo una 
opción? Porque sí o porque no? How does the government disuade 
urbanization? (if yes, why?). Is removal an option? Why or why not? 
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SI Table 1. Electoral timing: ejido land area. 95% Confidence intervals in brackets. 
 (1) 
 ejido area 
Area expropriated   
Months til 
election 
-0.000349 
 [-0.0115,0.0108] 
  
Alvaro Obregon 0 
 [0,0] 
  
Azcapotzalco 1.376 
 [-0.277,3.028] 
  
Coyoacan -14.48 
 [-1823.5,1794.6] 
  
Cuajimalpa 0.703 
 [-1.189,2.595] 
  
Gustavo Madero 1.362 
 [-0.240,2.963] 
  
Iztapalapa 1.679* 
 [0.114,3.243] 
  
Magdalena 
Contreras 
1.093 
 [-0.549,2.735] 
  
Milpa Alta -14.99 
 [-2410.4,2380.5] 
  
Tlahuac 2.090** 
 [0.545,3.636] 
  
Tlalpan 1.404 
 [-0.221,3.029] 
  
Xochimilco -0.0641 
 [-2.099,1.971] 
  
_cons -4.970*** 
 [-6.474,-3.466] 
N 616 
AIC 1159.2 
 
SI Table 2. Electoral timing private property parcels: lags and leads (in month 
increments) of dependent variable for robustness checks. 95% Confidence intervals in 
brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Titles Titles lag 2 Titles lead 1 Titles lead 2 Titles lead 3 Titles lead 4 
       
Months til 
Election 
-0.0352*** 0.0110 0.0317*** -0.0332*** 0.0183* -0.00613 
 [-0.0548,-
0.0156] 
[-
0.00898,0.0310] 
[0.0136,0.0499] [-0.0526,-
0.0137] 
[0.00155,0.0351] [-
0.0271,0.0149] 
       
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
       
1998 -1.113 -1.148 1.298 -1.597 1.131* -1.870 
 [-2.702,0.477] [-2.504,0.208] [-0.201,2.798] [-3.764,0.569] [0.0921,2.169] [-3.971,0.230] 
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1999 -1.819* -2.472** 1.212 -0.109 0.383 0.194 
 [-3.278,-0.360] [-4.105,-0.840] [-0.193,2.617] [-1.316,1.097] [-0.693,1.460] [-0.908,1.295] 
       
2000 -1.359* -1.225* 0.737 -0.554 0.859 0.100 
 [-2.490,-0.228] [-2.223,-0.226] [-0.523,1.997] [-1.752,0.644] [-0.0928,1.811] [-0.851,1.052] 
       
2001 -0.962 -0.780 0.743 -0.165 0.196 -0.157 
 [-1.979,0.0544] [-1.676,0.115] [-0.437,1.924] [-1.230,0.899] [-0.676,1.068] [-1.052,0.738] 
       
2002 -1.382* -1.737* 1.641* 0.309 -1.405 -0.981 
 [-2.625,-0.140] [-3.131,-0.342] [0.334,2.948] [-0.879,1.497] [-3.008,0.199] [-2.270,0.308] 
       
2003 -0.706 -1.297* 1.612** 0.133 -0.0311 -0.922 
 [-1.747,0.335] [-2.292,-0.302] [0.488,2.736] [-0.941,1.207] [-0.903,0.841] [-1.978,0.133] 
       
2004 -0.274 -0.978 0.923 -0.544 -0.104 0.0307 
 [-1.246,0.698] [-2.036,0.0796] [-0.252,2.099] [-1.692,0.604] [-1.048,0.840] [-0.897,0.958] 
       
2005 -0.475 -1.205* 1.722** -0.505 -0.514 -0.246 
 [-1.419,0.469] [-2.126,-0.284] [0.585,2.859] [-1.575,0.565] [-1.444,0.416] [-1.167,0.676] 
       
2006 -0.449 -1.344** 0.942 -0.796 0.429 -1.352* 
 [-1.392,0.493] [-2.267,-0.421] [-0.160,2.045] [-1.903,0.312] [-0.438,1.296] [-2.430,-0.274] 
       
2007 -0.207 -0.885 0.475 -0.542 -0.286 -0.317 
 [-1.132,0.718] [-1.788,0.0189] [-0.726,1.675] [-1.653,0.570] [-1.211,0.638] [-1.215,0.582] 
       
2008 -2.015** -0.323 1.503* -0.778 -0.810 -0.464 
 [-3.242,-0.788] [-1.232,0.586] [0.321,2.686] [-1.929,0.374] [-1.924,0.305] [-1.467,0.539] 
       
2009 -0.565 -2.764** -0.928 -1.310 -0.493 -1.613 
 [-2.112,0.982] [-4.860,-0.668] [-3.119,1.263] [-3.454,0.834] [-2.013,1.027] [-3.688,0.463] 
       
2010 -1.554** -0.388 0.181 -0.411 -0.238 -0.479 
 [-2.730,-0.378] [-1.291,0.515] [-1.106,1.468] [-1.726,0.905] [-1.302,0.825] [-1.599,0.641] 
       
2011 -1.875* -1.221* 1.591* -0.0764 -0.495 -0.538 
 [-3.303,-0.447] [-2.402,-0.0396] [0.312,2.870] [-1.279,1.127] [-1.738,0.748] [-1.669,0.593] 
       
2012 -1.115* -1.407** 1.135 -0.288 -0.501 0.795 
 [-2.204,-
0.0255] 
[-2.412,-0.401] [-0.0644,2.335] [-1.594,1.019] [-1.601,0.600] [-0.0689,1.658] 
       
Alvaro Obregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
       
Cuajimalpa -1.055** -1.105** -1.068** -1.000** -1.095** -0.872* 
 [-1.789,-0.320] [-1.852,-0.358] [-1.796,-0.341] [-1.736,-0.265] [-1.835,-0.356] [-1.607,-0.137] 
       
Gustavo Madero -0.602 -0.606 -0.634 -0.546 -0.579 -0.428 
 [-1.244,0.0396] [-1.255,0.0427] [-1.279,0.0107] [-1.197,0.104] [-1.242,0.0840] [-1.092,0.236] 
       
Iztapalapa -1.523*** -1.585*** -1.546*** -1.488*** -1.734*** -1.466*** 
 [-2.293,-0.753] [-2.374,-0.797] [-2.310,-0.782] [-2.260,-0.716] [-2.529,-0.938] [-2.255,-0.676] 
       
Magdalena 
Contreras 
-1.131** -1.119** -1.156** -1.164** -1.330*** -1.099** 
 [-1.857,-0.405] [-1.843,-0.394] [-1.876,-0.436] [-1.908,-0.420] [-2.074,-0.587] [-1.839,-0.358] 
       
Tlahuac -1.369*** -1.326** -1.425*** -1.501*** -1.620*** -1.348** 
 [-2.174,-0.564] [-2.135,-0.517] [-2.225,-0.626] [-2.333,-0.668] [-2.456,-0.783] [-2.180,-0.515] 
       
Tlalpan -1.263*** -1.378*** -1.334*** -1.222*** -1.425*** -1.078** 
 [-1.985,-0.541] [-2.107,-0.649] [-2.046,-0.622] [-1.942,-0.502] [-2.145,-0.705] [-1.801,-0.355] 
       
Xochimilco 0.166 0.232 0.204 0.211 0.149 0.251 
 [-0.450,0.783] [-0.394,0.857] [-0.422,0.829] [-0.412,0.833] [-0.479,0.778] [-0.372,0.873] 
       
  211 
_cons -0.106 -0.678 -3.224*** -0.595 -1.723*** -1.147* 
 [-1.213,1.001] [-1.735,0.378] [-4.501,-1.946] [-1.810,0.620] [-2.729,-0.717] [-2.258,-
0.0360] 
N 438 422 430 422 414 406 
AIC 2026.8 1994.1 2033.9 1988.9 1969.3 1940.5 
*note model did not converge for lag1 
 
SI Table 3. Electoral timing private property, area: lags and leads (in months 
increments) of dependent variable for robustness checks. 95% Confidence intervals in 
brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Titles Titles lag 2 Titles lead 1 Titles lead 2 Titles lead 3 Titles lead 5 Titles lead 6 
        
Months til 
Election 
-0.0354*** -0.00499 0.0349*** -0.0349*** 0.0234** 0.0264** 0.0122 
 [-0.0555,-
0.0153] 
[-
0.0240,0.0140] 
[0.0167,0.0530] [-0.0549,-
0.0150] 
[0.00618,0.0406][0.00762,0.0451] [-
0.00869,0.0331] 
        
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
        
1998 -1.406 1.356 1.359 -1.878 1.328* 1.413** -0.119 
 [-3.020,0.208] [-0.917,3.629] [-0.166,2.885] [-4.023,0.268] [0.241,2.415] [0.366,2.461] [-2.408,2.171] 
        
1999 -2.193** 1.616 1.449* -0.249 0.554 -1.256 1.593 
 [-3.683,-0.703] [-0.519,3.751] [0.0852,2.812] [-1.427,0.929] [-0.545,1.654] [-2.633,0.121] [-0.0984,3.285] 
        
2000 -1.638** 0.491 0.840 -0.879 0.925 -0.443 0.874 
 [-2.800,-0.477] [-1.675,2.657] [-0.427,2.108] [-2.049,0.291] [-0.0550,1.905] [-1.407,0.522] [-0.554,2.301] 
        
2001 -1.356* 1.172 0.764 -0.340 0.183 -1.734** 1.436* 
 [-2.393,-0.319] [-0.888,3.232] [-0.424,1.951] [-1.345,0.666] [-0.709,1.076] [-2.823,-0.645] [0.148,2.724] 
        
2002 -1.622* 1.505 1.671* -0.0742 -1.378 -0.356 1.963** 
 [-2.893,-0.351] [-0.625,3.635] [0.355,2.986] [-1.244,1.096] [-2.993,0.237] [-1.450,0.737] [0.549,3.377] 
        
2003 -1.050 1.285 1.678** -0.146 0.202 -0.296 0.568 
 [-2.134,0.0343] [-0.768,3.338] [0.548,2.808] [-1.177,0.885] [-0.692,1.097] [-1.133,0.542] [-0.800,1.937] 
        
2004 -0.444 0.721 0.952 -0.621 0.0851 -1.983* 1.289 
 [-1.427,0.540] [-1.431,2.872] [-0.230,2.133] [-1.725,0.483] [-0.877,1.047] [-3.506,-0.460] [-0.0755,2.653] 
        
2005 -0.758 1.334 1.760** -0.714 -0.460 -0.487 1.709** 
 [-1.735,0.220] [-0.698,3.365] [0.619,2.900] [-1.738,0.310] [-1.408,0.489] [-1.354,0.380] [0.415,3.003] 
        
2006 -0.786 1.931 1.157* -1.066 0.627 -0.0372 1.394* 
 [-1.763,0.191] [-0.0898,3.951] [0.0442,2.269] [-
2.137,0.00511] 
[-0.276,1.531] [-0.881,0.806] [0.102,2.686] 
        
2007 -0.545 1.615 0.491 -0.763 -0.278 0.00698 1.017 
 [-1.495,0.406] [-0.425,3.655] [-0.715,1.697] [-1.826,0.300] [-1.220,0.665] [-0.792,0.806] [-0.302,2.336] 
        
2008 -2.363*** 2.272* 1.491* -0.957 -0.617 -0.320 0.869 
 [-3.614,-1.113] [0.240,4.304] [0.302,2.679] [-2.070,0.155] [-1.708,0.475] [-1.253,0.612] [-0.519,2.257] 
        
2009 -0.853 0.180 -0.909 -1.501 -0.645 -0.691 1.776* 
 [-2.422,0.716] [-2.594,2.954] [-3.103,1.285] [-3.619,0.618] [-2.195,0.904] [-1.973,0.590] [0.340,3.212] 
        
2010 -1.761** 0.935 0.310 -0.697 -0.285 0.498 2.061** 
 [-2.950,-0.572] [-1.188,3.057] [-0.984,1.604] [-1.982,0.588] [-1.366,0.797] [-0.372,1.369] [0.737,3.385] 
        
2011 -2.203** -0.115 1.653* -0.417 -0.421 0.502 0.376 
 [-3.651,-0.755] [-2.536,2.306] [0.359,2.947] [-1.587,0.754] [-1.684,0.841] [-0.462,1.466] [-1.292,2.044] 
        
2012 -1.295* 1.903 1.384* -0.529 -0.318 -1.451* 1.884** 
  212 
 [-2.394,-0.196] [-0.137,3.943] [0.178,2.591] [-1.799,0.740] [-1.378,0.743] [-2.609,-0.292] [0.575,3.192] 
        
Alvaro Obregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
        
Cuajimalpa -1.145*** -1.101** -1.248*** -1.082** -1.285*** -1.095** -1.054** 
 [-1.815,-0.475] [-1.773,-0.429] [-1.917,-0.579] [-1.755,-0.410] [-1.965,-0.606] [-1.792,-0.399] [-1.766,-0.342] 
        
Gustavo Madero -0.695* -0.686* -0.697* -0.501 -0.578 -0.583 -0.236 
 [-1.281,-0.109] [-1.273,-0.100] [-1.297,-
0.0972] 
[-1.098,0.0958] [-1.192,0.0352] [-1.226,0.0606] [-0.864,0.392] 
        
Iztapalapa -1.420*** -1.556*** -1.562*** -1.418*** -1.738*** -1.406*** -1.410*** 
 [-2.119,-0.722] [-2.272,-0.840] [-2.262,-0.861] [-2.120,-0.716] [-2.467,-1.009] [-2.134,-0.677] [-2.157,-0.663] 
        
Magdalena 
Contreras 
-1.051** -1.075** -1.189*** -1.155*** -1.335*** -1.249*** -1.168** 
 [-1.719,-0.382] [-1.745,-0.406] [-1.858,-0.521] [-1.841,-0.468] [-2.028,-0.642] [-1.963,-0.535] [-1.899,-0.437] 
        
Tlahuac -1.376*** -1.360*** -1.553*** -1.513*** -1.744*** -1.650*** -1.515*** 
 [-2.089,-0.662] [-2.074,-0.646] [-2.273,-0.834] [-2.254,-0.772] [-2.497,-0.990] [-2.430,-0.871] [-2.322,-0.709] 
        
Tlalpan -1.158*** -1.351*** -1.352*** -1.122** -1.428*** -1.095** -1.064** 
 [-1.831,-0.485] [-2.033,-0.669] [-2.024,-0.681] [-1.796,-0.449] [-2.107,-0.748] [-1.779,-0.410] [-1.760,-0.368] 
        
Xochimilco 0.0866 -0.00488 -0.0672 0.0586 -0.0543 0.265 0.302 
 [-0.468,0.641] [-0.562,0.552] [-0.629,0.495] [-0.504,0.621] [-0.627,0.518] [-0.325,0.856] [-0.290,0.895] 
        
_cons -0.569 -3.579*** -3.991*** -1.059 -2.559*** -2.376*** -3.892*** 
 [-1.698,0.561] [-5.656,-1.502] [-5.246,-2.736] [-2.227,0.109] [-3.563,-1.555] [-3.352,-1.401] [-5.316,-2.468] 
N 440 432 432 424 416 400 392 
AIC 4045.6 4006.4 4020.0 3940.9 3893.1 3702.9 3548.8 
*note model did not converge for lead 4 
 
SI Table 4. Private property title distribution: patronage, competition? borough 
election lags and leads (in election increments) of dependent variable for robustness 
checks. 95% Confidence intervals in brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 # lots # lots # lots lead 1 # lag 1 area titled m2 area titled lag1 
main       
support for 
prd 
1.603      
 [-0.618,3.825]      
       
2000 
election 
0 0 0  0  
 [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]  [0,0]  
       
2003 
election 
0.474 0.356 1.016*** 0 0.338 0 
 [-0.0414,0.989] [-0.189,0.902] [0.586,1.446] [0,0] [-0.206,0.882] [0,0] 
       
2006 
election 
1.490*** 1.375*** 0.0485 0.574* 1.353*** 0.553* 
 [0.944,2.036] [0.808,1.942] [-0.517,0.614] [0.0562,1.091] [0.792,1.914] [0.0364,1.070] 
       
2009 
election 
0.746** 0.732** -1.956*** 1.741*** 0.733** 1.741*** 
 [0.255,1.236] [0.246,1.218] [-2.764,-1.148] [1.288,2.194] [0.248,1.219] [1.288,2.193] 
       
2012 
election 
-1.551*** -1.402**  0.862*** -1.403** 0.876*** 
 [-2.454,-0.649] [-2.246,-
0.559] 
 [0.364,1.359] [-2.246,-0.559] [0.380,1.372] 
       
  213 
Cuajimalpa 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
       
Gustavo 
Madero 
-2.385* -2.508* -14.87 -2.571* -2.508* -2.665* 
 [-4.486,-0.284] [-4.595,-
0.421] 
[-1094.3,1064.6] [-4.664,-0.478] [-4.569,-0.447] [-4.731,-0.600] 
       
Iztapalapa -0.901 -0.990 -0.454 -1.557* -0.830 -1.467* 
 [-1.969,0.167] [-
2.066,0.0858] 
[-1.576,0.669] [-2.897,-0.216] [-1.857,0.197] [-2.770,-0.164] 
       
Magdalena 
Contreras 
-15.08 -14.89 -22.43 -16.73 -28.24 -17.67 
 [-1279.2,1249.1] [-
1187.3,1157.5
] 
[-
62795.4,62750.5
] 
[-3043.0,3009.5] [-943930.5,943874.0] [-4684.8,4649.5] 
       
Alvaro 
Obregon 
-0.903 -0.953 -1.031 -0.945 -1.135 -1.151 
 [-2.256,0.450] [-2.306,0.400] [-2.645,0.583] [-2.299,0.408] [-2.434,0.164] [-2.451,0.149] 
       
Tlahuac -31.23 -16.47 -20.29 -30.13 -38.12 -28.56 
 [-
4206444.1,4206381.6
] 
[-
2550.9,2518.0
] 
[-
20043.9,20003.3
] 
[-
2395428.0,2395367.8
] 
[-
97363918.4,97363842.1
] 
[-
955021.8,954964.7
] 
       
Tlalpan -1.739* -1.804** -1.785* -1.743* -1.776** -1.757** 
 [-3.071,-0.406] [-3.139,-
0.469] 
[-3.376,-0.195] [-3.077,-0.409] [-3.075,-0.476] [-3.056,-0.459] 
       
Xochimilc
o 
-0.547 -0.629 -0.561 -0.512 -0.711 -0.701 
 [-1.362,0.268] [-1.455,0.197] [-1.495,0.374] [-1.330,0.307] [-1.489,0.0662] [-1.472,0.0709] 
       
margin of 
win 
 1.429 0.804 0.128 1.469* 0.218 
  [-
0.0449,2.903] 
[-0.754,2.361] [-1.545,1.802] [0.0209,2.918] [-1.432,1.868] 
       
_cons -4.254*** -3.681*** -3.122*** -3.537*** -4.795*** -4.571*** 
 [-5.494,-3.015] [-4.450,-
2.912] 
[-3.934,-2.310] [-4.415,-2.660] [-5.528,-4.061] [-5.414,-3.729] 
N 1060 1060 796 832 1065 836 
AIC 1100.2 1098.5 826.3 1004.7 1677.4 1544.8 
 
SI Table 5. Private Property Title Distribution: patronage, competition? Legislature 
Lags and leads. 95% Confidence intervals in brackets. 
 
  (1) 
  number of lots 
parcelsum_0   
support for prd  -0.416 
  [-5.280,4.447] 
   
2000 election  0 
  [0,0] 
   
2006 election  2.246*** 
  [1.014,3.477] 
   
2009 election  1.112** 
  [0.295,1.929] 
   
2012 election  -2.234* 
  [-4.302,-0.165] 
   
  214 
Cuajimalpa  0 
  [0,0] 
   
Gustavo Madero  -0.965 
  [-3.516,1.586] 
   
Iztapalapa  -13.79 
  [-4013.6,3986.0] 
   
Magdalena Contreras  -13.91 
  [-2927.9,2900.1] 
   
Alvaro Obregon  -0.351 
  [-2.852,2.149] 
   
Tlahuac  -18.57 
  [-15486.3,15449.1] 
   
Tlalpan  -20.47 
  [-32690.8,32649.9] 
   
Xochimilco  0.568 
  [-1.045,2.181] 
   
_cons  -4.108** 
  [-6.704,-1.513] 
N  348 
AIC  323.4 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
SI Figure 1. Variable importance plots, Core voter models, borough elections and # of 
titles. As.f= borough. Ahit= area of irregular settlement. Alph=alpha 
 
  215 
 
SI Figure 2. Variable importance plots, Core voter models, legislative elections and # of 
titles. As.factor(DEL)= borough. Ahitotal= area of irregular settlement. Alpha=alpha 
 
 
 
SI Figure 3. Variable importance plots, Core voter models, borough elections and area. 
As.f= borough. Ahi= area of irregular settlement. Alph=alpha 
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SI Figure 4. Variable importance plots, Core voter models, legislative elections and 
area. As.f= borough. Ahi= area of irregular settlement. Alph=alpha. 
 
 
SI Table 6. Informal Urban Expansion: patronage or competition? Borough Lags and 
leads, negative binomial distribution. 95% confidence interval in brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expansion Expansion lag 1 Expansion lead 1 Expansion 
     
Margin of Win -0.997** 0.559 -0.562  
 [-1.598,-0.397] [-0.247,1.365] [-1.404,0.280]  
     
2006 election 0  0 0 
 [0,0]  [0,0] [0,0] 
     
2009 election -1.109*** 0 0.314** -0.903*** 
 [-1.306,-0.913] [0,0] [0.0874,0.540] [-1.091,-0.715]
     
2012 election -0.767*** -1.021*** 0.0438 -0.558*** 
 [-0.966,-0.567] [-1.188,-0.854] [-0.200,0.288] [-0.720,-0.396]
     
2015 election -1.107*** -0.602***  -0.749*** 
 [-1.333,-0.881] [-0.772,-0.431]  [-1.089,-0.409]
     
Cuajimalpa 0 0 0 0 
 [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
     
Gustavo Madero 0.805** 0.638* 1.267*** 0.796** 
 [0.312,1.297] [0.0513,1.225] [0.638,1.897] [0.298,1.294] 
     
Iztapalapa -1.147** -1.670*** -1.612* -1.387*** 
 [-1.900,-0.394] [-2.564,-0.775] [-2.861,-0.362] [-2.150,-0.624]
     
Magdalena Contreras -1.052*** -1.534*** -0.614 -1.235*** 
 [-1.625,-0.478] [-2.226,-0.841] [-1.380,0.151] [-1.829,-0.641]
     
Milpa Alta 0.719* 0.669 0.903* 0.619* 
 [0.147,1.292] [-0.0484,1.387] [0.191,1.615] [0.0421,1.196] 
  217 
     
Alvaro Obregon 0.820*** 0.981*** 0.873** 0.907*** 
 [0.377,1.263] [0.452,1.510] [0.317,1.429] [0.459,1.355] 
     
Tlahuac 1.028*** 1.033*** 1.219*** 1.047*** 
 [0.581,1.476] [0.503,1.564] [0.655,1.782] [0.599,1.495] 
     
Tlalpan 0.181 0.441 0.449 0.0718 
 [-0.267,0.628] [-0.0986,0.981] [-0.113,1.011] [-0.385,0.528] 
     
Xochimilco 0.777*** 0.494 1.130*** 0.628** 
 [0.351,1.203] [-0.00489,0.993] [0.578,1.681] [0.196,1.061] 
     
PRD vote    0.319 
    [-0.536,1.175] 
     
_cons -0.501* -0.643** -1.753*** -1.032*** 
 [-0.942,-0.0604] [-1.110,-0.177] [-2.339,-1.167] [-1.641,-0.423]
N 1092 798 759 1092 
AIC 12908.2 8575.1 7982.8 12918.3 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
SI Table 7. Informal Urban Expansion: patronage or competition? Legislature. Lags 
and leads, negative binomial distribution. 95% confidence interval in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Expansion Expansion Expansion lag 1 Expansion lead 1 Expansion lead2 
      
Margin of Win -0.0878     
 [-0.745,0.570]     
      
2006 election 0 0  0 0 
 [0,0] [0,0]  [0,0] [0,0] 
      
2009 election -0.957*** -0.430** 0 0.812*** -0.00730 
 [-1.190,-0.723] [-0.750,-0.109] [0,0] [0.406,1.219] [-0.502,0.488] 
      
2012 election -0.579*** -0.205 -1.094*** 0.435*  
 [-0.769,-0.389] [-0.460,0.0494] [-1.278,-0.909] [0.104,0.766]  
      
2015 election -0.882*** -0.114 -0.527***   
 [-1.140,-0.625] [-0.552,0.325] [-0.751,-0.303]   
      
Cuajimalpa 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
      
Gustavo Madero 0.796** 0.948*** 0.751* 1.555*** 1.140* 
 [0.300,1.291] [0.445,1.450] [0.147,1.355] [0.918,2.192] [0.148,2.132] 
      
Iztapalapa -1.287*** -1.585*** -1.665*** -1.847** -0.658 
 [-2.040,-0.534] [-2.348,-0.822] [-2.569,-0.761] [-3.105,-0.589] [-2.312,0.997] 
      
Magdalena Contreras -1.137*** -1.344*** -1.524*** -0.753 -0.347 
 [-1.711,-0.563] [-1.927,-0.761] [-2.227,-0.822] [-1.523,0.0174] [-1.450,0.757] 
      
Milpa Alta 0.682* 0.530 0.700 0.823* 0.567 
 [0.106,1.259] [-0.0508,1.110] [-0.0252,1.426] [0.0955,1.550] [-0.539,1.673] 
      
Alvaro Obregon 0.909*** 0.952*** 0.966*** 0.982*** 0.588 
 [0.464,1.355] [0.503,1.401] [0.433,1.499] [0.423,1.540] [-0.294,1.469] 
      
Tlahuac 1.075*** 1.073*** 1.067*** 1.316*** 1.563*** 
 [0.625,1.526] [0.619,1.527] [0.529,1.606] [0.745,1.887] [0.666,2.461] 
      
Tlalpan 0.141 -0.0159 0.419 0.390 0.432 
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 [-0.311,0.593] [-0.475,0.443] [-0.140,0.978] [-0.182,0.962] [-0.471,1.336] 
      
Xochimilco 0.701** 0.576** 0.520* 1.001*** 1.442** 
 [0.270,1.132] [0.144,1.009] [0.0118,1.028] [0.446,1.555] [0.572,2.312] 
      
PRD vote  1.926*** 0.828 1.614* 0.549 
  [0.880,2.971] [-0.292,1.949] [0.159,3.069] [-1.196,2.294] 
      
_cons -0.852*** -1.964*** -0.825** -2.920*** -2.031** 
 [-1.310,-0.394] [-2.679,-1.249] [-1.393,-0.257] [-3.894,-1.945] [-3.405,-0.656] 
N 1091 1091 797 758 478 
AIC 12898.9 12885.9 8554.7 7959.4 3912.0 
 
 
SI Table 8. Informal Urban Expansion: patronage or competition? Legislature. Lags 
and leads, Poisson distribution with standard error correction. 95% confidence interval 
in brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 lag1 lead1 lag1 lead1 
     
Margin of Win 0.723*** -1.097***   
 [0.714,0.732] [-1.110,-1.085]   
     
2009 election 0 0.160*** 0 0.432*** 
 [0,0] [0.157,0.164] [0,0] [0.427,0.438] 
     
2012 election -1.238*** 0.408*** -1.190*** 0.608*** 
 [-1.240,-1.236] [0.406,0.411] [-1.192,-1.188] [0.603,0.612] 
     
2015 election -0.699***  -0.800***  
 [-0.701,-0.697]  [-0.802,-0.797]  
     
     
PRD vote   -0.187*** 0.0586 
   [-0.203,-0.171] [0.0386,0.0786] 
N 797 758 797 758 
AIC 2193480.3 3764476.4 2219483.7 3794288.5 
 
 
 
SI Table 9. Informal Urban Expansion: patronage or competition? Legislature. Lags 
and leads, Poisson distribution with standard error correction. 95% confidence interval 
in brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 lag1 lead1 lag1 lead1 
main     
Margin of Win -0.378*** -0.654***   
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 [-0.387,-0.369] [-0.665,-0.643]   
     
2009.year 0 0.305*** 0 0.670*** 
 [0,0] [0.302,0.308] [0,0] [0.667,0.672] 
     
2012.year -1.224*** 0.437*** -1.165*** 0.668*** 
 [-1.226,-1.222] [0.434,0.440] [-1.167,-1.164] [0.666,0.670] 
     
2015.year -0.820***  -0.924***  
 [-0.821,-0.818]  [-0.928,-0.920]  
     
2006.year  0  0 
  [0,0]  [0,0] 
     
PRD vote   -0.553*** 2.526*** 
   [-0.567,-0.539] [2.507,2.545] 
N 798 759 798 759 
AIC 2217653.0 3782360.0 2218531.2 3730045.3 
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, CHAPTER 4 
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 Methods 
 
General Approach, Country Media Analysis Method: 
 
Articles were selected and coded using the following steps. 
1) Find search engines in leading national newspapers (see table 1) and using the Bribes, 
Bullets and Intimidation book. 
2) Search using keywords from list below 
3) For each keyword combination include a year (2000-2017) and repeat the keyword 
search using each individual year. 
4) Repeat for each year with the keyword 
5) In separate meta search spreadsheet record the number of search results for the keyword 
and year combination. 
6) For each article, key attributes of each discrete event are recorded in a spreadsheet. One 
entry is recorded for each place and time mentioned in the article. For example, one 
article that mentions a drug landing in three locations will have three separate entries.  
The article date, event date, and locations including: country, department/province, 
municipality, aldea/canton/village are recorded. GADM administrate level 1 was coded 
for each department and level 2 for each municipality per country.  
7) Additional attributes including the names of any narco traffickers or drug trafficking 
organizations listed in the article, X, Y, and Z are recorded. 
8) Additional notes about the article are also captured (including if the event contained 
violence, the size of cocaine reported, if the movement was land, air, or marine based, the 
name of the cartels or individuals involved, and other ancillary data) 
 
Key words:  
 
Narco pista Narcopista, Pista Clandestina26, Narco avioneta, Narco ganad* (Narco ganadería, 
Narco ganadero, Narco ganado), Narco Incauta* (incautado or incuatan), Narco Soborno o 
Coima Droga, Narco lancha, Narco playa, Narco barco, Narco submarino, Narco lavado, Narco 
minería, Narco vida silvestre, Narco Palma Africana, Narco Incauta (incautado or incuatan should 
both get picked up by this abbreviated verb), Cocaína decomisada , Cocaína incauta, Narco 
lavado. , Narco Blanqueo. , Narco Legitimación de capitales, Narco Bodega, Narco Mar , Narco 
Océano, Narco Costa, Narco Puerto, Pesca con narco o cocaína 
 
Duplicate check 
 
No duplicate articles were added, and a 2nd analyst reviewed all entries and removed any 
redundancies.  
 
Guatemala Media Database Notes 
 
No online newspaper database exists for Guatemala.   The country’s leading paper, The Prensa 
Libre, has a complete online searchable database from 2015 to the present, and incomplete 
archived entries before then.  Therefore, the Guatemalan search is comprised of a a) digital online 
search for 2015 (and includes incomplete records for other years as well) and b) a manual search 
in the archives of the National Library of Guatemala for 2000-2014. A Guatemalan consultant 
was hired to access the hemeroteca of the National Library in Guatemala to obtain hardcopies of 
the Prensa Libre.  The consultant used the key words to identify articles of interest and: 
                                                        
26 For landing strip key words, convention for the local newspaper was used once 
common usage in the country was identified 
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1. took photographs of those articles containing narco-events to create a digital 
database of articles.  There are a total of 1014 entries. 
2. Analyzed and entered information into the database for these narco – events that 
had a listed amount of incautaciones, n = 576. 
News articles indicating less than 1 kg of cocaine seized, a focus on heroin or crack cocaine, or 
other indications that an event was “street level” drug dealing were removed from the database 
for this analysis. 
 
Representation Analysis 
Media reporting has a potential for a strong spatial bias towards urban areas, and the 
potential for underreporting an illicit activity. Journalists have been targeted in particular by 
narcotrafficking organizations in Central America, and may be hesitant to report if they are 
threatened. Some newspapers are also controlled by elite political or economic families who are 
involved in narcotrafficking themselves, which could bias reporting away from some areas. 
 To address this, the spatial distribution of media data was compared to an expected 
probability of narcotrafficking based on the GLOBE method to analyze representativeness 
(Schmill et al., 2014). The GLOBE method is aimed at understanding sampling bias to ensure the 
sample is representative of a global phenomenon by testing if the sample is drawn from the same 
distribution. The sample (in our case, media counts per location) is compared to an expected 
probability based on an independent dataset of the expected distribution. The probability data is 
then discretized into bins, and the histogram of this distribution compared to the histogram of the 
sample.  chi-squared, f-divergence, and the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test can then be used to 
compare distributions or reweight the sample data. However, given that we do not know the 
expected distribution of narcotrafficking to narcosuitability- other than that we expect it to be 
positively correlated- we do not make use of statistical tests or outputs to reweight the media data. 
However, the graphs comparing distributions are useful for a better qualitative understanding of 
the bias in the media data for each country. 
 
Narcosuitability 
This narcosuitability surface- which we expect to predict increased narcotrafficking 
activity- was used previously in the agent based model in Magliocca et al (2019). It is a 
combination of 30 meter raster data layers, based on assumptions of conditions for 
narcotrafficking from the authors of that paper. Narcosuitability ranges from 0-1 and is assumed 
to be a function of proximity to country borders, remoteness, tree cover, market access, slope, 
protected area status, and suitability of existing land use (Table S1). Risk of interdiction and 
increase in cocaine value were highest at border crossings, making these strategic locations for 
trafficking nodes (i.e., high suitability). In general, remote locations (using population density 
and market access as proxies) and locations with more tree cover were more suitable because of 
reduced risk of detection. Slope negatively influenced the suitability of the location for a given 
land-use (licit or illicit) and/or airstrips. Protected areas were considered suitable because 
detection risk is low and/or governance is often weak. Finally, land cover types classified as 
shrubs, trees, and pasture were rated highly suitable, whereas all other land uses (e.g., built-up 
areas, row crops, established plantations) were deemed unsuitable.  
The 30m resolution narcosuitability surface scores were aggregated using the mean at the 
municipal level for each country (using GADM). Departments were too large in area- and the 
mean narcosuitability scores were quite similar. Smaller municipalities had a larger variation in 
mean narcosuitability scores in the aggregation process. The distribution of mean municipal 
narcosuitability was then discretized into 15 data bins for each country using equal frequency. The 
sum of media accounts per municipality (note that this represents a smaller subset of the media 
data, since many articles did not contain municipal information) were then aggregated into the 15 
narcosuitability bins. We plotted the histogram of the narcosuitability bins and corresponding 
number of articles for each country (below) to aid interpretation of the media data quality and 
understand bias. Note that the line represents the number of media articles per bin. The width of 
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the bins represents the range of narcosuitability scores to calculate the number of municipalities 
in that bin for that country.  
 
 
 
 
CCDB Seizures Data 
 
Figure S1. Kilos of cocaine total seized, lost, and delivered from 2001-2014 in Central America. 
 
Figure S2. Temporal coverage and completeness for CCDB and media data. Temporal coverage 
calculates the number of departments per year that have a valid observation.  
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Table S1. Summary of Sources: 2000-2017 for media events 
Country Sources 
Consulted 
N Total Unique 
Events (N with 
department 
level data) 
N used in 
this analysis 
(number of 
events per 
department) 
Special Notes 
Honduras Proceso, La 
Prensa, La 
Tribuna, Bribes, 
Bullets, and 
Intimidation, El 
Heraldo,  
406 (385) 826 Multiple sources 
used because La 
Prensa had no 
data before 2007  
Costa Rica La Nacion 114 (90) 124  
Guatemala Prensa Libre 570 (516) 566 La Prensa has no 
online data 
before 2015 so 
paper archives 
were used. 
Under reporting 
possible. Large 
urban bias 
towards 
Guatemala City. 
All articles with 1 
kilo or less of 
cocaine, crack, 
or heroin, were 
removed 
Panama Prensa, 
Panamaamerica, 
Bribes Bullets and 
Intimidation, 
imprensa, el siglo 
283 (247) 327 Potential 
decrease in 2009 
and 2014 
because of 
elections. 
Increase from 
2005-2008 not 
supported by 
ethnography. 
Nicaragua La Prensa 100 (101) 165 Racism + 
Sandinista gov 
means over 
reporting in 
Caribbean and 
underreporting 
in pacific 
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Table S2. Variables for Narcosuitability 
Attribute  Description  
Proximity to Country Border  Country borders are strategic locations for trafficking nodes. Nodes 
closer to a country border are more attractive than those further 
away. Derived in ArcGIS 10.2 from the Global Administrative 
Boundaries (GADM) dataset (GADM, 2015).  
Proximity to Coast (Dcoast)  Interdiction risk increased with distance from coastline. Derived 
from global coastlines in ArcMap 10.2.  
Population Density (PDen)  Probability of detection decreases with population density. 
Population density is used as a proxy for and is inversely related to 
remoteness. Derived from Landscan 2000 data product.  
Tree Cover  Greater tree cover reduces the probability of detection and increases 
attractiveness for money laundering via land improvement through 
deforestation. Tree cover data in the year 2000 from Hansen et al. 
(2013).  
Market Access  Travel time along roads to cities of 50,000 or more (Verburg et al., 
2011). Market access is another proxy for and is inversely related to 
remoteness.  
Slope  Contributes to suitability for agriculture. Derived from ASTER 
GDEM (NASA & METI)  
Protected Area Status  Areas designated as conversation areas or indigenous lands (IUCN)  
Existing Land Use  Some land uses are easier for node establishment (e.g., shrubs, trees, 
pasture) than others (e.g., built-up areas, row crops). Classified land-
use data from (Aide et al., 2013).  
 
Ancillary Data 
 
Narcotrafficking Airstrips, Caribbean Honduras 
 
 
Figure SI.3: Narcotrafficking Airstrips in Honduras. Green circles are in protected areas, and 
white circles are outside protected areas. 
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Cartel Land Holdings, Peten, Guatemala 
In 2011, Insight Crime published a report called “Grupos de Poder en el Peten.” They identified 
networks for six cartels operating in the region, and used network analysis to outline the full legal 
names of everyone associated with the cartel. Search through cadastral records enabled the ability 
to link land holdings of people working for the cartel from 2004-2011. This only includes areas 
where legal land title is possible, expressly outside of protected areas. We georeferenced these pdf 
maps (Figure S1 4) and calculated the area of forest loss per year in these polygons (Figure 25, 
main text). 
 
Figure S1 4. Cartel Land holdings recorded by Insight Crime as of 2011 and forest loss, Petén, 
Guatemala. Orange box shows inset. 
Land Seizures in Guatemala 
 
Land seizures were obtained by request to the Ministerio Public under Guatemalan Transparency 
of Information Laws. The .pdf data was digitized into an excel. These data represent accusations 
of “ursurpacion” or illegal land seizures in protected areas from the Guatemala Public Ministry. 
Each crime is reported to the ministry and recorded by municipality and by year. Many of these 
are reported by the Guatemalan National Commission of Protected Areas (CONAP). Interviews 
with CONAP revealed that many of these cases are narcotraffickers, but could not give us access 
to case specific data as that information is not public except for a few “emblematic” closed cases 
listed below in table SI 4.  SI Figure 5 shows a time series of number of reports of land seizures 
per Guatemalan Department. This could be an indicator of narcoactivity in protected areas. These 
data are compared to the media in figure 25 of the main text. 
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Table SI 4. Emblematic cases of narcotraffickers and illegal land seizures in the Peten 
Name Location Year Area 
Rodolfo Antonio Guerra Cameros  San Miguel 2012 1507 ha. 
José Sanabria Roldan Carmelita y Cruce a la 
Colorada 
2016 64.5 ha. 
Carlos Marroquin Contreras Carmelita 2016 154 ha.  
Mynor Estuardo Palma Melgar Cruce a la Colorada 2016 675 ha. 
Luis Carabantes  San Miguel 2017 135 ha. 
Laguna Larga Triangulo Candelaria 2017 74 ha. 
 
 
 
Figure SI 5. Land seizures accusations in protected areas, Guatemala (top 10 departments) 
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Representativeness Analyses 
 
Figure SI. 6. Distribution of media events and municipal narcosuitability for each country in 
Central America. Each country has 15 narcosuitability bins defined by equal frequency of mean 
narcosuitability per department. As the bin number and narcosuitability increases (to the right), 
we expect to see more narcoactivity. Guatemala, N=497 media events; Costa Rica, N=106 media 
events; Honduras, N=426 media events; Nicaragua, N=106 media events; Panama, N=213 media 
events. 
 
Guatemala Media Database 
While the Guatemala database had the highest total number of events, there is a strong bias 
towards Guatemala City (the municipalities of which are in bins 1,3-4 and 8), where there are 
much more media articles than would be expected for these low suitability surfaces that would 
predict reduced narcotrafficking activity.  Bin 15 contains mostly municipalities in the Petén, 
which we know to have high activity from the CCDB data. Bin 1 contains the Guatemala City 
airport, where there are over 35 articles alone representing large interdictions of cocaine in the 
hundreds to thousands of kilos. No other country showed such a strong urban bias. This could be 
related to unique methods required - articles prior to 2015 in Guatemala were hard copies instead 
of identified through an online media database. It could also be related to repression by DTOs and 
self censorship.  
 
Nicaragua Media Database 
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Nicaragua had the lowest number of total events. While media coverage does increase with 
narcosuitability, there is an over representation of narcoactivitites in Matagalpa and Managua 
(bin 3). Ethnographers in this region note an apparent under reporting of trafficking in western 
Nicaragua that may be related to racism, or to the government protecting routes on the western 
side of the country  
 
 
Panama Media Database 
 
Figure SI 7. Top map shows the mean narcosuitability score for each municipality from low 
(green) to high (red) for Nicaragua and Panama. Bottom map then compared the expected media 
distribution (which should increase as narcosuitability increases) to the narcosuitability.  For 
Panama Areas in blue are places with very low media reports, but high narcosuitability- and 
indicate potential under reporting. Areas in pink are places with higher than expected media 
reports given its low or medium narcosuitability- this either indicates that our expected 
narcosuitability is incorrect, or that media is over reporting narcotrafficking (as often occurs in 
urban areas, like panama city). 
 
There are many media events reported in northwestern Panama, in bins 3 and 4, which are of low 
narcosuitability because of its medium population density, access to market, and agricultural land 
cover. However this location is strategically near the Costa Rican border, and has moderate 
activity reported in the media. Bins 11 and 12 are alone the Western panama coast, and have 
higher activity than the forest border regions like the Darien, Panama, like Guatemala, has a 
strong urban bias. Bin 13 has Panama City, which has a very large number of media reports of 
narcotrafficking activity. 
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The time series of media in Panama (see figure 3 main text) has an unexplainable increase in 
activity from 2005-2008 that cannot be corroborated with ethnographic insight. The media in 
Panama may poorly represent the temporal distribution of narcoactivity. 
 
Honduras Media Database 
The Honduras media data most closely resembles the CCDB data both spatially and temporally. It 
also demonstrates many media reports in the high suitability areas of Honduras. High correlation 
with CCDB could imply improved sampling efforts there by the US government. Honduras was 
also cooperative with the US government especially after the 2009 coup. Honduras, the media 
accounts drop off just as cocaine flows ratchet up, ca. 2011. This could have to do with the fact 
that this is when murder rates for journalists, lawyers, and activists started to rise, when 
repression increased, and when the media climate in Honduras, therefore, was not very friendly 
to talking about narcotrafficking. 
 
Costa Rica Media Database 
The spatial distribution of narcotrafficking activity in Costa Rica follows a distribution similar to 
Honduras- where areas of high suitability have many media reports. The temporal distribution 
however is perplexing- the increase in media reports in 2007 and 2008- and no increase in the 
recent period of 2013-2015- does not follow ethnographic insight. The Costa Rica data may not 
capture temporal trends well.  
 
Country Level Regressions for Media and Counter Narcotics Data 
 
 
Figure SI 8. Scatterplots of media events compared to counter narcotics data (kilos seized). A) 
CCDB kilos SLD (with trend line for all data, not for each country.); B) CCDB shipments (with 
trend line per country); C) kilos seized from INCSR; and D) UNODC (with trend lines per 
country, and 95% confidence interval).  
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SI Table 5. Correlations between Media and Counter Narcotics Data. *indicates 
interaction with counternarcotics variable. Country names with no start indicate dummy variable 
to control for media variation by country. Linear regressions were used to predict media counts 
per country-year. 
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Cross correlation analyses 
 
Figure SI 9. Average and standard errors for correlation between media, seizure, and ancillary 
datasets by A) data source and C) country.  B) Average lag times for each data source and D) 
countries compares to media data. See Table 3 in the SI for details. 
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Figure SI 10. CCDB kilos SLD versus media event counts in 7 10 years or more of CCDB data per 
department. Red lines are kilos SLD of cocaine, blue line is number of media events per year. 
Dotted lines interpolate between years of no data.  
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Figure S11. INCSR to UNDOC seizure data time series plots 
 
 
 
Figure SI 12. Corrolelograms between CCDB Shipment and media data by country. Blue line 
indicates significant correlation (p<.05). 
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Figure SI 13. Corrolelograms between UNODC kilos seized data and media data by country. 
Blue line indicate significant correlation (p<.05). 
 
Figure SI 14. Corrolelograms between INCSR kilos seized data and Media data by country. Blue 
line indicate significant correlation (p<.05). 
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Figure SI 15. Corrolelograms between Ancillary data and Media data by country. Blue line 
indicates significant correlation (p<.05). 
 
Table SI 6. Results of Correlation Coefficients and Lags reported per country and department 
dataset as compared to the media. 
 
Scal
e Location Variable Source 
Significant 
Correlatio
n? Lag or Lead 
Correlation 
Coefficient(
s) 
Coun
try 
Costa Rica 
Shipment CCDB no   
Kilos Seized 
INCSR no   
UNODC yes no lag 0.558 
Panama 
Shipment CCDB yes 
shipments lagged 
by 4 years 0.386 
Kilos Seized 
INCSR yes media leads 1,2,0 .538,.557,.471 
UNODC yes 
media lagged by 
0,1,2 years 
.538,.478,.21
6 
Nicaragua 
Shipment CCDB yes 
shipments lagged 
by 4 years 0.518 
Kilos Seized 
INCSR yes no lag 0.453 
UNODC yes no lag 0.625 
Honduras 
Shipment CCDB yes 
shipments lagged 
by 0-4 years 
.476,.5,.551,.6
06,.669 
Kilos Seized 
INCSR yes 
shipments lag 3,4 
years .739,.596 
UNODC no   
Guatemala 
Shipment CCDB no   
Kilos Seized INCSR yes 
media lagged by 
one year 0.452 
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UNODC yes 
media lagged by 2 
years 0.458 
Depa
rtme
nt 
Gracias a 
Dios, 
Honduras 
Airstrip 
Construction 
Authors, Honduran 
Military no   
Gracias a 
Dios, 
Honduras Kilos Seized CCDB yes 
seizures lead 1,2, 
lag, 1,2, and 0 
.513,.541,.513
,.635,.586 
Petén, 
Guatemala 
Cartel Land 
Holding 
Forest Loss 
Insight Crime and 
Hansen et al 2013 yes 
Media lags by 1 
year .634 
Petén and 
Izabal, 
Guatemala 
Land Seizure 
Accusations  
Ministerio Publico, 
Guatemala 
Government 
yes 
seizures lagged by 2 
years 0.357 
All 
departments
, Guatemala yes 
seizures lagged by 
1-2 years, media lag 
by 3 .17,.16, .433 
Petén, 
Guatemala 
Kilos Seized CCDB 
Yes seizures lag 4 years 0.563 
RAAN, 
Nicaragua Yes 
media lags seizures 
1 and 0 years .973,.77 
RAAS, 
Nicaragua No   
PuntaArenas
, Costa Rica No   
Panama, 
Panama 
yes, but 
negative! no lag -0.511 
Darien, 
Panama Yes 
media lags 1, 0 
years .794, .631 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robustness Checks for Regression Models 
Table SI 7. Robustness checks for regional models, lagging and leading dependent variable. 
 
Table SI 8. Country models with media with NO NA=0 fill 
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Table SI. 9. Country level conventional only models 
 
 
Table SI 10. Robustness check, media+ Honduras country model, lagging and leading 
dependent variable 
 
Table SI 11. Robustness check, SLD+ Nicaragua country model, lagging and leading dependent 
variable 
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Table SI 12. Robustness check, media and Guatemala country model, lagging and leading 
dependent variable 
 
